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CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you and good morning. Welcome to the first meeting 
of the Legislature's Joint Oversight Committee on Lowering the Cost of Electric 
Services. This oversight committee was created by the Legislature pursuant to 
Assembly Concurrent Resolution 143, which assigned the committee three main 
tasks: First, the committee should ensure that any proposals made by the 
California's Public Utilities Committee for restructuring industry the electric 
services industry or adopting Performance Based Regulation (PBR) mechanisms 
which meet certain criteria which are outlined in the resolution. Let me just 
read some of the more important ones. The first criteria was establishing a 
just reasonable fare and equitable rate treatment that significantly reduces 
rates for the national average for all consumers, classes and assist 
California's economic competitors. 
Secondly, establishing performance standards that ensure that utility's 
performance is one of the most efficient in the nation. 
Thirdly, promoting fair competition and customer choice in the generation and 
purchase of electricity through nondiscriminatory transmission access and 
utility and ratepayer indifference to the ownership of the source of the 
electricity. 
The fourth, promoting public health and complying with federal and state 
environmental laws and regulations. Also, providing for electric resource 
diversity and cost-effective energy efficiency investment, among other criteria 
which are listed on page four of the resolution. So that's our first task. 
Secondly, the committee should ensure that the Legislature is properly 
consulted and involved in policies proposed by the California Public Utilities 
Commission to deregulate the electric services industry. 
And thirdly, the committee should provide a mechanism for the Legislature to 
work with the Governor, the Public Utilities Commission, the Energy Commission 
and other parties on the most effective strategy for achieving lower utility 
rates, fair competition, improved environmental protection and resource 
diversity. 
This morning, we begin to implement the resolution and perform our assigned 
tasks with an overview of why electric rates are high in California and with 
descriptions of the various proposals which have been put forward to address 
the problem of high rates. 
First, this morning we will hear from economists and researchers from the 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory on the nature of the problem. Following that, we 
will hear from a representative of the Public Utilities Commission of who's now 
famous, some would say notorious "Bluebook" created all the interest in 
restructuring and performance base rate-making and, of course, was the primary 
reason that Assembly Concurrent Resolution 143 was introduced and passed by the 
Legislature. And, of course, when we hear from the PUC in legislative 
committee hearings we make it a rule also to hear from the Energy Commission so 
they will follow the PUC representative. 
Then, we will hear from various parties who have advanced their own 
Page 1 
restructuring proposals to promote competition and reduce the high cost of 
electricity. And finally, we will hear from customer groups, non-utility 
generators of electricity, environmental and labor groups, municipal utilities 
and other interested parties about their perspectives on the implications of 
these various proposals. It goes without saying that this is an important and 
controversial topic. Many interest groups are involved in the debate over how 
to lower electric service costs in California. Indeed, we received over 40 
requests from persons who wanted to testify at today's hearing. In order to 
accommodate these numerous and diverse perspectives we have had to limit the 
time for many of our witnesses today. In the letters of invitation I suggested 
that it would be helpful if witnesses would summarize their testimony at the 
hearing rather that reading lengthy statements. I would reemphasize this 
request by asking that with exception of the overview presentation at the 
outset and perhaps a little bit more time to hear from the Public Utilities 
Commission representative who's going to update us on where the commission is 
on this matter. Apart from those, all witnesses should try to limit their 
testimony to five minutes or less. That way we can ensure that the committee 
will hear from as many witnesses as possible this morning. 
I'd like to welcome members of our committee who are present. As you know, 
this is a busy time for legislators many of whom are in their campaigns for 
election, but we do have with us Senator Leonard, who is a member of the joint 
committee, and also Assembly Member Baca, who is not a member of the committee 
but who is an interested observer and of course we welcome his participation. 
We expect others to arrive and hope that they will be here soon. The fog has 
presented a problem for some of the legislators who had planned to be here from 
Southern California. Senator Leonard, would you like to make a brief opening 
statement? 
SENATOR LEONARD: I don't have a long prepared statement. I'll take your 
admonition just to thank you and the Legislature for their leadership in 
looking at this most important topic. When we look at the competitive 
advantage other states might have in areas like worker compensation and other 
things, we tend to ignore the very pragmatic costs of energy that other states 
public and private utilities offer to there customers and I think that's very 
much a consideration in our own economic climate and I commend the leadership 
of the Public Utilities Commission for an attempt to find ways to bring about a 
more competitive environment and I'm pleased to see its brought forth the kind 
of response that it has and I think this committee is an excellent forum to 
hear all of those competing proposals so I thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. Assemblyman Baca? 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: Thank you very much for the invitation for sit here 
as a observer. I appreciate your comments that you said. I look forward to 
hearing the different witnesses that will talk about lowering the electric 
rate. I think it's an interest in the state of California as we look at 
competitive market. But at the same time that we look at the quality of 
service that we have to provide and the cost of this to the ratepayers. I look 
forward to hearing the testimony this morning. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you very much. With that we can get started with 
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our witnesses. First, our overview and our witness is Mr. Severin Borenstein 
who is the director of the University of California Energy Institute and with 
him, I believe are Mr. Edward Kahn and Carl Blumstein. Welcome gentlemen. 
Thank you for being here. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Good Morning. I'm Severin Borenstein. I'm the 
director of the University of California Energy Institute and a Professor of 
Economics at the University of California Davis. I am also a co-director ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Since you're right at the beginning, let me just welcome 
Assemblywoman Gwen Moore, also a member of the committee. Welcome Gwen. 
Sorry. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: I'm also co-director of the university's program on 
workable energy regulation. With me today are Edward Kahn who is going to take 
care of the slides from Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory who is the other 
co-director of the program on workable energy regulation and Carl Blumstein, 
who is a researcher at the uc Energy Institute and Associate Director of the 
California Institute for Energy Efficiency. We have been asked by the 
consultants to the committee to give an introduction to the issues that the 
committee faces, an overview, particularly to address three questions: Whether 
California has high electricity rates; that one should not take very long; Why 
California has high electricity rates; and finally, what can be done about it. 
To start out, yes, California does have high electricity rates, among the 
highest in the country. The map that is included with the testimony that you 
received shows electricity rate, average electricity rates in the United 
States, California is in the highest cost area, the black area, along with 
states in New England, Alaska and Hawaii. For the most part, the states with 
the lowest rates, the Northwest and parts of the southeast and south, have 
large hydroelectricity and coal generation. California has some 
hydroelectricity, slightly more than the national average but as you know we 
burn no coal in California for electricity generation and consume very little 
electricity that is generated with coal. California has nuclear power plants 
generated on the order of 30% of the electricity for the state. That is 
somewhat above the national average. If we go back to the map of the U.S., 
what we'll see is that the single factor that probably ties together the states 
with the highest electricity rates is the generation of power by nuclear 
generators. That's true in New England and California. It's also true in the 
Chicago area and in Michigan where power rates are also comparatively high. So 
prices in California are high. They are among the highest in the country. To 
some extent this can be attributed to what I would term endowment factors, 
factors that California is stuck with and has to simply live with such as the 
presence or absence of certain natural resources. We do have hydroelectricity, 
we don't have the cleanest burning coal or particularly any other coal. 
Population densities which affect the cost of generating electricity, 
environmental, the environmental vulnerability of the state. The endowment 
factors we can't do much about, but there have also been policy choices made in 
the past that have had significant affect. Probably the most significant is 
the choices of electricity generating technology, particularly decisions to 
build nuclear power plants that have, after the fact, turned out to be 
extremely costly. It is also the case that California has implemented the 
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Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act by generating bids for electricity 
particularly in the mid 80's and making commitments to purchase electricity 
that has turned out to be very expensive. The state has also chosen to 
regulate public utilities in much the same way that most other states do to 
rate of return regulation, a process that we have found to generate real 
inefficiencies in many cases in the choice of generating methods and the 
inefficiency of production. 
Finally, California has chosen to invest in conservation and energy and 
efficiency programs that require investment from the state that have lowered 
consumption to some extent but have required payments that are reflected in the 
bills. Those past choices have all contributed to the electricity rates we 
have today. I think, although probably nothing one can say on this is 
noncontroversial, I think it is generally recognized that the nuclear power 
plants have probably made the largest contribution to raising and keeping our 
electricity rates above the national average. 
So that's my quick overview of that we do have electricity rates that are 
higher than the national average and why we do. Let me give a quick overview 
now of what the possible solutions are and what can be done about the rates 
under various proposals. 
The first and probably least controversial proposal I'll talk about is 
Performance Based Regulation. This is an attempt under the more traditional 
regulatory structure that we've had to give power companies more incentive to 
produce efficiently. The rate of return regulation, cost of service regulation 
it's also been called, generates very weak incentives for lowering costs. The 
Defense Department has learned this in procurement of and we have seen some of 
the same effects in rate of return regulation in Public Utilities. The 
Performance Based Regulation is designed to improve those incentives, 
particularly to give firms the incentive to lower cost by rewarding the 
shareholders of these companies with the savings that they would generate. The 
most extreme version of these would be what's called price-cap regulations. 
Simply that the company is given a maximum price they can charge and allowed to 
keep whatever cost savings it can generate. That obviously generates very 
strong incentives to minimize costs but it has a problem that regulators have 
had difficulty credibly committing to maintaining the prices that they have 
set. Particularly if it turns out costs are substantially higher than 
anticipated the regulator is likely to allow an increase in prices rather than 
permit financial distress of the utility and if costs are substantially lower 
than anticipated political pressure will generally cause the regulator to 
reevaluate and attempt at least to lower the prices of permitted. 
This tradeoff of credibility and cost incentives is at the heart of the 
Performance Based Regulation. The milder or revised proposals that exist now 
generally allow the regulated company to keep some proportion of cost savings 
and make them liable for some proportion of increased cost, but not 100%. 
We've had a brief experience with Performance Based Regulation in California, 
Pacific Telephone is under PBR, Pacific Corp is under a PBR for providing 
electricity in some counties in far northern California and the three largest 
investor-owned utilities are all proposing PER's of one sort or another. 
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More controversial, of course, is the move to a more competitive electricity 
generation system. Technology changes over the last 20 years have encouraged 
competition. Nuclear power plants have turned out to be more expensive than 
anticipated. The decline in natural gas prices has made smaller scale 
generation more cost competitive. Improvements in transmission technology, in 
particular, coordination technology through increased computerization, have 
made it more feasible to integrate multiple generators into the grid. The 
early attempts at competition that you're aware of, of course, under PERPA, 
were the standard offer contracts in the mid-80's, some of which turned out to 
be quite expensive and the legacy of which is part of the cost of our high 
electricity prices today. 
More recently there has been a move towards allowing Public Utilities to 
announce the quantity of power they need and have independent power producers 
and other generators bid for that. Although this is a clear improvement, I 
believe, over the standard offer contracts, the problems have still arisen that 
we have difficulty comparing bids for different types of power. Most 
importantly, probably, transmission remains a difficult and complex issue. 
Transmission is probably the most difficult issue that, technological issue 
faced in moving towards a competitive electricity system. Technology still 
dictates some centralization of control in transmission. The simple science of 
electricity transmission does as well. Transmission on any part of the 
electricity grid can affect the quantity and cost of transmitting on all parts 
of the grid. So it is not, so a disaggregated grid would not be feasible. 
There are, of course, when transmission is controlled by a company that also 
produces power there are potential conflicts-of-interest that have certainly 
have led to complaints in the bidding for electricity from power producers who 
have tried to acquire transmission and have said that they have been prohibited 
or charged prohibitively high prices. An important part of any move towards a 
competitive power system will be integrating non-discriminatory and transparent 
prices for transmission. 
The most controversial issue, of course, with competition, would be what to do 
with the generating facilities that have turned out to be much more costly than 
anticipated which falls under the general category of stranded investment. 
Many of the generating facilities, particularly the nuclear power plants, 
produce power at an average cost that is well above the competitive price of 
electricity today. This obviously wasn't anticipated at the time they were 
built but has turned out to be the case. If retail competition were permitted 
in the state, these power plants would probably still be viable operationally 
but would not recover there full costs. The difference between the costs that 
will be recovered under normal amortization and the cost that would be 
recovered in a competitive system is generally referred to as what would be 
stranded investment by a competitive system. 
Some of the standard offer contracts would also represent a loss that one could 
think of as a stranded investment in those contracts. Who should cover those 
stranded investments is probably the most controversial issue this committee 
will face and goes to the heart of the question of what unwritten contract 
between the ratepayers and the government, on the one hand, and the Public 
Utilities on the other hand says. That is, what was the commitment made to the 
Public Utilities at the time that they built these? One of the proposals that 
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has surfaced in dealing with these issues is simply to delay competition to 
allow the stranded investments to be recovered either at the normal rate or 
through some sort of accelerated depreciation. Although that would allow these 
costs to be recovered, that is a policy decision. It isn't avoiding the 
problem, it is making the choice that the ratepayers will cover those costs 
over the period that had previously been prescribed. 
If that's chosen however, they'd still face as a problem of bypass. Some 
producers have and continue to bypass the electric system to produce on their 
own and that's a natural economic phenomenon that's going to occur when the 
cost of competitive generation is much higher that the ratepayers are being 
asked to pay. Obviously, few residential consumers will bypass but industrial 
users have the demand that makes it possible for them to bypass. 
Bypass will force the issue of competition even if the policy is formulated to 
try to delay it, so this is an issue the committee and the Public Utility 
Commission is going to have to face. The basic fact is someone has to pay for 
the mistakes that were made. They may not have been mistakes at the time the 
decisions were made but certain investments have turned out to be much more 
costly, generated power that's much more costly than today's competitive rate. 
That might have been due to mistakes at the time, it is certainly in part due 
to the decline of natural gas prices in the 1980's. 
One possibility for covering these stranded investments, if the committee and 
the Public Utility Commission decide that the shareholders should be repaid for 
all of the stranded investments is some sort of electricity service surcharge. 
The PUC, in it's proposal, referred to a competition transition charge. More 
generally, this would be, what as an economist I can only term an excise tax. 
It would be an addition to the price of a kilowatt hour of electricity that 
would go towards, one use of it would be to go towards covering stranded 
investments. 
An issue that has received somewhat less attention but certainly it will arise 
if we go to a more competitive system or even under PBR is the treatment of 
certain public good and social programs, such as subsidies for low-income 
consumers, research on energy efficiency, programs to encourage end-use 
efficiency, etc. These are programs that, the benefits of which are not fully 
internalized by the company and the companies might very well not have an 
incentive to continue these programs and recent actions on the part of the 
Public Utilities have indicated that that indeed is the case. They would not 
want to continue the funding at the current levels. 
An electricity service surcharge could also address this. Again, this would be 
an additional charge per kilowatt hour. Some of the funds generated by that 
could go towards financing end-use efficiency, research and development 
programs, and so forth, to the extent those are determined to be of sufficient 
value that they should be continued. 
I have to raise one issue that as an economist I don't know that much about of 
legal jurisdiction, but obviously it's one that will have to be addressed and 
many of the witnesses you'll talk to today will have opinions on it. There are 
clearly issues of authority of control of transmission lines and the prices for 
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transmission. There are also clearly issues of who has the authority to set an 
electricity service surcharge, whether the CPUC could do that itself or whether 
that would require the Legislature. 
And finally, there's the question of how municipal power companies should be, 
what rights they have and how they can be treated under a move towards more 
competitive electricity. 
So, in conclusion, California does have high rates, among the highest in the 
country. Mostly, this is due to past decisions that have not turned out as 
well as we had hoped they would at the time. To some extent it's probably due 
to endowments. The proposals for Performance Based Regulation and Competition 
are likely to benefit consumers but on their own they are not going to bring 
our rates down to national average. 
The simple fact is that some mistakes were made in the past in investments and 
technology. If the ratepayers are to pay for those mistakes through the rates, 
that is going to keep our rates high until those mistakes have been paid for. 
If someone else, either the taxpayers or possibly the shareholders were to pay 
some part of that, obviously the electricity rates could be lowered more 
quickly. 
The gains from moving to a more efficient Performance Based system or a 
competitive system that encourages greater efficiency in production are real 
but they are not probably the major difference between our rates and the rates 
in the rest of the country. The major difference is the cost of these 
historical, these decisions that have been made in the past. Still, 
competition is upon us. The pressures to move towards a more competitive 
system are going to continue, bypass is going to create increasing pressures to 
deal with these systems as some consumers threaten to bypass and receive 
reduced rates in order to prevent bypass. That is going to mean the remaining 
consumers have to pay an increasing share of these historical costs. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you very much. That's an excellent beginning for 
us, a very good overview. We have your statement prepared for other members of 
the committee and I think it's an excellent basis on which we can start our 
discussions. Let me start, I have three questions I'd like to put to you. One 
relating to Performance Based Regulation, the second to what you said about 
stranded investment, and the third that relates to what you call the social 
programs and public goods. I would include diversity and environmental issues 
as well. 
First, on the Performance Based Regulation which you list as one approach to 
trying to do something about the high cost of electricity. My question is 
that, what I really want to know is that compatible with the other approaches 
you talked about which are designed to introduce more competition. In other 
words, if the Public Utilities Commission should move to adopt the pool 
approach where everyone sells their energy into the pool, including the 
utilities who are asking for this Performance Based Regulation, or as some have 
suggested in the nP.w world of competition, utilities don't sell any energy in 
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their own service area generated by themselves. If that's the way it turns 
out, what is the role of Performance Based Regulation? Isn't that a way in 
which it's determined how much the utilities be allowed to earn on their 
generating facilities? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, we have to distinguish retail competition from 
wholesale competition in this case. If we move to assist them, as we are 
moving to of greater wholesale competition, that is not inconsistent with the 
PBR necessarily. These companies will remain generators of electricity. To 
some extent, they will remain distributors and owners of transmission lines and 
there are costs to doing that that the companies can ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I'm not talking about the transmission or distribution, 
I'm talking about their generating facilities. If we go to wholesale 
competition, they will be, to the extent that they are going to generate 
electricity, they would sell it into the pool and I thought what they'll get 
for the power is not some formula adopted by their regulatory agency. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: That's right. On the wholesale side, if we go to a 
pool or an active trading market where the prices are well understood, we 
wouldn't need a PBR for that part for regulating that aspect of the company 
because their cost would be completely transparent. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Therefore, does it make any sense to move ahead with PBR 
until it is determined what kind of system the PUC is going to propose and 
adopt for generation and how it's priced? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, that depends on how quickly this process is 
going to move. If it's the case that we will in the next six months or a year 
have definitive outcomes to the structure of the wholesale electricity market, 
then delaying PBR for that part of the system probably makes sense. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Under the PUC Bluebook proposal it was indicated, I think, 
that this was going to move very quickly and that some kind of proposal or 
competition was going to be crafted by the PUC and be in place very soon. So, 
I think you've answered by question. I have this kind of nagging question 
about whether it makes sense to move ahead on the PBR track at the same time it 
looks like there's going to be restructuring that introduces its competition on 
the generating facility. Now PBR may still work on the other functions that 
investor-owned utilities will continue to carry on. 
All right. Let me go to my second question which relates to stranded 
investment. In your testimony, -- I'm going to give the other members a chance 
in a minute. I just want to do these three questions. 
On the stranded investment question, you indicate that that's the most 
difficult problem. I think we all understand that it is a difficult problem 
and if the decision is made that the investor-owned utilities, as we move to a 
new system, are entitled to recover all of these stranded investments. You 
suggest that, if that's true and the investors and utilities don't have to bear 
any of those costs, that we're not going to able to bring electricity rates in 
California down to the national average and so, I guess what I'm asking if the 
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determination is made as the PUC indicated in the Bluebook that the investors 
should be protected with respect to these investments, will the surcharges, or 
you used the "T" word, we wouldn't call it a tax here, we would call it 
something else, but you can say that. Will that be so high that the benefits 
of competition, if you put a surcharge or this excise tax on top to deal with 
the stranded investments that the restructuring really won't produce the 
benefits that the large industrial users and others are agitating for because 
the surcharge will eat up the savings the competition has brought. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, I'm not sure I would phrase it that way but the 
surcharge would be a significant part of the difference between national 
average prices and our prices today. So if that surcharge were placed on 
electricity to make the shareholders whole our rates would not drop to close to 
the national average. A significant proportion of the difference would remain. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, if that's true and if the threshold decision is made 
to impose the surcharge or some version of that, is the restructuring that 
introduces competition worth it because you don't end up having lower 
electricity rates? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, I would argue it is worth it because we still 
are going to get improved efficiency in the operation of the system. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: It's worth it for other reasons but not because consumers 
are going to pay less rates. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, consumers are not going to pay the national 
average price. They will pay less, I believe, but there is no magic potion as 
I said in my testimony. This isn't going to suddenly give us rates equal to 
the national average rate. Somebody's got to pay ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Not suddenly. It might happen eventually when all of 
these mistakes are paid for. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Right. And I believe that when that point comes, 
which may be a decade away, or more, we will have lower rates if we move now to 
a more competitive system than if we continued under the current system. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But nobody should be operating on the assumption your 
going to have this drop-off in rates quickly. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Somebody has to pay for what's been done ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You can say that directly in your testimony. All right. 
My final question relates to these public goods, social programs, the adopted 
policy of the Legislature that we should have diversity of sources of energy in 
California. The adopted policies of the Legislature that we ought to care 
about how the power is generated and be interested in cleaner generation. All 
of those things, would you want to give us an initial view of the various 
proposals we are going to hear about them today, the wholesale, the retail 
wheeling, variations of those? Which of those is better suited to deal with 
these other concerns, these other policies that are currently reflected in 
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California law and regulations? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Any system that gives the power companies a strong 
incentive to cut costs and gives them the freedom to make the decision of how 
to cut those costs is going to give them an incentive to eliminate these social 
programs, let's call them broadly. Whether it's initiated under a strong 
Performance Based Regulation or retail competition or wholesale competition 
without any sort of explicit adder for these programs is going to give the 
company strong incentives to eliminate these programs. We've already seen this 
begin to happen. The IOU's have reduced their funding and have proposed to 
further reduce their funding for many of the research and development programs. 
so ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And it accelerated the depreciation schedule on some of 
these high cost facilities in order to stabilize the rate. You've got to give 
up something if your going to accelerate, is that right? That's an example of 
that? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Yes. Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Ms. Moore. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Let me see if I can follow-up a little bit because 
I'm still trying wrestle with the notion of the stranded investment. In your 
definition or in your mind does stranded investment include both profit and 
original investment? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Stranded investment would include the full cost of 
the investment in which I would include a normal return on that investment. 
So, yes. I think what a lay person would call profits, if it's a fair profit, 
yes. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Well, wait a minute now. Who's going to make a 
determination of whether it's fair or not. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, the CPUC has been doing this for the last many 
years. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Actually, you're saying that whatever is out there 
regardless to in our mind to try and get down the cost and move them to a 
different direction, that if it's out there and it's the rate of return that 
was established by the Commission, that should be included in the stranded 
investment. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: I think that that is a policy ... I would include that 
in the definition of the stranded investment. It is a policy decision that 
this committee should and I'm sure will address of how much of that stranded 
investment the shareholders should be reimbursed for. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: All right. Because that was the other part of my 
question -- should recovery of the stranded investment include both the return 
of capital and the return on capital? 
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SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: I think that the... I would say yes, it should treat 
those equally. What proportion of that sum it should be reimbursed to the 
shareholders is a policy question on which, I think, there are strong and good 
arguments on both sides that you will hear today that would be a real 
efficiency effect if the government or the ratepayers were seen as abdicating a 
promise they made to the utilities to cover these costs. On the other hand, if 
these costs continue to be covered through high electricity rates, it obviously 
has certain effects on the impact of the state's economy which are part of why 
we're here today. So I think there are strong arguments on both sides and at 
its heart to that question goes to what is the contract that exists between the 
public and the Public Utilities? 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: You're a cautious testifier. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: I don't have, I have not reached a strong opinion on 
what proportion of the stranded investments the shareholders should be 
reimbursed for. If upon learning ... 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Let me ask the question a little different. Do you 
think they ought to be reimbursed 100% of whatever? You said what portion so 
I'm assuming that there may be something in your mind that says that maybe all 
is not necessary, particularly since the goal is to lower electric rates. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, the goal is clearly to lower electric rates in 
the long run. I would not say that failing to reimburse something less than 
100% today is necessarily going to be the best road to that goal in the long 
run. It would clearly change the incentives for future investment in 
government regulated industries, or even government influenced industries. If 
there is a long-term commitment that exists and if it is well documented, I 
don't know the legislative history well enough to say this, but if it does 
exist and it was well understood that ratepayers should cover all prudent 
investments then, I think the argument for 100% reimbursement is strong. If, 
on the other hand, there was an understanding that some costs might be 
determined to be imprudent or if they just turn out to be a bad investment, 
shareholders do have some of the responsibility, then less than 100% 
reimbursement would be, I think, a reasonable outcome. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: So then, can I take it that if it's somehow 
determined that it was a bad decision or a bad deal that maybe there ought to 
be some revisit that it clearly can be demonstrated that that decision 
contributes heavily to the high rates of any given company? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, there's no doubt in my mind that those 
decisions contributed heavily to high rates that exist today. They are the 
reason. They did turn out to be mistakes after the fact. Everyone knew at the 
time they were made that they could turn out to be mistakes after the fact, but 
it is not clear to me that at the time they were made it was stated that if 
they did that the shareholders would be expected to bear some of that burden. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Clearly that wasn't ... 
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SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Well, it depends on what risk the shareholders were 
expected to bear at the time the decision was made .. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Very well. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, I think Ms. Moore is alluding to the fact that with 
respect to this understanding that existed at the time these facilities were 
constructed that perhaps the understanding was changed with respect to certain 
facilities from the original understanding. You talk about reasonable and 
prudent investment with respect to some facilities maybe that was changed after 
the facility was built in certain cases. But we'll get to that. She also 
called you a cautious witness. That's what we wanted you to be. We invited 
you here to be our objective witness who would describe the situation to us and 
lay the groundwork for the advocates who state their own proposals and tell us 
how there going to deal with these issues. I know as an academic you're very 
comfortable having that role and saying on one hand but on the other hand I've 
been known to do that myself. 
Mr. Baca? 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Very often. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: Thank you, Mr. Chair. If I may follow-up on one of 
the questions that you asked based on the Performance Based Regulations as we 
look at lowering that rates in competition right now the effects that it may 
have on the municipalities and others in the two different types of 
jurisdictions regulations that we have. Does that also make a difference 
because of the nonprofit organization offering verses a profit offering the 
services that would be available under the Performance Rate Regulation? Would 
that affect us and what effects would it have? And then what are we actually 
looking at when we're looking at short- and long-range plans and the services 
that are provided by the supplier and provider based on the Performance Based 
Regulations that we have for a nonprofit verses a profit as well and the effect 
that it has on the consumer? 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: Okay. My knowledge of jurisdictional issues and the 
legal issues of municipals is not very strong. So I will address this sort of 
from the economic point-of-view of how they might behave under these changes. 
Performance Based Regulation doesn't have a natural application to a 
government-owned or operated or a nonprofit of this sort that's directly 
answerable to the government for its charter. The efficiency improvements for 
which there is an attempt to pursue with PBR in the IOU'S are pursued through 
other methods in municipal or state-owned or government operated agencies. So 
it doesn't have an obvious application to me that I understand. 
EDWARD KAHN: In some jurisdictions where these services are provided by 
publicly-owned entities, there are attempts made to link, let's say, the 
compensation of senior managers of the firm to some sort of performance 
requirement. That's just a substitute for the arguably stronger incentive of 
tying shareholder returns to the Performance Based criteria. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right. Well, that frequently happens. 
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ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Keep asking. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Senator Leonard? 
SENATOR LEONARD: I,rn interested in a historical perspective on pricing 
which I did not see in your otherwise very comprehensive analysis. Would this 
map dated April, 1994, look much different twenty-five years ago? 
CARL BLUMSTEIN: Actually, that 1 S dated 1992, but, I think that ... 
SENATOR LEONARD: ... at the bottom of this page, so you,re... Oh, it,s 
from a book published in 1 94 and the chart of 1 92. Okay. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: ... from 1 92. Actually, my knowledge of this is not 
going to be as strong as that as Carl,s, so I 1 rn going to ... 
CARL BLUMSTEIN: It,s my understanding that regional differences were 
substantially less pronounced twenty-five years ago. 
SENATOR LEONARD: So the phenomena you described of our natural endowment 
and some of the fluctuations there, drought and other factors, and then some of 
our public policies, both mistaken and unconscious, I guess, have changed the 
ratio, the relationship, just within the last twenty-five years? Is that a 
fair conclusion? 
CARL BLUMSTEIN: It,s my understanding, yes. 
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: I think that that is clearly the case, that the 
decisions that have been made in the last twenty-five to thirty years, 
actually, have been the principal reason for the difference between our costs 
and the rest of the county. 
SENATOR LEONARD: And the rest of the country. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Ms. Moore? 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Along that same line, would you say ten years ago 
or, let,s say ten years ago, that it would have looked any different? 
EDWARD KAHN: I,d say ten years ago it would have been a little less 
extreme. Ten years ago not all the nuclear facilities or all the private power 
projects were recognized in rates and fuel prices were probably a bit higher 
than they are today, so this spread really has to do with recognition of high 
cost projects which were authorized under the expectations of very high fuel 
prices, corning out at a time when the fuel prices have gone down instead of 
going up. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: So the late 1 80 1 s, I guess, is when you really 
would have seen the pronounced change that we are now experiencing. 
EDWARD KAHN: Yeah, I think that 1 s correct. 
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ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Any idea/ because there 1 s obviously a great debate 
going on as to whether the standard offer contracts contribute substantially. 
We know that they contribute somewhat/ but do they contribute to the extent 
that some believe 1 to the high cost of electricity rates in California? 
EDWARD KAHN: They 1 re clearly an important factor. I think it also needs 
to be said as Dr. Borenstein pointed out in his testimony/ that this is a 
problem to the extent that they do contribute/ and itts not a small extent/ a 
good deal of this problem will be ameliorated through the contractual 
mechanisms in these contracts. They are expected to come down in price over 
the next five years. And that will be one dividend that the state will get. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I guess my question still is centered around as 
they come down in the next five years/ will that be substantial to the extent 
that it may eclipse the need to do something else? 
EDWARD KAHN: I don 1 t think it will eliminate the problem. It will not 
bring our prices down to national average levels 1 but it will be significant. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right. Well/ I want to thank you for your excellent 
testimony/ your response to our questions. We 1 ll be in communication as we 
proceed with our deliberations of the committee and I 1 m very grateful to all of 
you for your written statement and your oral presentation. At this point/ we 
are going to turn to our next witness. Unfortunately/ President Fessler of the 
PUC could not be with us today 1 but Mr. Peter Arth 1 General Counsel/ will 
present what I understand to be President Fessler/s testimony. These are his 
words youtre going to give US 1 although when we ask you questions I 1 m not sure 
you can give us his response, unless ... I know you know him very well, then 
maybe you can. So ... 
PETER ARTH: In a position of great jeopardy, I'm glad to be here 
nonetheless, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, proceed please. 
PETER ARTH: Actually, at your request President Fessler had prepared a 
rather extensive statement/ and that is being distributed to you and I 
certainly hope that it is not only included in the record but you get a chance 
to read it because it does go from the first question you asked, that is, why 
are rates so high to the intermediate question, "What can we do about it?" and 
then it spends a fair amount of time on what, I think, we will try to focus on 
in our few minutes here today, that is, what has happened since the Bluebook 
was launched in April of this year and how we responded to the rather kinetic 
response in terms of the committee we now sit before and to take a look at 
where we're going in the near term 1 especially with the deadlines that exist in 
ACR 143 that have the Commission undertaking evidentury hearings and reporting 
to you on some pretty big issues. I want to introduce Paul Clanon, who is the 
Assistant Director of the Commission's Advisory and Compliance Division. If we 
do have some time to get into what is in the Bluebook, I wanted to have Paul 
available to answer technical questions. I think you've described it fairly 
well, and it's really with no reluctance at all that we shear away the first 
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half of President Fessler's prepared remarks because the first panel was truly 
excellent. We saw no major areas of disagreement as to the diagnosis as to why 
rates are high in California. One of those items on the list that needed to be 
looked at was rate-of-return type regulation. One of the items in the Bluebook 
is Performance Based Rate-making and maybe we'll get a chance for you to ask 
your question again to Paul as far as does that make sense to go forward with 
that in the context of the second leg which is a proposal, and I underscore 
proposal, to look at direct access ap a means to move into this competitive 
environment. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Could I interrupt you right there? Since the the joint 
hearing that we had and since you've issued the Bluebook, I've had a number of 
conversations with President Fessler and he insists that the Bluebook is a 
staff proposal. It's not a Commission proposal. Would you verify that? 
PETER ARTH: Actually, in the part of the testimony that I'm going to 
present to you, that phrase appears. It was issued by the Commission in two 
formal dockets. In other words, they initiated both a formal investigation and 
that was to resolve disputed issues-of-fact and a rule-making, and obviously 
the target was the two items that we mentioned and the bigger target is direct 
access. I don't know if there's a clear distinction drawn. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Those proceedings were designed to give the public and 
interested parties an opportunity to comment on the staff proposal? 
PETER ARTH: Well, I think there was obviously a sense of vision, and the 
word vision for better or for worse ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Whose vision though? That's what I'm asking you. Whose 
vision is embodied in the Bluebook? 
PETER ARTH: Well, maybe it will best serve now for me to put on my 
President Fessler's format and talk about that. And to get back to the 
question, "What has happened since the Bluebook was issued?" And this will be 
in the first person. In May, at a combined hearing of two important Assembly 
committees, several members expressed concern that the Bluebook reforms might 
be adopted as final Commission orders without consulting the Legislature or 
taking sufficient time to explore the goals and concerns of the broadest 
variety of stakeholders. Both Commissioner Knight and I appeared to assure you 
that notwithstanding the unfortunate statement in the staff proposal, the 
Commissioners, as ultimate decision-makers, had no intention of reaching any 
judgment until such time, and with such consultation as we deem necessary to 
get it right. I would now like to report on our activities since the date of 
that hearing. 
By the time you convene this initial inquiry, the five members of the 
Commission will have held no fewer than five full panel hearings. And for 
those who are not familiar with that term that means all five commissioners 
sitting in bond. These hearings which have ranged from one to two full days 
are remarkable for the variety of participants from within and without 
California. Indeed, individuals and parties have come forward from beyond 
North America to congratulate the commission for its recognition of the 
Page 15 
technological changes which mark the generation of electricity and the 
potential which competition has to place long-term on downward pressure on 
rates in California. 
Utility and non-utility generators have been joined by witnesses who represent 
industrial, commercial, agricultural and residential ratepayers. Academic 
critics, financial commentators and institutions such as the New York 
Mercantile Exchange have been joined by spokespersons for labor and 
environmental concerns. I'm also happy to report participation of 
representatives of economically disadvantaged Californians. It goes on to 
state, and I'm going to shorten this somewhat, the extent of the full-panel 
hearings. They have been in Los Angeles, two days in that part of Southern 
California, here in Sacramento for a day, San Francisco for two days and most 
recently, in San Diego. There has been a real effort to share with the public 
what has gone on in the hearings. We have used video recordings. We have 
paper transcripts for those who need that format. All the materials available 
to the committee and any interested members of the Legislature has been widely 
shown on CalSpan and made available by local cable companies as community 
service programming. 
Besides the full panel hearings, individual commissioners have gone throughout 
the state. They have gone, in essence, from Eureka to San Diego. Dan, 
himself, has held nine forums. Each have been attended by two to three hundred 
interested Californians. He personally conducted two to-date, first in Eureka 
and more recently in Fresno, and at each more than fifty persons spoke while 
many others listened and were content to leave statements. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I want to apologize for interrupting but that's important 
and we've got it here in writing. Even more important is the next part of the 
testimony. What you have learned and even more important than that, is where 
is the Commission in the process? 
PETER ARTH: Let me move along. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. 
PETER ARTH: In what he has learned, he spends a fair amount of time again 
describing direct access as one model compared to various wholesale marketing 
reforms. I won't go over those. The snapshot sitting where he has sat through 
these full panel hearings is this. "In presiding over the entirety of each 
full panel hearing and in holding the aforementioned public forums, I have yet 
to be told by a single witness that the inquiry is either untimely or unworthy. 
The phrase, 'it ain't broke so don't fix it' has yet to be uttered. 
Californians of every ratepayer class complain of electric rates and concur 
that our economy is daily hobbled by our competitive disadvantage when 
contrasted with neighboring jurisdictions. While reform is greeted with 
enthusiasm there is great praise for the reliability of our current system and 
strong, cautionary statements that it must not be risked in any restructuring. 
In addition, the social and environmental goals which have marked our recent 
history are broadly applauded even as some expressed doubt that they can any 
longer be afforded or born by investor-owned utilities. The challenge to 
reevaluate these programs and to more adequately and fairly support those 
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deemed worthy of continuation is squarely before us and the Legislature." 
I would conclude by going to what's next which he describes as a work in 
progress. As we near the end of October, I can report that we have completed 
full panel hearings on both the wholesale and retail markets. No decision has 
been made and we have yet to explore the jurisdictional transition cost and 
environmental consequences issues which are implicated if we attempt to 
optimize the wholesale market and intensified if we were to seek to implement 
any form of direct access. This agenda is a logical outgrowth of the fact that 
one cannot rationally address these critical implementation issues until there 
has been a basic decision on the reach of the reform attempt. A reform which 
leaves the utility and places the sole purchaser in the wholesale market for 
resale to all classes of ratepayers will have one set of consequences. A 
reform which empowers direct access will have others. The extent, if any, 
which a commission-framed reform would depend on the repeal modification or 
enactment of statutes cannot be determined in the absence of our making this 
critical policy choice. The basic outline of the implementation issues has 
begun to emerge and I can report the following. This is an issue that Mr. 
Borenstein deferred on that of jurisdiction. In fact, that is the conflict 
that causes Professor Fessler not to be with us today. He is at the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission and he is working through an approach that is 
described in his testimony and is further described in testimony that I have 
distributed that he gave before Congressman Sharpe's committee. The concept is 
based on the fact that California is not an island. We are part of a grid that 
interconnects virtually all investor and publicly-owned utilities in twelve 
western states, two Canadian provinces and two Mexican states. The concept 
that he is putting forward is one that he entitles cooperative federalism which 
builds on the jurisprudence of Mr. Justice McKenna, the second Californian to 
sit on the United States Supreme Court. The notion basically is, yes, there 
are jurisdictional overlaps but at the same time there is plenty of 
jurisdiction to go around as we work with our federal colleagues to move in the 
direction we want to go and that is obviously an ongoing issue that involves 
us, the American Bar Association, the Federal Department of Energy and clearly 
will involve the Legislature as well. 
On the issue of transition costs, again, in his statement President Fessler 
states a major provision of ACR 143 calls upon the Commission to hold 
evidentury hearings on the dimension and allocation of transition costs and to 
report to the Legislature not later than January 31st. We will, of course, 
comply. You will recall, that prior to the adoption of the Concurrent 
Resolution I suggested that such a focus was premature since it was impossible 
to determine the amount of what are termed transition costs in the absence of 
the Commission framing a final reform proposal. All witnesses anticipate that 
a reform limited to the introduction of Performance Based Ratemaking would 
result in little, if any, a more ambitious goal of enhancing competition at the 
wholesale level might, and I emphasize that term, occasion such a claim. Any 
attempt to sweep beyond the wholesale market to empower consumers in what have 
heretofore been utility monopoly markets would almost certainly result in the 
claim that certain assets were now overvalued while purchase power obligations 
were onerously given market clearing prices for electric generation. Given the 
assurance that no final orders will be framed prior to January 31st, I 
respectfully urge the committee to take immediate steps to extend this deadline 
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for our reporting obligation until a proposal has been framed. Failing such 
action we have no choice but to order the responding utilities and all 
interested parties in the hearings which many condemn as premature and 
ill-focused. At this point I would simply note, for your information, and those 
of the parties in the audience last night, in fact, the two assigned 
commissioners, Commission Fessler and Commissioner Knight, did issue a joint 
ruling on this issue. So it is in the mail to all of the parties and it is 
going to be our best effort at holding evidentury hearings between now and the 
first of the year so that we will be in the position to comply with that 
provision in the Joint Resolution. But again, it is simply our effort to 
comply with not only the spirit of the resolution but the letter as well. We 
have serious misgivings about it and that is something we would want to pursue 
with you. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I'm sorry. Excuse me. What did they issue? 
PETER ARTH: They issued a joint-ruling that basically invites parties to 
respond to the issue of the competition transition surcharge. That is, for 
respondent utilities and others. It obviously is going to be a rough cut, but 
it's going to be 'You tell us what you think it is,' 'You give us an idea of 
the allocation' and it's going to be a start. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Do we have a copy of that ruling? 
PETER ARTH: Yes, we didn't distribute it but we have copies. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: We'd like to see it before you get away. 
PETER ARTH: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let me say, after you finish your testimony I want to 
pursue this with you. I believe that the impetus for this ruling, as you call 
it, is the January 31st, 1995 deadline in the ACR for the Commission to submit 
certain information to the Legislature and to conduct an evidentury hearing on 
it. And so this is laying the groundwork, but in our dialogue that will follow 
the completion of your testimony I want to tell the members of the committee as 
well as the assembled audience what is being discussed in terms of perhaps 
postponing that date if and when we know when the Commission is actually going 
to frame its order. But we'll get into that. I want him to finish his 
testimony this morning, then we'll pursue this because this is an important 
point. 
PETER ARTH: Excellent Mr. Chairman. And I'm nearly done. The one point 
that President Fessler wanted to make with regard to the transition costs is 
that some view the issue as a new burden which may be imposed on ratepayers as 
a consequence of the Commission's restructuring effort. I respectfully 
disagree. What we are discussing is the degree to which utility-owned 
generating assets or purchase-power obligations may exceed prices which 
consumers would pay if they were free to shop an open market. Those costs are 
on the system even as we speak. They are a burden and an opportunity cost on 
California's economy which we seek to recognize and address. We did not create 
them and the abandonment of this restructuring effort cannot make them go away. 
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Editorializing, I think that seems 'to comport with the answers that you heard 
at the previous panel. 
The last point is on environmental consequences and concerns. At the present 
time we have pending a motion by the Natural Resources Defense Council that we 
initiate a CEQA review of the Bluebook proposal. While we have yet to formally 
rule on that motion, I can make several basic points. 
First, the Commission will fully comply with California's Environmental Review 
Mandates. It is the law and we follow the law. But what that will entail is 
entirely dependent on the nature of the reform which we eventually seek to 
accomplish. As with the earlier observations respecting transition costs, it 
is the reform which will give us a project against which to apply the statute. 
That completes his comments on the environmental issue and his prepared 
testimony other than to thank you very much for the indulgence you've extended 
to us. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right. Thank you. The most critical point that we 
need to explore President Fessler comments on in his testimony, I think in 
several places, talks about the difficulty the Commission has in responding to 
the ACR mandates, if you will, or requests if you want to soften it, that the 
Commission supply certain information to the Legislature with respect to the 
proposal. On page eight of your testimony, he says, " ... it's almost impossible 
to tell you what we're going to do about "transition costs" until we frame our 
proposal." But, of course, ACR 143 was formulated in response to the Bluebook 
which indicated that the Commission was going to take action even though this 
may be a staff proposal but the original indication was they were going to take 
action in August, 1994. Then we heard about that slipping into October, so 
naturally the Resolution was framed in a way to require quick response. I 
think he's quite correct in suggesting that it would be most helpful to 
everyone to give this information to the Legislature once the Commission has 
decided what its vision is, what proposal it's going to suggest. Of course, at 
that time the Commission will want to give the rest of the world, the public, 
an opportunity to comment and the Legislature will want to have an opportunity 
to respond to it. But, in this testimony on page eight, we now see this 
statement given the assurance that no final orders will be framed prior to 
January 31st. 
Has the Commission formally acted and decided that there will be no order or is 
that President Fessler's appraisal of the situation? 
PETER ARTH: I would answer that it is an appraisal of a single 
Commissioner who is one of the two assigned Commissioners and it probably is 
based on looking at the calendar. Realistically, that probably is a safe 
statement to attribute to the full Commission, although no formal vote has been 
taken. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right now. Does that suggest that we may see a final 
proposal on February 1st? Can you tell us anything about when the Commission 
does anticipate issuing a final proposal? Because we need that in order to 
adjust the dates which President Fessler directly has asked me to try to 
Page 19 
persuade the committee and the Legislature to do. We can't do that now 
obviously. We're not in session. But, at the beginning of January when we're 
back in session if we had some firm dates in mind as to when the Commission 
expects this and would commit that its proposal won't be forthcoming and we 
also need to know what the initial proposal is going to be. Is it going to be 
a draft proposal and not a final proposal so that there will be an opportunity 
for the public to respond to it and I'm sure the Commission itself will want to 
have hearings on it before it becomes final. But we want to have an 
opportunity here to have a look at this proposal with the underlying premises 
and date upon which its based which are called for in the Resolution. So can 
you give us these dates? 
PETER ARTH: I cannot give you the dates. I can say that that's an 
entirely reasonable request and set of observations and this, I think, is the 
mechanism, part number three of what we're about here. But the ruling is 
something that the two assigned Commissioners just produced in the last 72 
hours and I think the next step is probably going to come as this effort cranks 
up. And maybe Paul is in a better position. There's a large amount of 
internal planning to provide the dates. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Let me just say I agree with the statement in 
President Fessler's testimony that it doesn't make a lot of sense to do an 
environmental review of the Bluebook proposal if the Bluebook proposal is no 
longer extant. I mean, if it's not going to be what the Commission comes up 
with. It also doesn't make a lot of sense to look at the transition costs of 
retail wheeling if what the Commission ultimately is going to propose is not 
retail wheeling. But I feel the Legislature had to, in a sense, protect itself 
because all that was out there at the time we were in session and were 
responding was the Bluebook which looked like a pretty firm proposal, whose 
ever proposals they were, whether they were the staffs or the Commission and a 
pretty firm timeline for moving fast. Over and above that there were 
statements of individual Commissioners quoted in the press about moving quickly 
and not letting these proposals lose there luster, I believe, was the 
expression I saw quoted in the newspaper and so we had to move quickly on 
these. If that's not the situation anymore, it's incumbent on the Commission 
in a formal way to let us know that and if we can get those kinds of assurances 
and get an actual firm date then I'm in a position to ask the committee to 
adjust our deadline in a way that I think the Commission would find more 
reasonable. Yes, now did you want to say something? 
PAUL CLANON: I was just going to say that sounds like a heck of a fair 
proposition to me. There is a very active internal effort now going on at the 
Commission to try to figure out what the best next steps are. We have ACR 143 
which is a pretty good list of the sorts of issues the Commission was going to 
have to look at anyhow. We've got the Commissions own processes, we've got ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Once again, Ms. Moore suggests, I think correctly, that 
you should just for purposes of the record, identify yourself. 
PAUL CLANON: My name is Paul Clanon. I'm assistant director for energy 
and environmental stuff in the Commission's Advisory and Compliance Division. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. I think you've answered the question. All 
right, Ms. Moore. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: So we can leave here today knowing that the 
Bluebook is nothing more than the figment of the staff's imagination. 
PETER ARTH: I know that's one of those rhetorical questions. 
PAUL CLANON: I'll defer to Pete on that. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I just want to be comfortable in leaving here 
with ... Now we had a whole hearing on the Bluebook back in March or May or 
whenever it was, shortly after it came out and there was no implication then 
that it was just a figment of the, or the wish list or the staff and so I just 
want to know if this is indeed now the position of the Commission that it is 
not their idea and that we don't have to worry about the implications that are 
involved in it. And I'm reading the Commissioner Fessler's statement so we 
don't have to worry about direct access, at least, at this point. 
PETER ARTH: Well, you have the date of December 31st and beyond that ... 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: But then we start worrying December 31st. 
PETER ARTH: Well, I think the Commission owes the parties and you a 
procedural ruling that will pretty much answer that question. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Wait a minute now. They're not just stringing us 
along and having us do busy work when they've already made up their mind now, 
are they? 
PETER ARTH: Well, no, but the notion is that policy choices are before 
them and you're going to hear the rest of the afternoon, some very substantial 
differences in these broad reforms and somehow they're going to need to sort 
through them and all of the issues that you have set forth in the Resolution as 
to the impacts of those. So what I am saying is I think it will be educational 
to everyone to see how we go about it. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Let me ask you this. Does the order at FERC on 
Wednesday beginning an investigation into power foods, does that reduce the 
need to press forward with a final PUC report or proposal? 
PETER ARTH: I'm not familiar with a specific docket. This is the area of 
overlap as far as the jurisdiction that FERC has asserted, the jurisdiction 
that the state ... 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: It's wholesale power. It's wholesale power reform 
at the federal level. 
PETER ARTH: Yeah, I'm not aware of any ... 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: And I'm looking at Section A of our wholesale 
market reform, does it make any sense for us to, if FERC is looking to make 
Page 21 
significant changes at the same time we are which obviously would or could 
pre-empt or have significant impact on anything we propose to do. Is there 
some thought about how we reconcile what's going on at the federal level with 
what goes on at the state level? 
PETER ARTH: Well, the sessions that I've been to ... 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I know we're the trend setters and fans usually 
follow us but in this instance ... 
PETER ARTH: The sessions that I've been to on this issue portray a single 
car with a single steering wheel and two hands on the steering wheel. One of 
the state commissions and another of FERC and again, the lawyers can argue at 
length as to the overlap. We're optimistic that this is going to be done on a 
cooperative basis rather than a tug-of-war. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I want to come back to the ruling that was issued last 
night. I haven't had a chance to read it obviously but the first sentence 
says, "This ruling sets evidentury hearings on subjects related to electric 
utilities uneconomic assets and obligations. So it's going to be evidentury 
hearings on stranded investment type questions. 
PETER ARTH: That's a fair reading. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: The Commission, certainly President Fessler, thinks it's a 
bad idea to do this because you can't really do it without knowing what the 
proposal is and each proposal will have different implications for stranded 
investment so this is not a good thing to be doing, but then he sites ACR 143 
so he's laying it off on 143 as forcing him to do this bad thing. He doesn't 
want to do it, it doesn't make any sense, it's wheel spinning. There are a lot 
of proposals out there and they're going to have to do an evidentury hearing on 
the implications for stranded investment of all of these knowing that some of 
them are inconsistent and the Commission, when it finally reaches and "crafts" 
in his words, a proposal, it's only going to be one of those. But in the 
meantime we are going to have evidentury hearings on a variety of possible 
proposals. Wholesale, retail, so it's a bad thing to do but ACR 143 forces us 
to do it. That's the way I read this. Now, what I want to know is, building 
on our earlier conversations, if when we're back in session in January we have 
an opportunity to push the dates in the Resolution back based on firm 
assurances from the Commission they aren't going to do anything dramatic or 
drastic until a later date where they will craft a proposal, then you can be 
more focused on the implication that for stranded investment and these 
environmental issues and so forth. Would it be the Commission's policy, or 
policy is the wrong word, intention to recess these evidentury hearings or are 
they just going to go full speed ahead and give us something in the alternative 
by January 31st that may not be very useful? 
PETER ARTH: My instinct would be to say that they would try to do the 
decision path that makes sense; not waste the parties' time and not do this in 
bad faith. I mean that the notion is that we have a timing problem that's the 
basis of the appeal. The information is valuable. I don't think there's a 
hostility to having the information. 
Page 22 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, I know, but what we find is we are on a 
merry-go-round here. The Commission issues a Bluebook in the spring of 1994 
laying out certain dramatic proposals for restructuring the electric service 
industry in California and moving away from traditional ratemaking procedures 
as well as traditional ways in which electric services have been delivered to 
consumers with an indication they're going to move very quickly in doing this. 
The Legislature, to try to become involved in what we consider an appropriate 
way, rushes to adopt a Resolution which sets up this committee and sets certain 
dates so that we can get into to the game. Now the Commission rushes to set up 
these evidentury hearings which they think are a bad thing to do and wasteful 
of time and energy in response to ACR 143. I'm looking for a way to get off 
the merry-go-round and do it in a way that's more rational and cost-effective 
for the Legislature and for the Commission. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Byron, can I ask ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, let's get a response and then we'll let you follow 
that. 
PETER ARTH: The short response is we are too. And it's really 
unfortunate that we have the merry-go-round. I think it would be easy enough 
to get past this fairly quickly so that again we are working as a partnership 
and looking at transition costs on a basis that fits the policy choices before 
you and before us. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Well, this ruling itself, I already have a note 
from a party that suggests that it's going to become a point of controversy in 
itself because there are going to be people unhappy with the fact that as 
described in the ruling the Commission will decide which utility witnesses are 
subject to cross-examination and which aren't; which parties can cross-examine 
and which can't; limitations on the discovery process, so it's going to become, 
there is going to be a whole debate now that will rage around this ruling that 
was issued last night. So that's bad from my point of view. 
PETER ARTH: But in fairness to the Commission, we would not be in a 
favorable position if we simply ignored the deadline, and the assigned 
Commissioners chose not to do that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That's what I said, it's part of the merry-go-round. 
would not have been in a very good position if we had ignored what looked 
the time schedule on which the Commission was operating when it issued its 
Bluebook. That's where it all started, let's not forget. Ms. Moore. 
We 
like 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I just was going to ask you, what was your reading 
of the Resolution itself? What do you think it was that we were seeking to do? 
PETER ARTH: I read it to say two things. One, that I think Chairman Sher 
has clearly described. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I don't want to hear what Chairman Sher -- I want 
to hear what your reading of it was. 
Page 23 
PETER ARTH: Okay. That the Commission was moving far too quickly to a 
major reform and was doing it on such a pace that they would not adequately 
consider both state policy and state statute as well. That there was not the 
comfort factor for those that have worked so hard for those policies that they 
would be thoughtfully dealt with before the reform occurred. The other is 
simply to develop a mechanism to have effective oversight, because this, as 
much as there was a fast track field, it's obviously a huge project that other 
states are watching, other parties are watching, if it is direct access, it has 
major issues to it, so to lay out a longer track that would have the 
Legislature talking to the Commission as it goes forward on whatever policy 
choice it takes. So it's both a short term message and a long-term message. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: It was centered around the notion that there 
appeared to be a policy decision that had already been made that was not well 
founded, in fact, in method and that's what we were attempting to do. And I 
read the proposal, the rulemaking that was issued last night in much the same 
manner as Mr. Sher, because it seems like now that we're just making you do 
busy work on a bunch of proposals that may or may not go anywhere and that 
you're going to have to do all this work and because of what we have asked in 
the Resolution that you won't be able to give full attention to the really 
important issues and I think it's unfair and secondly, I think it does a 
disservice to the effort that you're making to move forward on policy that's 
much needed and changes that would benefit everyone if it followed a course 
that gave proper discourse and other kinds of things to that process and I 
think that you won't do it under this rulemaking given the changes that have 
occurred in the sense that the Commission no longer recognizes the Bluebook as 
the reform that we initially thought it would be. So somehow we've got to 
rectify it because I think that the rulemaking is not going to do what we 
initially intended to do and that should make us all feel comfortable with 
whatever Resolution comes forth because it will be based on solid ground. 
PETER ARTH: Well, the beginning and the ending of President Fessler's 
statement has him coming in good faith and I assume that's for the whole 
Commission. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, okay, I think we've got to move along. Our time ... 
I trust you will take back our concerns to President Fessler and I might even 
go so far as to suggest they might want to reconsider this order that was 
issued last night if we can make them comfortable enough that we can, on a 
consensus basis, find a better timetable for the activities that each of our 
bodies have to carry out so that we can make such an evidentury hearing more 
useful if and when the Commission has indeed crafted what is its thinking about 
how we should go forward. 
PETER ARTH: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you very much. Okay. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Just let me say one final thing and I just don't 
want to walk away with you thinking that we think that the transitional costs 
are so complicated. We know that the complication is more political than 
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complex and I think that it's something that we all ought to be mindful of. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right. Thank you. Next witness is Chairman Imbrecht. 
Thank you for being here witnesses and welcome Chairman Imbrecht. 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Thank you. Mr. Chairman 
of your admonition about trying to be succinct. 
that goes into these points in some detail but I 
issues that we think are critical to this entire 
the previous discussion in context. 
and Members, I'm very mindful 
I have a prepared statement 
would like to emphasis a few 
debate and perhaps put some of 
One thing I think it's important to emphasize and that I don't mention in my 
prepared statement is that while it is true that California, in fact, has 
higher rates than the rest of the nation, it is not true that for the vast 
majority of our consumers electricity represents a burdensome cost in 
comparison with the rest of the nation. Because, in fact, the cost of 
electricity service as we all know is a combination of both rates times 
consumption and in conjunction with all of you on the dais, the regulatory 
agencies of the states and the Legislature and the executive branch have 
successfully attacked over the last fifteen years the issue of consumption in 
California so successfully, in fact, that our consumption is well below 
national averages in virtually every sector. And as a consequence, every 
independent measure whether its energy costs or electricity costs per dollar of 
state gross product or per capita costs show us well below the national 
average, not above it. Now that doesn't, in any way, undercut the importance 
of attacking the other half of the equation, namely the rates because we ought 
to be able to benefit from lower rates as well as we currently benefit from 
lower consumption. 
I offer those comments only to put in context this overall debate so that we 
don't wring our hands unnecessarily and conclude that, in fact, California's 
energy policies have been an abject failure over the last decade. In my 
judgment that simply is not true. 
Secondly, I would like to compliment the Public Utilities Commission. I know 
that we and they don't always see eye-to-eye. But quite frankly, I think they 
have moved in a very prudent and responsible fashion in dealing with this 
issue. I want to emphasize that we would support their request for an 
extension of the January 31st deadline and I also think they should be 
complimented for initiating one of the most fundamental intellectual debates 
that has occurred in public policy in this state for many, many years. It has 
brought together an extraordinary collection of experts throughout the nation 
and there has been a remarkable coalescing, in my judgment, just in the last 
few weeks of opinion on some of the key issues that you have heard described up 
until this point in time. 
What I want to work off of is the last page of my prepared testimony which is a 
brief series of five principles that we have tried to reflect in our testimony. 
We've had a high-level team at the Energy Commission that has spent an 
extraordinary amount of time trying to understand and make sense and hopefully 
provide some assistance to you in your deliberations as to the appropriate 
approach to provide equity and the best outcome for the citizens of California. 
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I should emphasize that over the last decade we have consistently, as I know 
most of you are aware, been strong advocates of economic efficiency through 
increased competition in every energy sector within the state. We have 
attempted in our filings before the PUC to enunciate fundamental principles 
that the debate should cover in terms of ensuring equity. 
First, and most important one is that regulatory reform and restructuring 
should attempt to maximize customer choice for all customers. Purely, from a 
political perspective, if we apportion the benefits of this exercise unfairly 
between all the customer classes in the state, I see it as a nonstarter. And 
so, with that issue in mind, I would emphasize as well that in dealing with the 
so-called stranded investment question, we should reject any of the concepts 
that contemplate rationing of access to the benefits of restructuring over an 
extended period of time. Some of the proposals contemplate that one class gets 
the benefits six, ten, or even twelve years before the entire group of 
customers in California have access to the benefits of increased competition. 
We do not believe that that is necessary and we think that the discussion and 
the coalescing of viewpoint remarkable changes in the opinions of a number of 
the utilities in the state and other stakeholders in the last few weeks and 
months is drawing us closer to a relative consensus on the appropriate approach 
to take. 
Transition costs can be dealt with in a variety of fashions and that will be 
addressed by, I know, other speakers that will be appearing before you. I 
would just note that from our perspective the proposal embodied originally in 
the San Diego Gas and Electric proposal now largely embraced by many of the 
other players that we should deal with this with an equitable transition charge 
across all customer classes is the most likely way to ensure fairness amongst 
all the consumers of the state. But one of the other intriguing proposals that 
I believe Mr. Caldwell will be addressing later today is the consideration of 
possible divestiture of the existing utility assets that are undervalued and 
that have great appreciation possibilities as a means to mitigate that 
transition fee and also to buy down, if you will, the stranded investment and 
deal with that compact we've heard so much about between the utilities and the 
public sector in the state. I urge, but we don't have a formal position on 
that yet and frankly there's a lot of analysis that needs go forward. I think 
it's an intriguing concept that deserves your attention. 
I would note that way back in 1985 I testified on behalf of the Energy 
Commission urging FERC to open up wholesale wheeling and competition of the 
wholesale markets throughout the United States. For many historical reasons 
independent, nondiscriminatory operation of an access to the transmission 
system and other critical facilities is essential for a fair, competitive 
market. And one of the, I think, important coalescing of viewpoints in the 
last few weeks is the fact that all of the utilities, in essence, are moving 
towards a position of agreeing to, in essence, divestiture of their control of 
the utility system to opening up the black box that has been the impediment for 
allowing a more competitive wholesale market over literally decades of 
litigation between municipal utilities and investor utilities and now more 
recently between independent energy producers and those that have transmission 
rights. We think it's absolutely essential to have an independent operated 
system to ensure, in essence, that you have a noninterested traffic cop so that 
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pricing and availability of transmission issues are viewed as being handled on 
a fair basis and not on a self-interested basis. 
I'd also emphasize, and you'll hear more debate on this, but we have spent an 
extensive amount of time trying to analyze the differences between pooling and 
bilateral contract proposals. We believe that both are compatible, that we can 
have both and that they will maximize choice and maximize competitive benefits 
and there's further explanation of our views on that in my prepared testimony. 
And finally, with respect to the areas that you have traditionally looked to 
the Energy Commission for implementation on broad public policy questions I 
will note for you that over the rest of this fall in a series of proceedings, 
some of which we have publicly noticed and others which will be noticed 
shortly, we will be considering some of the subsidiary issues associated with 
broad public policy considerations. Mainly, how do we insure the continuity of 
the demonstrably cost-effective demands on management or energy efficiency 
programs that have been a hallmark of California energy policy for an extended 
period of time. 
Secondly, how do we insure that there continues to be a diverse resource base 
and that we don't, by looking to price signals alone, end up with an all 
natural gas future over the course of the remainder of this century. We 
believe that it is important from a long-term insurance policy perspective that 
we continue to have a diverse resource base and I would add that there are a 
series of subsidiary issues that spin off into all kinds of other public policy 
implications. 
Cust briefly, think through what happens if the 66 biomass electric generation 
plants that we have in California are forced to close down because they are not 
competitive? What does that mean in terms of implications of air quality, 
buyer suppression and our forests as well as land use and solid waste landfill? 
It's a very complicated issue and candidly it's going to be difficult to 
unscramble that egg but it's a question that someone needs to address. 
And finally, as was indicated in your first presentation we already seen 
indications from the utilities that there's an effort in terms of down size and 
restructuring to abandoning some of the historical consensus items that we 
generally viewed as being economically efficient and societally beneficial. 
Not the least of which is collective research and development with respect to 
advanced transmission and energy generation technologies. To the extent that 
we conclude that those continue to be societal beneficial, we have to explore 
some of the other options for insuring that they are reasonably financed and 
that they continue to retain within California that very unique nexus, if you 
will, of high salaried, high technology technical experts that frankly many of 
whom reside in your own district Mr. Chairman, that, I believe to be critical 
to the ongoing leadership of California both in terms of producing technologies 
for our own state but also for export opportunities abroad. I'd be happy to 
take any questions. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you for your testimony. We appreciate it, 
particularly your five principles. I only have one question. These five 
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principles that you have enunciated, do you offer them simply as 
your good friends at the PUC as they move forward to craft their 
you suggest that they ought to be embodied in legislation as, if 
design criteria for any proposal that might come out of the PUC? 
reduced to ... 
guidance to 
proposal or do 
you will, 
Can they be 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: I think they can be but I don't think that is 
necessarily the preferable approach. I'll tell you, Mr. Chairman, I've had an 
opportunity to have several private conversations with members of the Public 
Utility Commission in recent weeks. Last week Commissioner Fessler and Conlon 
and I participated in a Broad Western Regional Interstate Meeting on the 
implication of these issues. I frankly feel quite strongly that we have moved 
much more closely towards consensus on how to resolve some of these questions. 
Obviously, there is still a lot of public debate that has to take place but as 
I think I say in my prepared testimony I've become increasing optimistic that 
we can have it all. We can protect ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That's true. But what you're telling us is in your 
conversations with President Fessler and the other commissioners they've said, 
"Trust us, we will select these five principles and what we are about to do." 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: It's been more in the context of having detailed 
discussions about where they see the debate evolving and as well as what we 
perceive to be the evolution of the debate. The fact that investor-owned 
utilities have come increasing close to one another in terms of positions that 
generally reflect these principles gives me added confidence that we may be 
able to come out of this with a fair degree of consensus. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Mr. Baca? 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: Can you define a question on one of your principles 
that you have outlined here, define number two, "All customers should be 
provided equal and fair access to the benefit of competition? At the same time 
there should be no rationing or competitive benefits." What do you really mean 
by this? 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Well, initially some of the utility proposals 
contemplated dealing with stranded investment and I think your first witness 
touched on this as well. Dealing with stranded investment by extending out 
over an extended period of time access to competitive market benefits for 
various customer classes. And actually, the Bluebook contemplated a similar 
approach. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: Industrial versus ... 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Industrial first, then large commercial, and then 
medium commercial and then, ultimately residential. In our judgment that 
raises some basic fairness and equity issues and it really is dependent upon an 
assumption that you have to deal with stranded investment through the 
continuation of embedding, in your rate structure, those historical costs that 
have already been described as being uneconomic and in which we agree with that 
conclusion. 
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The alternative approach embodied in the proposal initially enunciated by San 
Diego contemplates dealing with those costs with a transition charge that's 
applied equally across all customer classes. And, as I indicated, there is yet 
another innovative approach that suggests some possibility of perhaps buying 
down that transition charge through partial divestment of some existing utility 
assets. 
For example, the transmission system is unquestionably carried on the utility 
books way under value and there is fair debate that some of the right-of-way 
assets have significant appreciation value above and beyond their use simply 
for high voltage transmissions. There's no reason, for example, why we can't 
be contemplating stringing fiber optic cable on utility rights-of-ways and 
selling those rights to other interested parties. In fact, the one advantage 
of that proposal is it's the only one that, in essence, puts new money into the 
system. The rest of the debate is how you move the chess pieces around on the 
chess board. So to the extent that that's a viable option, it ought to be 
given consideration. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: How will the average ratepayer know what this means 
to them out there. I mean, it's foreign to them. They don't know what's going 
on. 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Well, the average ratepayer in our judgment, just as 
was the case with natural gas, will enjoy substantial benefits through 
increased competition. And, in fact, it is also likely that we're going to see 
a whole series of new cottage industries spring up with different providers 
offering different types of service to different groups of customers. 
Heretofore, we've kind of offered on this assumption that aside from large 
industrials everybody wants generic electricity as opposed to red, blue or 
green electricity; different rates of service, different times of service, 
different qualities of service. Do you really need the assurance of no 
interruption at any time for your household service if you were willing to pay 
for something less than total reliability? Shouldn't you have that choice in 
the marketplace? In our judgment there will be people that will aggregate 
various customer classes whether it be folks living in a condominium complex or 
apartment complex or given neighborhood and in essence go out into the 
marketplace and purchase a type of energy service that those customers deem 
appropriate for their own use. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: That's true and as far as choice goes one of the 
common complaints that I heard last night on the plane coming down, I had this 
conversation with someone that talked about deregulation, the effects on the 
telephone industry of the amount of long-distance services that are available. 
Fifty-four percent of the average consumer doesn't know which one to get so how 
do they know what's cheaper for them but yet there is choice. But that's a 
problem they have out there and this is a little bit different but at the same 
time it's going along the same lines. The consumer out there is still 
wondering, "Well, yes, there's choice, but which one is cheaper? We've got 54 
different choices. Who provides that information to us? 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Well, frankly the customer will still have a choice of 
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retaining utility service ... 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: But who will provide the information of the lowest 
cost? See that's what they're saying out there even with that choice. They 
don't know. 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: I understand. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: We're going to have to move on, I think. Ms. Moore, you 
have a final question for Mr. Imbrecht? 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Let me see if I can phrase this delicately. Often 
on the federal level California has not been seen as speaking with one voice on 
issues and I know you know that and I just wonder as we go through this 
restructuring obviously everybody in the country, as you point out in your 
comments, is looking at California and this is probably stimulated the most 
interested dialogue among folks about what we're doing here in California. Is 
the Public Utility Commission going to be the voice of California? Is it the 
Energy Commission? Who speaks for California on this issue? 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: I think in the context of discussions they refer 
clearly to the PUC has, that responsibility and I should add that I believe 
President Fessler has had extensive discussions with Betsy Moore, the 
Chairwoman of FERC, trying to work out some of these jurisdictional 
difficulties. Some of the orders they issued earlier this week appear to be 
first steps in resolving some of those questions, at least from our 
perspective. We think our job, and I might add the hearings that we're doing 
have been scheduled in consultation with the Governor's office as well, to try 
to provide a complementary forum and a place to develop consensus on some of 
these other subsidiary pieces. The PUC has a lot on its plate; stranded 
investments, transition charges, how you set up the overall structure of the 
market, how the pool will functionally operate, who will own it, etc., are all 
big questions and they still don't address resource diversity, demand side 
management, collective warranty and so forth. So what we're going to try to do 
with our proceedings is develop some consensus within the community that's 
affected in each of those areas. Hopefully, with the appeal we can then 
present that to the PUC and perhaps simplify their own workload. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: So, some of the environmental and other kinds of 
things that put California in the forefront over the last 25 years in terms of 
our policies related to those kind of activities will still remain with the 
Energy Commission and you will pursue them in line of competition and those 
other kinds of things and then present your hearings and your recommendations 
on those proceedings to the Commission. 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Well, Ms. Moore, until the members of the Legislature 
change the law, I deem it my obligation to support and shepherd the various 
public policy issues that you've delegated to us and those were the ones that I 
emphasized at the conclusion of my remarks. If you tell us that those are no 
longer important societal or economic objectives obviously we'll change course 
but until you do so it seems to me it's our obligation to try to find a way to 
make continued pursuit of those policies compatible for the more competitive 
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environment. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I think that's extremely important and I'm just 
trying to be sure that as we get carried away with competition that we don't 
forget some of our obligations and commitments of the past and just want to be 
sure that those are being looked for and I have great confidence in your 
leadership in that area. 
CHARLES IMBRECHT: Thank you, Ms. Moore. I have not addressed another 
area that's really not our bailiwick per se but I'm sure others today will get 
into the question of some of the social program issues, lifeline rates and so 
forth. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: There are witnesses who, I think, are very concerned 
with... Thank you for your testimony. All right now we are going to call 
forward the next group of witnesses, those who have actually made their own 
proposals in this restructuring debate starting with Mr. Robert Glynn from 
Pacific Gas and Electric. Mr. Glenn, welcome. I'm going to ask, now I know 
that's we've slipped about an hour in our schedule. I think what we're going 
to try to do is to hear from each of the people under item four on our agenda 
who have proposals and then we hope we can finish that by 12:30 or a little bit 
after and then I think it probably would be a good idea to take a half hour 
break to let people get a sandwich and then we'll come back and do the rest of 
it so Mr. Glynn, let's start with you. 
ROBERT GLYNN: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and members for inviting 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company to present our views on the changing electric 
industry in California and to describe the proposal that we have submitted to 
the California Public Utilities C'Jmmission in that regard. 
Restructuring of industries that have been at one time been monopolies is 
something that is not new. And it's been driven greatly by customers making 
their preferences known to their policymakers, customers in the marketplaces 
for each of those former monopoly service industries and restructuring of the 
electric industry in California is similarly something that's not new. 
Certainly something that was not dreamt up just before the Bluebook was issued 
in April of this year. The competition in the electric industry and some of 
the changes for it have been moving forward during the last two decades. A 
couple of quick examples of that; it was in 1978 that the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policy Act invented, if you will, a new class of electric generators 
who now in California provide a very large fraction of the electric energy 
consumed in California. It was during the '70's, '80's and '90's that a number 
of interstate transmission projects were built. Some with single owners and 
multiple users and some with multiple owners and multiple users. In the mid to 
late 1980's the western systems power pool which is the largest spot market 
wholesale electric power pool filed with the federal Regulatory Commission to 
begin it's experiment, an experiment which was finally converted it into an 
operating pool with the last court, a challenge cleared through the FERC just 
last year. And the Energy Policy Act of 1992 pushed more towards wholesale 
competition, transmission access and created another new class of electric 
generation industry competitors, the exempt wholesale generators. All of these 
things have moved towards the existence in California today of what appears to 
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many, including PG&E, including many customers as a workable, competitive 
electric generation market and customers seek to access that. 
The proposal that Pacific Gas and Electric Company issued in response to a long 
series of matters before the PUC, the Yellowbook which was an early 1993 
description of change potential in regulation and then the Bluebook was based 
on the objectives that the CPUC in each of their various colored books issued 
objectives that ought to frame transition from one regulatory reform to 
another. The customer should receive the benefits of competition that the 
safety and reliability of the electric system shouldn't be compromised, that 
social environmental programs so valuable in California should be continued, 
that smaller customers or those that choose not to avail themselves of such 
access should not be burdened with any of the costs associated with the onset 
of competition and that the financial integrity of utilities should be 
maintained. PG&E sees the value in each and all of those objectives and has 
included and embodied them in our proposal. The CPUC raised in its documents 
the issue of transition cost recovery and it was that fact and their approach 
to providing some time for this transition to take place that led PG&E to 
propose the use of transition time rather than explicit transition charges to 
deal with the costs of our own generating assets that were priced above market. 
Our proposal includes explicit transition costs recovery for the over-market 
costs of electric power supply contracts which we hold and regulatory assets. 
We propose that the environmental and social program costs continue to be born 
by all California electric consumers and that there not be a mechanism, 
intentional or unintentional in this process, that allows some consumers to 
escape their fair share of funding those programs and we propose very clearly 
that there not be cost shifting between any classes of customers as a result of 
any part of this transition. 
The most recent enhancements of the proposal that we've made were described in 
this weeks Full Panel Hearing that the California PUC held in San Diego where 
responding to comments that we heard in a number of the earlier Full Panel 
Hearings we said that if the grid operator relationship with PG&E is an issue 
that we would separate that relationship from PG&E and let grid operation be 
independent. We also indicated that notwithstanding what we believe about the 
degree of openness of our electric transmission system that because others are 
concerned about it and because of the FERC's policies on that have become 
increasingly clear that PG&E intends to file a full open access comparable 
service tariff with FERC. Our proposal contemplates moving forward with the 
first customers who would have the opportunity to use direct access either on 
January 1st, 1996, which we selected because it was the CPUC's date or soon 
thereafter as regulatory approvals are gathered. And the reason that we did 
that is because we agree with many who say it's going to take time to develop 
the protocols and rules of the road and metering an information handling 
systems to handle the millions of electric consumers in California, but we know 
how to deal with the larger retail customers because we already deal with 
similarly sized wholesale customers. 
So the PG&E proposal provides true customer choice through direct access 
starting very soon. It preserves the opportunity for environmental social 
program costs, programs to be maintained and costs to be financed by all. It 
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provides a mechanism for insuring the financial integrity of the utilities and 
it proposes to build firewalls between customer classes so that there would not 
be cost shifting among them. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. Those are, I think, excellent principles that 
we'll be discussing but it was my understanding at one time, at least, that I 
understood the PG&E proposal to be one that would not cut in until the year 
2008 and that if that were done the utility would recover these investments and 
there would be no stranded investments, at least in generating facilities. But 
now you say that the direct access can occur as early as January 1st, 1996, so 
that's a modification or was I mistaken in what I originally understood. 
ROBERT GLYNN: It's not a modification although a number of folks have 
characterized the PG&E proposal as a delay proposal. In fact, the PG&E 
proposal is the only one that said on January 1st, 1996, there should be direct 
access and we're prepared to move forward. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, then, there will be a problem about stranded 
investment because of the customers that have direct access somehow have to 
participate in paying off these stranded investments, isn't that right? 
ROBERT GLYNN: The PG&E proposal characterizes stranded investment in two 
broad categories. The first of which is the stranded investment which results 
from our own investment in our own company assets and we have said we will not 
seek transition cost recovery for that cost. That the program duration that we 
have laid out will provide us some opportunity to recover those transition 
costs; however, as each class of customers becomes eligible for direct access 
and to the extent that those customers choose to buy their power elsewhere we 
will eat those costs. That's been a part of our proposal since it was first 
put forth in June of this year. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But those who stay on your system, they get to share in 
those costs 
ROBERT GLYNN: Well, as the first witness pointed out the costs, there's 
not an increase of costs for anyone associated with any part of the PG&E direct 
access proposal. Those costs are in the system now, so there's no one whose 
bearing any additional costs because of the transition to competition. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: It would be a big break for those who can at an early date 
take advantage of direct access. I mean, if for no other reason than because 
they are going to escape paying for these uneconomic facilities if I may call 
them that. 
ROBERT GLYNN: In a relative sense, the customers who exercise the direct 
access option earlier would achieve those benefits earlier but all customers 
will have access and the opportunity for direct access long before the end of 
the economic life of those assets, so there is no ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Would you say that violates Chairman Imbrecht's second 
point which is that all customers should be provided equal and fair access to 
the benefits of competition at the same time? 
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ROBERT GLYNN: The idea that Chairman Imbrecht puts forth is one that 
others have also put forth. The difficulty that it presents is that no one 
thinks that direct access can be offered to all California electricity 
consumers in a reasonably short-term. Even the United Kingdom who started with 
the fact of a single entity, a single regulator, no existing contracts to deal 
with, no difference between utility ownership, no significant sources of supply 
outside their borders. Their program very carefully laid out step-by-step 
implementation that has run off the rails already in two areas. One of those 
areas is on their forward pricing index which has been essentially suspended or 
capped by their regulator and more recently as the customer class ......... . 
100 kilowatt and above that was direct access eligible on April 1st, came into 
direct access opportunity. They've had tremendous difficulty and I'm told have 
not billed a great number of those customers since April. So it's going to 
take time to handle the millions of customers. So the difficulty with adhering 
to the principle that Chairman Imbrecht put forward is that means that no one 
would get the benefits that competition at the generation level accessed 
directly by customers offers. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. One other question, in the Sacramento Bee this 
morning you're quoted as saying, "The others," that is the people that we are 
going to hear from in a minute are advocating a wholesale bureaucracy? We are 
the only utility that is advocating the customers get choice. We want to 
elaborate on what's wrong with the proposals of those advocating a wholesale 
bureaucracy? Tell us what you mean by that. 
ROBERT GLYNN: The fraction of the interested parties who support 
inventing a new wholesale pool seem to believe that there are some economic 
efficiencies that aren't yet captured by the existing myriad of wholesale 
pooling entities that exist throughout the western United States and that some 
new invention is required in order to capture those economic efficiencies. As 
a practical matter today, each one of the utilities dispatches all of its own 
generation and the contracts it has within the context of the contracts and 
agreements that govern the purchases and within the physical and economic 
operating characteristics of the units to reduce the incremental moment-to-
moment cost of running their systems. Above and beyond that a great number of 
utilities have formal exchange agreements between them under systems like the 
California Power Pool where if there are economic efficiencies that are not 
already captured within one company's boundaries, they can get captured between 
several companies' boundaries. And in the late '80's and early '90's the 
western systems power pool formed and that's an entity that includes virtually 
every state west of the Mississippi, a few states east of the Mississippi and 
some Canadian provinces. It includes investor-owned, municipal-owned, federal, 
power broker, power marketer, virtually every element of the industry. And 
they have the opportunity to exchange on a spot market basis, transmission and 
generation resources. So the wholesale market is combed pretty thoroughly on a 
pretty regular basis already. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let me give you... You won't be back. I think we're 
going to hear from them, at least, as these wholesale pools have been described 
to me that they combine the direct access availability to customers through 
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these contract for differences approach. Do you want to anticipate that 
argument and tell us why that is not really direct access or is that your view? 
ROBERT GLYNN: It's certainly my view that that's not direct access. I 
believe when you hear from customers you'll hear very clearly that they don't 
feel it's direct access. Customers want to buy from a supplier and as we found 
in the restructuring of the natural gas industry, they like to buy directly 
from a supplier and have the utility be the transporter so when natural gas 
industry deregulated and frankly many of the same parties were participants in 
that restructuring change, customers had the opportunity to access the gas 
supply of their choice. There's no pool, there's no contract for differences 
from a pool price, they simply buy according to whatever form of economic and 
financial instrument they choose and they hedge that purchase or don't hedge 
that purchase depending on their own corporations risk acceptance. 
A contract for difference is a difference from an index or something and that 
index is not necessarily what any one customer is buying. In fact, it's kind 
of a vanilla like average of what everybody's buying and the customers that I 
talked to don't want to buy off an average vanilla index. They want to make a 
deal and live with its consequences and they have competition in their own 
markets and they want to be very successful and they feel that they'll be 
better buyers for their own account than the utilities will. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I'm sure we'll hear a response to that subsequently. 
ROBERT GLYNN: We probably will. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You did say in your formal statement that PG&E's prepared 
to divest itself of the transmission facilities. Is that right? 
ROBERT GLYNN: That's not what I said. What I said was PG&E is preparing 
to make a filing with FERC for an open access comparable service tariff which 
will put to bed, one hopes forever, the issue of whether or not the grid is 
adequately open ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Who would control the operation of the access? 
ROBERT GLYNN: We said that we would be willing to spin that off. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That gets to my question. Would that create a new 
bureaucracy to deal with that? 
ROBERT GLYNN: It would be the same folks with the same computers but they 
would be owned by independently Pacific Gas and Electric Company. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You don't see that as a bureaucracy but you see the 
wholesale pool as ... 
ROBERT GLYNN: I see creating something new as a bureaucracy. In other 
words, creating some brand new entity as creating a new bureaucracyi 
particularly one that has its own new set of regulatory ... 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: So you're saying that the bureaucracy would be the 
existing bureaucracy at FERC that would control the open access to the 
transmission? 
ROBERT GLYNN: Well, the regulatory relationship is a FERC regulatory 
relationship. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But the ownership would be retained by the utilities? 
ROBERT GLYNN: For the transmission system? 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Yes. 
ROBERT GLYNN: Yes. That's the way I see it. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Is there some other entity that has to be involved in this 
open access or that's it? 
ROBERT GLYNN: The concept of FERC open access comparable service tariff 
is that then any eligible entity can use at a predetermined just and reasonable 
price terms and conditions. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You don't need anybody to run that, is that right? I mean 
to oversee that? 
ROBERT GLYNN: If you mean to oversee the implementation of the tariff, 
the folks who do that are already in place. I mean, that work is already done. 
Lots of people use the PG&E electric transmission system today. There is 
nothing new required to have that tariff filed. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. Thank you for your testimony. I appreciate 
it. Okay. Why don't we have our next witness, Dr. Eugene Coyle from TURN. 
Then next will be Mr. Foster who I see has arrived from Southern California 
Edison. 
EUGENE COYLE: Good morning. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Good morning. 
EUGENE COYLE: Good afternoon. We have a proposal that is not direct 
access. It is called community access. I want to describe that to you. But 
first let me make a few perhaps rebuttal remarks to what I've heard today. 
First of all, the PUC has heard from us that we would prefer competent 
traditional regulation. Not what we've had from the PUC for the last ten or 
fifteen years but real cost-based regulation with the elimination of all the 
adjustment clauses and balancing accounts that keep the PUC continually in 
session. We propose a basic rate case every two years for each utility. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But if I understand that, if I may interrupt, what you're 
saying in response to President Fessler's statement that was read to us. 
Nobody says in the response "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Everybody says 
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it's broke and it needs to be fixed, he says. You're saying that what's broke 
is the way the PUC is implementing the current ratemaking? 
EUGENE COYLE: Exactly. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And you want to stay with the current ratemaking at your 
position, but you want to fix the PUC. 
EUGENE COYLE: That's right. Clean up all the accounts that require 
enormous litigation. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: How does that tie in with this community access then, that 
seems ... the backup position? 
EUGENE COYLE: I just wanted to correct that because we've told the 
Commissioners in their Full Panel Hearings about that position. Mr. Glynn 
didn't mention the year 2008 in response to your question. But that's still 
the date, I believe, that they would give the residential customers the 
opportunity for choice. We're talking about 14 years during which time they 
would basically lay off with recalling transition charges onto the existing 
customers. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, he said as they're currently paying them. These 
charges, anyway, because those facilities are on their rate base so he's saying 
he won't be any worse off and some other people will be better off, is what he 
was saying, I believe. 
EUGENE COYLE: Right. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You don't like that? 
EUGENE COYLE: No, I don't. We don't. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Didn't think you would. Okay. 
EUGENE COYLE: And then Assemblyman Baca raised a good point which is that 
even if you offer choice to everybody all at once some people are not going to 
be served by that. Either because they don't have the information to exercise 
a choice but more importantly, I haven't heard any credible statement since 
April that aggregators, or anybody else is actually going to go door-to-door 
and sign up customers to be served by this retail competition. The cost of 
acquiring those customers, that is the marketing cost, is just too high for 
that to happen and we've seen in the gas industry that it hasn't happened in 
spite of a lot people saying that it would and a lot of people saying they'd be 
in that business. It just hasn't happened. So that's the reason that we have 
an alternative which we call community access. This is not direct access. 
It's a wholesale competition where any independent power producer or utility 
could offer to sell power at wholesale to a political entity, a community, 
either an existing city or water district or any other viable political entity. 
All the customers within that community then would have to buy through the 
community. This would include the residential and the industrial customers, as 
well. They would get the benefits of the wholesale competition that wouldn't 
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have the elimination of the residential and small businesses from the game 
because you eliminate the marketing cost to reach them. So our proposal, which 
would require legislation to implement is that we don't go to direct access but 
we go to community access. 
Let me make one other remark on PBR. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I understand that community access would be that the 
community would be created and individuals in that community could not go make 
their own deals, they'd have to do it through the community? Is that right? 
EUGENE COYLE: That's exactly right. And there are two reasons for that. 
One is that in an industry like electric power where you have a lot of overhead 
costs, from time-to-time there is excess capacity and when a power plant owner 
has excess capacity they're willing to offer really good deals to employ that 
capacity. We see that in the airlines where they have really low fairs for the 
elastic part of their market. So that what we see if the customers within a 
community could go out, they'd be cherry picked from time-to-time by the 
independents when capacity was in excess. They'd come back and the community 
would have to afford them service when capacity was short. 
The second reason for it is a political one. We think that if you offer 
communities the opportunity to form themselves in this way, the pressure to 
actually form them and to go out and buy wholesale power cheaply will come from 
the big customers within the community and the city councils or whoever the 
boards are that make the decision will get the pressure from those customers. 
If they are free to go off, the rest of the community may never see the 
opportunity. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You wouldn't force anybody to create such a community 
would you? 
EUGENE COYLE: No. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So suppose no community is created in my area and 
Hewlett-Packard and Varian and Associates get together and form their 
community, would that be a community of a kind you had in mind? 
EUGENE COYLE: Well, I guess I'm hoping to rely on your wisdom for that 
here in the Assembly and the Senate that I guess there is a possibility of sort 
of sham communities being formed that way. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So you would want the Legislature to define what a 
community is and make sure it wouldn't be the first community that gets set up. 
They've got a community and anybody else would not include those components, is 
that right? 
EUGENE COYLE: Right, yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So you'd look at the Legislature to define what is an 
appropriate community? 
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EUGENE COYLE: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Good luck. Go ahead. 
EUGENE COYLE: I was going to say something about PBR because it was sort 
of described here this morning as if it were all to the good. There are two 
PBR's. There hasn't been, as far as I can tell, any testimony by the utilities 
about how they're going to perform better in the future if they get this type 
of regulation. It's just that somehow there's some vague incentives out there 
and it's interesting that here the utility executives come in and they're 
drawing over a million dollars a year in salary and they come and say that 
well, we're not performing now but we'll perform later. What we see as PBR 
really being about is discrimination between customer classes and PG&E's on the 
record that they want to segment the market further and discriminate between 
classes so we see PBR as a really dangerous thing for small customers because 
they're going to cut prices to their big customers and try to make it up on the 
less elastic small business and residential customers. 
There is a good form of PBR in that we have a proposal with others in a 
coalition called CARE which is to simple tell the utilities, "lower your rates 
5% a year for the next 5 years. We don't care how you do it. You perform but 
these are the constraints on you and that's what we consider a good form of 
PBR. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Are you finished? 
EUGENE COYLE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you very much. All right. Mr. Foster for Southern 
California Edison. Have you got a plan for us? Okay. Welcome to northern 
California Mr. Foster. 
BOB FOSTER: Thank you. It's good to be back, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
stipulate that I'm not one of those executives that make a million dollars a 
year. That's a substantial amount at home apparently. In the interest of 
time, I know that you are over your allotted time at this point and I think the 
questions were related to mostly on our proposal on Poolco. I'd like to talk 
first about what we think creates high rates in California. And secondly, 
about the Poolco proposal in particular. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You didn't hear our initial witness who described and has 
given us a paper on what's the cause of high rates in California, I don't know 
if you've seen that but if you are responding to that and disagreeing whether 
we want to hear that but we don't want a treatise on what causes higher rates 
because we've already heard that. But you can give us your spin on it. 
BOB FOSTER: Well, I haven't heard it but I'm sure I disagree with it. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: This was our objective academic, you know. This person 
had no ax to grind. 
BOB FOSTER: Well, the problem is there are distinctions among utilities. 
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I was told the jist of that testimony and ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: This ~as not a witness from the utilities. 
BOB FOSTER: I understand that, but I'm saying there are differences among 
utility companies as to why rates are higher in one utility as opposed to 
another. And at least, from what I've heard relative to nuclear comments from 
that testimony, that is not the largest cost on our system. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Is it part of the cost? 
BOB FOSTER: Oh, absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And it's part of the reason for high rates? 
BOB FOSTER: It is part of the reason for high rates. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, what else? 
BOB FOSTER: The major cost on our system in terms of high rates, pushing 
rates higher over what would be the national average that are the excessive 
overpayments for mandated contracts to independent energy producers. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: In five years will that problem be ameliorated? 
BOB FOSTER: Part of the problem will be ameliorated in actually by the 
year 2002, the energy payments for those contracts go to market, or go to 
avoided costs. The other side of the problem and one that's not generally 
known is that the capacity payments for those contracts continue on for the 30-
year life of the contract and to give you an idea of what the difference is 
right now you could buy capacity on your market for about $60 a kilowatt year. 
We're paying, on average, $180 per kilowatt year and that goes on for 30 years. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You will have these contracts part of your "stranded 
investment" as we move to this competitive ... 
BOB FOSTER: That is correct and I might also add that my shareholders 
make nothing on those contracts. We have no opportunity to earn anything. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Now tell us about your plan. 
BOB FOSTER: Tell us about my plan? You're really disturbing my order 
here. I don't know what to do here. I would like to make one comment if I 
might, Mr. Chair. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. 
BOB FOSTER: And that is relative to the CARE report. I had intended on 
giving you a fairly lengthy rendition of why the CARE report is inaccurate and 
quite frankly, worthless, relative to California rates. I will only say that I 
submit to you read, the cross-examination before the PUC on the economic 
sciences witness and I think that report has been fairly well refuted. It does 
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not take into account major factors in California, for example. It left out 
the fact that there are payments to QF's in California. It did not deal with 
the fact that California does not utilize coal to any substantial degree which 
clearly increases costs in California. And it didn't normalize for a host of 
other things. In fact, the method they used, they employed, was a method 
called the Colley Bodmer method which I'm sure will soon become a household 
word. In any case the founder of that method Edward Bodmer, if you will, this 
is a quote from him. "The CARE report incorrectly interprets the results of 
inappropriate regression methods that contain numerous computational errors and 
omit important factors." And under cross-examination, they said the CARE 
report, their analysis anyway, demonstrated they made no comment about whether 
any management changes or any efficiencies in management occur and made no 
recommendations on how to reduce costs. So we really think its been pretty 
well refuted under cross-examination. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That's the first time its been mentioned at this hearing 
and I'm not sure that the other members of the Legislature that are here know 
what that is. I happen to know because I have a copy of the report and I have 
a copy of Edison and other utilities communications with the PUC about the 
report. But, I mean, obviously it goes to your view of how high California 
electric prices are as compared to the rest of the country. 
BOB FOSTER: Rates are higher here than the rest of the country and there 
are basically reasons of QF contracts, coal and mild climate and a very 
strenuous DSM program, which is reduced energy use in this state. We still 
have to have fixed facilities to meet peak load. It's no great secret why 
rates are higher here. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But they don't have to stay that way because you have a 
plan. 
BOB FOSTER: Absolutely not. We have a plan. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: Mr. Chair, if I may ask ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Yes, Mr. Baca. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER BACA: Going back to the cost factor, you indicated 
mandated costs for contracts, can you tell us what the average length of the 
contract is because I believe the public is not aware as we look at price ... 
BOB FOSTER: The contracts, they vary under the length of the terms of the 
contracts or 30 years. The energy payment portion, the ones we are talking 
about permanently are standard off of four fixed energy payment contracts. The 
energy payment portion of those contracts are fixed for ten years. They are 
fixed payments that are based on a sliding scale on a forecast of oil prices 
that started in the mid '80's at around 30 plus dollars per barrel that will 
end up in the year 1999 at $100 per barrel. We are paying right now for energy 
produced under those contracts as if the barrel of oil equivalent of $75. Oil 
is under $20 on the world markets. That's the terms and the prices. Thank 
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you. 
This issue, first of all I think the Public Utilities Commission deserves some 
credit for, I think a bold step in moving towards competitive markets, I think 
with the issuance of the Bluebook, it certainly has started a debate, I think a 
meaningful debate, one in which obviously a number of parties are engaged in 
which a number of interests have a great deal at stake. And we welcome the 
move to a competitive market. We think that will, in fact, force costs down. 
It will tend to put a downward pressure on rates. It will make utility 
companies more efficient and I think it will correct some of the difficulties 
that command in control regulation, prescriptive regulation, has had in 
California. We think the move to a market system is, in fact, a positive one 
and will help all consumers. We think there ought to be three principles when 
you do that and we have disagreed with the Bluebook in the manner in which they 
seek to have direct access. We think three principles ought to guide any 
implementation to a competitive market and the first is equity and that is that 
all customers, not just a few, all customers ought to receive the benefits of 
competition. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: At the same time? 
BOB FOSTER: As soon as they can. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, then all ... as soon as there are benefits everyone 
should share in them. 
BOB FOSTER: There are ways in which you can transfer benefits from 
competition to all customers today. We do that on the wholesale market I think 
as Mr. Glynn described. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I don't know if you heard Chairman Imbrecht. That's his 
principle number two. So you agree with that? 
BOB FOSTER: It's actually our principle number one. So we're ahead of 
him now, I think. Sorry, Chuck. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Did you know what his principle number one was? 
BOB FOSTER: I shudder to ask. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Restructuring should attempt to maximize customer choice 
for all customers. 
BOB FOSTER: Now, I would put equity ahead of that. And I'll talk to him 
about it later. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I don't know that he ranked these, actually, so ... 
BOB FOSTER: The second is opportunity. We think the customers will 
benefit to the greatest extent from competition and that utilities should have 
a fair opportunity to participate in that competitive market on a level playing 
field. 
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And third is cost recovery. Past investments and obligations incurred to meet 
customer needs must be honored in order to treat fairly those who have invested 
in previous utility structure and those costs ought to be placed in a 
transition charge and born by all customers. 
With those principles I think you can frame a system that really will operate 
to benefit all Californians. And we have suggested a system called Poolco. 
And you can call it anything but basically you can call it Harvey if you want 
but I mean basically it's a system which will dispatch generation and 
transmission in the most efficient manner and will provide for the benefits of 
competition at the wholesale level and also allow for direct access and make 
sure that those benefits are transferred to all customers. You heard today, 
that what we need is that customers want choice, they want direct access and 
clearly there is no doubt that if you went to a bilateral contract world, it is 
clearly more difficult to start with three or four million transactions. In 
fact, it's probably impossible to do that in a bilateral world. And so, the 
scheme is to have the largest customers go first. The problem with that is, 
and this occurs with quite frankly the large customers and the marketers that 
are out there that want to extract the efficiencies in the market and take some 
of them for themselves is that they want to go out there and lock up the most 
efficient generators. I mean that's the reason they want direct access. And 
the problem is that those efficiencies then are not available to the rest of 
the customers. 
In a pooling arrangement all the generators compete among themselves and they 
all put power into the pool. Everyone takes power out of the pool and so what 
you do is you place the efficient generators, those efficient generators which 
would otherwise have a propensity to be locked up, in fact, are in the pool and 
that power gets transferred. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So that, if I may interrupt, is your main objection to 
both the proposal that appears in the Bluebook with the staggered timetable for 
direct access to different categories of ratepayers. And I assume it's your 
main objection to the PG&E proposal that we heard a few minutes ago which also 
suggests you can't do it all at the same but it gives immediate direct access 
to some consumers. 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. Let me also dispel something here. We tend 
to view this as if I contract with, for example, if I am XYZ Manufacturing 
Company and I contract with Montana Power Company that somehow I'm going to get 
Montana Power Company's electricity. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Nobody ... 
BOB FOSTER: Well, that's simply not the case. We all know that electrons 
flow according to laws of physics and we can't interrupt that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Can we get a different price? 
BOB FOSTER: It's all a financial arrangement. It's all ... 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: I think everybody understands that ... 
BOB FOSTER: All Poolco does is separate the physical transfer of 
electrons from the financial arrangements. You can have a contract for 
differences in a pooling arrangement that provides you all the benefits of 
direct access. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: The PG&E witness suggested that the customers don't want 
to contract with the pool, that their availability of a bilateral contract is 
somehow warped if it's indexed to this pool price which is an average price of 
everybody selling into the pool. You don't see that as a problem? 
BOB FOSTER: No. They could have a contract for differences with a 
generator which is below the pool price and that generator would return that 
difference to them. It's a contract around the pool. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Just as if they had bought it directly from them and they 
paid their bills not to the Poolco but to the ... 
BOB FOSTER: That is correct. Every proposal for direct access has a 
system coordinator or dispatcher or some central unit that dispatches power. 
You have to have that. The electric system needs to be balanced and you have 
to have control area services. That flow needs to be managed. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: On your second principle the opportunity, I think you were 
saying that the investor-owned utilities ought to have the opportunity to sell 
into the pool if they can compete. Is that right? 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And so you don't see anything wrong with the utilities 
selling power in their own service area that they generate in that area? 
BOB FOSTER: No, because the possibility of self dealing is eliminated 
with an independent pool operator. It's an independent company, it dispatches 
your generation and dispatches transmission. So those decisions which could, 
if you said the utility has the distribution transmission system and also owns 
generation, you could favor your own generation. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And your third principle then, second principle is if the 
utility has, if I may use this expression, economic assets that will enable 
them to be competitive in the pool. That's fine, they ought to have that 
opportunity but to the extent they have uneconomic assets so that they'll lose 
out in the competition, those should be treated as stranded investments and a 
mechanism should be created to reimburse the utility for those. 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. Those investments were made under a 
different regulatory regime where a bargain was struck between the state and 
investors and on our system, for example, the largest amount of stranded 
investment occurs on independent energy produced contracts, on those QF 
contracts I talked about. I mean, I don't know what we would advocate getting 
out of those contracts. We would ..... . 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: What else will you tell us? 
BOB FOSTER: Well, I think you've hit most of the essay. It is important 
to note that Poolco would not be a utility company. It would not be owned by a 
utility company. It would be an independent entity. It would be regulated by 
the state. It is not a massive bureaucracy. It basically requires computers 
and phones. It does not require a massive bureaucracy. And I would submit 
that most of that, in fact all of that, is being done today. Every proposal 
has a system dispatcher or system coordinator involved in it. All those 
functions are being conducted today. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Then the diagrams, and there have been many, that have 
been presented to me, they show the Poolco being regulated not by the state but 
by FERC. 
BOB FOSTER: It would be under FERC's jurisdiction. That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, any questions? Senator Leonard? 
SENATOR LEONARD: Help me out here. The Poolco idea is both the regulator 
of the market of electricity and also the wheeler of the power itself? 
BOB FOSTER: It's not the regulator of the market, it would hold an hourly 
or half-hourly auction among generators and it would make the market, if you 
will. 
SENATOR LEONARD: It has an economic function and I guess the broker 
making the market? Commodities exchange? 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. It does not regulate that market. 
SENATOR LEONARD: Okay. And on the other side it would wheel the power? 
BOB FOSTER: It would dispatch transmission according to efficiency. 
SENATOR LEONARD: Does your plan, is it necessary that it own all of the 
grid or does it just have guaranteed access to all the grid? 
BOB FOSTER: It would not own the generation or the transmission. It 
would have control of the generation and transmission. It would not own it. 
You separate control from assets. 
SENATOR LEONARD: In your definition transmission, is that to my house? 
BOB FOSTER: That's distribution. 
SENATOR LEONARD: It's the distribution grid and then ... 
BOB FOSTER: That is still to be, under almost any proposal I've seen, the 
distribution and transmission of electricity is to be regulated, be a regulated 
entity as it is today. 
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SENATOR LEONARD: Say that again. 
BOB FOSTER: It is to be a regulated entity, much as it is today. 
SENATOR LEONARD: From the grid to the meter? 
BOB FOSTER: That is correct. 
SENATOR LEONARD: Okay. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Ms. Moore. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Under the Edison proposal, talk to me a little a 
about the pool price. What would the pool price be? 
BOB FOSTER: I have no idea. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: I mean, I'm thinking more conceptually. 
BOB FOSTER: The pool price would be very mercurial. It would vary from 
every half hour and it would have fairly large swings, according to time of 
day, according to available ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I think it would be the market clearing price that would 
come in to satisfy the demand and then everybody who sold in would get that 
price. 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Now do all generators, regardless of their bid, get 
whatever the price is? 
BOB FOSTER: What the pool does is manage supply and demand. So let's 
hypothetically say that we're a thousand megawatts of demand and you had 1500 
megawatts of supply, you would hold an auction and let's say the prices came in 
from two to three cents. The three cent power would match with your thousand 
megawatts a load. All the generators under that, they would get paid the three 
cent price and the five hundred megawatts that does not clear that market is 
idle, it does not generate into the pool. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: So wait a minute. So regardless of what their bid 
is and if I bid considerably lower than the three cents, I'd still get the 
three cents? 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Sounds familiar. 
BOB FOSTER: What might it sound like? Now, what you're trying to do is 
provide an incentive for future generators. 
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ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Well, I mean, sounds familiar. Thin is thin. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Mr. Foster, I want to make sure ... Have we reached the 
point where the Edison Plan is essentially the same as the San Diego Gas and 
Electric Plan? 
BOB FOSTER: It's very similar. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They both have this wholesale pool? They both have the 
opportunity for direct access through the contract for differences? 
BOB FOSTER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And I know there's a difference in San Diego because 
there's not enough transmission capacity to bring into that service area all 
that's needed. Is that the only difference? So you'd have to deal with that 
additional increment that clearly at the outset the utility would have to 
provide? 
BOB FOSTER: I believe that's correct. I guess to quote Yogi Bear, "Our 
similarities are quite different." 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. They're next so let's bring them forward to see if 
you've described what is their plan. 
BOB FOSTER: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you for your testimony. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: Do you have anything for us in writing? 
STEVE DAVIS: Yes, I do. 
ASSEMBLYMEMBER MOORE: May we have it? 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Maybe we'll, Mr. Julian. we'll make copies for all the 
members here. Yes, welcome, Mr. Davis, Director of Regulatory Affairs for San 
Diego Gas and Electric. 
STEVE DAVIS: Thank you Chairman Sher and members of the committee. A lot 
of what Mr. Foster said I had planned on talking about. I won't duplicate the 
commonalties, I will try to show distinctions or differences. But I would like 
to start out, I too, was going to talk a little bit about a recent CARE study 
that has been referred to and ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Don't do that because we know you don't like it ... 
STEVE DAVIS: In May I appeared before you and I suggested that the 
independent study that I felt was needed thoroughly answered why rates are 
indeed high in California and you've heard various experts and you'll have 
various reports coming to you suggesting the reason why. We have advocated an 
independent study and when the CARE report initially came out I was very 
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excited about getting my hands on that. I wanted to see if there was something 
in there that provided value to the debate. Well, it took me two months to get 
ahold of it, and then I had to sign a nondisclosure agreement and then I looked 
at it and found out why they didn't want anyone to see it. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I know and you said all that in your letter to the PUC ... 
STEVE DAVIS: So my point is, I still believe that there is a need to 
really begin to understand why rates are high. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let me ask you this, generally, do you disagree with 
anything that Dr. Borenstein said in his testimony to us about why rates are 
high in California? 
STEVE DAVIS: I think he gave us some good concepts and some good 
foundation. I think you need to go into much greater detail and analytical 
evidence to find out why indeed that is correct. It will differ by utility. 
My utility has, he referred to some mistakes in judgments. In San Diego, 
unless we start getting about five times the amount of rainfall we get, we're 
not going to have hydropower. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: San Diego, I think you told me yesterday, was saved from a 
mistake in judgment by the Energy Commission. Is that right? 
STEVE DAVIS: As it relates to adding another nuclear plant, you're 
correct. And also, is it a mistake that we don't burn coal in this state? 
There are some that say we're glad we don't burn coal because of air quality 
concerns. So, that's not a mistake in judgment in my eyes. I think we need to 
address this utility by utility and really take a good look at why rates are 
indeed high. 
In 1985 my company's rates were second highest in the nation, 13 cents a 
kilowatt hour. When you worked in San Diego for my company, you didn't tell 
your neighbor where you worked. It wasn't a very pretty sight back then. 
Today we stand before you as the lowest IOU in the state. We have reduced our 
rates by 25%. We are under performance-based ratemaking today. We filed a 
rate decrease two weeks ago and my expectation is to end 1995 with rates lower 
than we have today. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So would you say in San Diego it ain't broke so don't fix 
it? 
STEVE DAVIS: No, absolutely not. We view performance-based ratemaking as 
we have said all along as a mere bridge to competition. As we now enter the 
Energy Policy Act aftermath of 1992 what we're saying is now it's time to be 
focused on the wholesale market and largely what you heard Mr. Foster talk 
about Poolco, the similarities, the two proposals are essentially the same. 
There are some structural differences between the two. For instance, we 
suggest that we would separate out our generation component completely into an 
affiliate. Also, the transmission ownership of this system we suggest that it 
could actually be divested and I think you're going to hear from Mr. Caldwell a 
proposal about that. So from the structural perspective there are some minor 
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differences but foundationally as to how the pool would operate we're in lock 
step. But we view that component as an evolutionary progression to greater 
competition to begin to reduce rates and you've heard people talk about 
principles and again, one thing that we have said all along, my company, 
competitive benefits of the wholesale market must go to all of our customers. 
Secondly, the benefits go to customers at the same time. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Imbrecht principle number two. 
STEVE DAVIS: That' correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. 
STEVE DAVIS: Also, the pool mechanism will still allow for public policy 
choices to be made by bodies such as yourself in a manner in which people 
cannot bypass that. It's not fair to have one certain class of customer able 
to go around that and not pay for their share of those sociatable objectives or 
this proposal would provide for everyone paying for that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: To make that concrete, what you're saying is that 
California wants diversity, it can require the pool to buy at a certain 
percentage, wind power whatever ... 
STEVE DAVIS: Or it could require the distribution company to take 15 
percent of its power requirements from a renewable resource. I mean, there are 
various ways to do that and this is an efficient way to do that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But I would suppose you would be urging it's easier to do 
it through a pool than it is to do it through a distribution system because 
there's going to be a distribution system whatever the plan that's adopted. 
STEVE DAVIS: Correct. Absolutely. Another concern and principle for us 
is that we need to insure and maintain our current system reliability and 
customer reliability. We feel that the pool again allows that. It's 
dispatching the system based upon efficiency and economy and rather than 
dispatching is based upon a series of agreements between generators and 
customers. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I misspoke, Mr. Lipper points out to me. You couldn't do 
it through the pool because FERC will control the pool so you have to do it 
through the distribution whatever plan's adopted. 
STEVE DAVIS: Yes, FERC would be the controller of the pool so what you 
would basically do, as I said, the distribution company would be the one in 
which you would need to ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: PG&E says, of course, they've got a distribution system as 
part of their plan but you could do the same thing with them. So that it's not 
an advantage for your system if it in all cases these policies are reflected 
through the way the distribution is regulated. 
STEVE DAVIS: Again, part of our proposal is the separation of our 
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business to generation transmission and distribution and it makes it a lot 
cleaner and more efficient by just making that policy choice go to the 
distribution level where everyone is hooked up to. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: But our goal here is to try to educate ourselves about 
which of these proposals is floating around there will best be able to reflect 
these policies that we now have and we may seek to continue. So, I'm asking 
you does your plan have any advantages over the PG&E retail wheeling plan, 
direct access plan? 
STEVE DAVIS: Well, I think it provides greater clarity and efficiency in 
promulgating societal objectives on a distribution company. Again, we would 
separate it out; distribution, transmission and generation. Now, that's not to 
say you could not do that in a fully bundled or vertically integrated utility 
company. We're doing it today. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Well, their plan doesn't contemplate the fully integrated 
company in the future. I mean, they're plan is moving away from that. Their 
plan, as I understand it, might lead to a point where the PG&E is not providing 
any of the energy generated by them for customers in their service area. 
STEVE DAVIS: I'm just saying in looking at their proposal I have not seen 
that separation as my company has proposed. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: All right. Anything further? 
STEVE DAVIS: No. Any questions? 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Do you see under your plan and what we heard from Mr. 
Foster that one pool could be created for (a) for the whole state? One pool 
for the Edison and San Diego service areas? Would that work better? 
STEVE DAVIS: We have said that ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Or a pool for each. 
STEVE DAVIS: We have said that a pool could be up and running for an area 
the size of our service territory. However, we've also said that the larger 
the area, the greater the opportunity for economies and efficiencies, so we 
would certainly support a broader pool, a broader transmission network, broader 
competition in the generation sector. But it could work on a smaller level. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Thank you very much. 
STEVE DAVIS: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Any questions? All right, our final witness in this group 
is Mr. Caldwell, who is the technical director of the Center for Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Technologies. Welcome. 
JAMES CALDWELL: I'd like to put up one chart. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. I've been trying to give names, in my own mind, to 
these different proposals and so far I guess I had on the PG&E retail wheeling 
delayed at least for some customers, TURN's easy, they gave us their own label, 
community access, Mr. Foster is Poolco, I guess San Diego Gas and Electric is 
also Poolco although I think they describe it as Poolco plus efficient direct 
access and your plan, as I understand it, is refinancing of the utility costs. 
Is that a good label for it? 
JAMES ·::::ALDWELL: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, tell us about it. 
JAMES CALDWELL: I'd like to start going back to where we began the 
hearings here and try to quantify it a little bit about what these costs are by 
function. We've heard a lot about distribution, we've heard a lot about 
transmission and about generations so what do we spend and where and what could 
we spend in the future? And the first graph there shows essentially what we're 
spending now, the distribution of the 23 billion dollars or so that the state 
spends on electricity and the second graph shows what we could do relatively 
shortly under what we believe is our proposal. And the savings we are talking 
about is 4.7 billion dollars. Now when you break those down functionally, we 
can see the top bar there is the distribution system. That's when we talk 
about PBR. That's generally what we're talking about regulating and what we're 
saying there is under PBR we can achieve some efficiencies and over time we 
will get rid of the fat that is marbled throughout the meat in that sector. 
What we're showing here though is, and what most people have said today is that 
PBR will not reduce rates today. I'll come back to the middle bar in a minute. 
The bottom bar is generation. Clearly, that's where the action is. That's 
where the brass ring is. That's what Dr. Borenstein talked about and that's 
what most of the witnesses have talked about. And the issue before us is how 
to get from here to there. If we're going to reduce rates, that's the nut we 
have to crack right there. 
The middle bar in transmission you can see is relatively minor in terms of its 
cost contribution. It's extremely important in this sense that it is the 
gating item and the item that controls the access from one to the other; and 
therefore, is the mechanism to shift costs from one to the other and if we mess 
up the transmission function, it's not so much the transmission cost that will 
be incurred but we will end up shifting costs from generation to distribution 
and if we envision a future where distribution is regulated, monopoly 
generation is competitive. What we will do is set up a regime where we can 
shift the risks under the regulated portion and shift the profits out into the 
unregulated portion and that's a prescription for disaster. 
Now, the problem that we face on how to get from here to there is not lack of 
direct access. It's not lack of economic dispatch or variable costs through a 
pool and it's not principally QF costs and it won't be solved by burning more 
coal. Let's get it straight. The problem is the promise of fixed cost 
recovery for existing generation without regard to the market value for that 
generation. That's the principle cause of the problem. And it doesn't reside 
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in one of us, it resides in all of us. 
In the handout that I gave I listed five principle things. I could go on and 
list ten. The point that I want to make, first of all, is that we all bear a 
piece of that. Everyone's generation is a piece of that and we all must solve 
it together if we're going to do it. We cannot solve it piecemeal. We cannot 
solve it utility by utility. We cannot solve it plant by plant. We have to 
solve it together. One significant reason for that is as well as some 
uneconomic assets we also have some super economic assets embedded in our 
mixed. And if we try to solve all the uneconomic assets by giving people their 
money back and then say now generation is competitive then what we've done is 
create a tremendous windfall for those. So we need to solve these questions 
together. 
The second point I want to make on the fixed cost issue is that not all fixed 
costs are sunk and not all sunk costs are stranded but we're treating them that 
way today. We're treating all of our fixed costs as if they were sunk. We've 
heard today that they're all stranded. They're not all stranded and they're 
not all sunk. We are incurring fixed costs. We are making new decisions every 
day about what fixed costs to incur, about what capital additions to make to 
our plants. And that's the problem that we have to address. We have to get 
that decision subject to market forces. 
The third point I want to make is one that disturbs me a lot about the PUC's 
ruling last night and the discussion that was held earlier here. CERT filed a 
motion last week to require the PUC to start hearings on this issue of fixed 
cost recovery because we were concerned about the piecemeal nature of the way 
it was coming up. And the point is that this fixed cost recovery and who they 
are and where they are and what we should do about them is the key input to the 
process. It's not a policy outcome. It's the key input. We have no way of 
determining what the results of our policies will be or what kinds of structure 
we set up unless we have the input information and without that information 
we're not able to choose between alternatives so to say we're going to make our 
alternative choice and then come back later and figure out how much it's going 
to save, to me is just ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I want to be sure I understand this point and get it 
clarified. So you disagree with what I said that this is a bad thing to do. 
This is a good thing to do. It's the right thing to do and we ought to be 
looking at this question of stranded investment with respect to all the 
proposals that are out there because that will help us decide which is the 
right one. 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And so you think they should go forward with that and 
they ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: Yes, they should have gone forward six months ago ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And they don't need to ... And they should do it in the 
alternative. 
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JAMES CALDWELL: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Look at all of these proposals and look at how they handle 
the stranded investments and what impact that will have on future prices of 
electricity. 
JAMES CALDWELL: All of the various proposals are about how to distribute 
those costs. Okay. We can have a discussion about how to distribute those 
costs but first we have to say what they are and if we don't know what they are 
how can we tell how to distribute them. And those who want to go ahead early 
without making that determination, what they're really saying is let's go ahead 
and let me start. Then you determine the costs. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So why are you upset if they're doing it? Is it the way 
they're doing it? 
JAMES CALDWELL: They're not doing it at all. 
don't want to do it until the end. They don't want 
don't want to face what the problem is. They don't 
around it. They don't want to try to discover what 
fix that. That's what we need to do. 
And as you pointed out they 
to face the problem. They 
want to get their hands 
it is that we need to do to 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You're suggesting that they PUC is on a track to craft a 
proposal where they don't have the information they need in order to come up 
with the one that's going to do the best job of lowering electricity price in 
California. 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: How long would it take them to do that? 
JAMES CALDWELL: I think we don't want to confuse precision with accuracy. 
In order to come up with precise answer, we can argue about it forever. We can 
come up reasonably quickly with a very, very good estimate and I think that's 
what's required. And that estimate can be done, I think, within workshops, 
could be done by the January 31st deadline. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So why do you say that they aren't doing it? Is it 
something that you read in this order that suggests to you that they aren't 
doing it? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Well, as I said, I think we filed a motion two weeks ago 
asking them to start this process. Last night we come up with this thing and 
as you characterized it, it was damning that idea with faint praise. It said, 
"Well, this is something that we don't want to do. It's really a bad idea, but 
because you made us do it, we'll do it. And what we're suggesting is they 
should have wanted to do it a long time ago and it wasn't ACR 143 that should 
have compelled them to do it, it was getting the information to get the right 
answer. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, forget the reason for it, if they're going to do it 
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is it ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's great. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Are you applauding? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Yes. And I just didn't want to leave the impression that 
what we ought to do is just sort of dismiss it. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. All right. 
situation they're in, they can look at 
deal with this question and provide by 
Legislature. 
And they can do it. Given the 
the different alternatives and they can 
January 3~st that information to the 
JAMES CALDWELL: We would say that it's possible. I think to get into the 
distribution of how to solve the problem or who's going to bear these things is 
a political discussion that has to take place afterwards. I would despair of 
that taking place by January 31st, but the analytical detail as to what it is, 
I think can be done properly. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, you know, these political questions the PUC doesn't 
get into those. That will be here in the political body after we hear what 
they've proposed. 
JAMES CALDWELL: Well, this is a political problem and there will be a 
political solution. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Then we obviously ought to be a part of that ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: ... because we are politicians. Okay. Go ahead. Tell us 
about your plan that you would like to have them also look at in terms of this 
problem of stranded investment. 
JAMES CALDWELL: Our plan starts with a clear v~s~on of what the division 
between these and what the functions of these functions are. And we think it's 
very important to start with that vision first. We're talking about a 
transition to a more competitive environment or those kinds of vague things 
doesn't get it. That's what gets us into the jurisdictional issues. That's 
what gets us into the cost shifting issues. We need to be clear about the 
separation of these functions and what our vision is, is a disaggregated 
utility structure. Where there is a disaggregation between generation, 
transmission and distribution. And the generation level, most of us agree and 
I don't think you've heard anything today that would say anything different, 
should become a competitive commodity. And we believe that means that 
investors and not ratepayers should be at risk for field diversity for 
environmental footprint, etc. We also believe that all costs, those fixed and 
variable costs need to be recovered at market rates. In the transmission area, 
we believe it's simple to say that this is a regional monopoly and we ought to 
start treating it as such. We ought to stop treating it like a bunch of Vulcan 
nations where each individual utility has their own transmission and then tries 
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to guard that transmission and tries to use that transmission to keep someone 
else from having some competitive advantage. We need to put transmission 
together into a regional monopoly and start treating it as such. It will 
become a FERC regulated common carrier with nondiscriminatory access and 
pricing and it should have and it will have state and regional oversight. And 
we believe the transmission should also be responsible for the measurement of 
the environmental impacts of generation. This is the place where the 
information counts and this is where we can act on that information in our 
oversight capacity. 
The distribution portion becomes a disaggregated local monopoly with state, PUC 
or municipality regulated cost of service provider under PBR regulation if 
that's what people wish. The distribution should be responsible for mitigation 
of end use deficiency market failures, should be responsible for the social and 
low income programs but it should be under local control. 
And the deal, how do we get there? Our proposal is that we sell the 
transmission assets and we sell those transmission assets at a multiple of the 
embedded costs. Now we sell the transmission assets first so that we can begin 
this disaggregation process. And we sell them in a multiple of their embedded 
costs, something below their replacement cost and something like their market 
value. And we use that money. We use that cash that we have raised to cover 
the stranded generation assets and to give the rate decrease to the people. 
On the transmission side of the equation, we get financial leverage. We get it 
from a longer term, no financing, a lower interest rate and higher debt premium 
because transmission is a much less risky asset than generation is. We also 
can get a premium for the hard asset value, the real estate value of the 
transmission. It would be similar to what you would do as a consumer if you 
began to get into trouble with your monthly payments that you'd incurred on a 
credit card and that's what we've done. We incurred these generation assets on 
our credit card. We're paying for them at something like an 18% fixed charge 
rate or an 18% interest rate. And the first thing anyone tells you to do when 
you go in with a problem, a work-out problem is refinance. Refinance your 
credit card debt, put it on your home equity. Where is our equity? Where is 
the assets that we have that has some collateral that we can use and that's the 
transmission. And that's what we say it on that side of the equation. 
On the generation side of the equation, we have the same premium for hard asset 
value. Since we're going to transition to this competitive market where those 
generation assets are part of the competition, then the real estate value, the 
premium for those assets can reside with the owners of those assets. There's 
also a discount for cash in doing this that replacing one regulatory promise to 
pay with another regulatory promise to pay in some drawn out transition service 
charge is guaranteed to be viewed with skepticism by the markets and that 
skepticism will be translated into a higher risk premium, higher interest rates 
- worst financial conditions for the utilities. 
And finally, that's the way we can get to a market test for our new fixed 
costs. Not just the old fixed costs but for the new fixed costs. And we 
believe that this leverage that we get on both sides of the equation from the 
transmission to the generation allows us to incur maybe a 3/10th of a cent 
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increase in transmission rates and that's going to support a 2 cent per 
kilowatt hour drop in our generation cost. That's the way we get a rate 
increase and that's the way we transition to a new world. 
The other side, after we've made this sale is that generation rate base is set 
to zero. That guaranteed fixed cost recovery for generation is over. Any 
mistake that is made in the future will not be warned first by the investors, 
not by the ratepayers. The contracts will be cashed out and renegotiated and 
uneconomic assets will be retired. 
The third piece of the deal has to be this disaggregation. The distribution 
monopoly has to be forbidden from signing long-term contracts with affiliated 
generation. We have to break the vertical problem of shifting risks one way 
and shifting profits the other way. And I would compare this to Dr. 
Borenstein's excise tax and I would also say to Assemblywoman Moore that we 
want to do is we want to return the cash to the shareholders and let them earn 
the return. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let me just see if translating it into concepts that I 
understand better. The way this process would start is that an independent 
entity would be set up to handle the transmission. Is that right? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And would go to the financial market, borrow money on a 
long-term basis at a favorable rate of interest ... right? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Now it's going to take this money and it's going to 
buy from each of the investor owned utilities in California ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: And we believe it's also important and this is a very 
important point that I think hasn't been said today is is that the municipal 
utilities in this state must be brought up to equal footing. That sitting here 
just talking about the PUC will not work. Municipal utilities are one third of 
the load in this state. They own a significant piece of the assets and ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But do they own transmission? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So they're going to have to sell their transmission? 
JAMES CALDWELL: They're going to have to be involved in the process. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But what does that mean? I thought ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: Someone's going to opt out. I mean it's not necessary to 
every last piece of transmission. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: The transmission entity is going to own all the 
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transmission line. 
JAMES CALDWELL: All the transmission that is voluntarily sold. In other 
words, if you want to raise the cash to cash out your stranded assets then this 
is the way you get the stranded asset recovery. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Okay. 
JAMES CALDWELL: If you want to keep it where you are, that's your 
problem. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Okay, if that's your problem and you don't get anything 
for stranded investments, so everybody is going to want to do this presumably 
who has these standard offer four contracts or nuclear power plants. 
JAMES CALDWELL: And it's more broadly than that. It's not just nuclear 
and it's not just QF contracts. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Okay. 
JAMBS CALDWELL: What I've read throughout this. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Okay. Now each utility then will get a different price 
for its transmission facilities depending on how much of those uneconomic 
stranded investments they have because you're going to pay them out this way. 
There not all going to get the price based on the market value of those power 
poles and lines then. The transformers ... 
JAMBS CALDWELL: We're suggesting that they get the price based upon the 
value of the transmission. It just happens that we can set that value high 
enough so that we can cover the generations to make ... 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Would it be the same for each utility? 
JAMBS CALDWELL: No . 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: So I'm going to get more for the same, let's take 
comparable units of transmission. Edison might get more for it's than ... 
JAMBS CALDWELL: No. For comparable units of transmission they would get 
the same value. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: But suppose these stranded investments are much bigger 
with certain utilities as compared to others. How does that work out? 
JAMBS CALDWELL: I think the remarkable thing when you look at the numbers 
as we've looked at it that the ratio of stranded investment to transmission 
book value for the three investor-owned utilities is remarkably similar. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: It has difference components but it has ... 
JAMBS CALDWELL: But the number is about the same. Now maybe that's a 
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testimony to consistently bad regulation or something, I don't know, but it's 
remarkably the same. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: It is remarkable to me because they have a different 
quantity of transmission facilities and they have different stranded 
investments but putting it altogether they'd all get paid in effect the same 
thing for their, on a comparable basis ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: The same multiple over their embedded costs. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: If they choose to participate, it would pay off all 
theirs. 
JAMES CALDWELL: Now the municipal utilities are not the same. There's 
considerable diversity among the municipal utilities and if you get that far 
the one person you might hear from today, Jan Schori, would probably be helped 
least by this proposal of all the major utilities in the state. Doesn't mean 
they wouldn't be helped by it but they would be helped least or less likely 
than the rest of the utilities in the state. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They would all keep their generating facilities? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And the ones that are noncompetitive they'd sell them off 
for whatever they can get? 
JAMES CALDWELL: Shut them down or do something with them or sell the real 
estate ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You wouldn't even look at that, as I understand ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: What you're saying when you buy it you're going to buy it 
based on some market value of these transmission facilities. 
JAMES CALDWELL: You would obviously have to look at that in terms of 
making the decision. The market will have to look at that in terms of how it 
views the transaction. It will have to look at both sides of the transaction. 
It has to look at what is the value of what's left and was that enough money to 
compensate the shareholders for, if you will, breaching this contract. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I thought you said this stuff magically all works out on 
your calculations, that I thought you said you're not going to set the price 
for the transmission facilities based upon what the stranded investments are. 
You're not going to look at the fact that PG&E owns Diablo Canyon in deciding 
how much you're going to pay PG&E for their transmission facilities. 
JAMES CALDWELL: PG&E will obviously look at that and the market will look 
at that when we try to decide what happens to PG&E stock. Clearly, we can also 
make a determination about that that is separate from this transaction. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Wouldn't this be a negotiated contract between this new 
transmission entity and PG&E as far as what PG&E's going to get for, or whether 
they're going to decide to participate in? 
JAMES CALDWELL: We think that the construct here is a grand deal and that 
the formula for the transmission sale is similar for all utilities. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, you say that but I thought you said it was voluntary 
with each utility and so PG&E may feel that it has to bargain for a higher 
price for its transmission facilities that come out as you say they will. 
JAMES CALDWELL: Then it's going to have to ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But then Edison would. 
JAMES CALDWELL: It's going to have to convince everyone in that 
transaction that they deserve that and it's also going to have to convince the 
market that the price for the transmission that results is viable in the 
future. It's also going to have to convince it's own shareholders that it got 
enough and that's where the tension is. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I've taken more time than I should. I'm going to have to 
study your plan a little more carefully and see if I can ... They said you gave 
us something and I guess this is the document. 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's clearly a simple outline. I mean I have obviously 
the next level of detail down and I've committed to the PUC to a third level of 
detail down. The issue turns out to be in the numbers and that's why what 
we're saying is again that what we want to do is begin to hold evidentiary 
hearings. Not just on our plan, necessarily, but on the numbers that underlie 
what the conclusions that we drew and that's what we need to do to go forward. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: If I understand you though, what you're saying is that if 
your system, if your plan is adopted, it's voluntary with each utility whether 
to participate, those that don't stay under current ratemaking structure. Is 
that right? Those that participate get into this new world so ... 
JAMES CALDWELL: They get into the new world and for that they get some 
cash. If they don't then they have to take care of their own stranded 
investment their own way. They have to eat it basically. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: There won't be any stranded investment if we discontinue 
with the current system. 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They'll recover it out of their rates. 
JAMES CALDWELL: That's correct. They will be encouraged to join. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Well, it's interesting. Thank you very much for 
Page 59 
your testimony. At this time I promised you a break. We have one witness who 
we are going to hear right after the break who has to go back to San Francisco. 
He says he has one minute of testimony so we're going to accommodate him and 
ask Mr. Gamboa to come forward from the Latino Issues Forum who's listed under 
the next item on our agenda. Welcome. Sorry to squeeze you in this way but in 
order to accommodate you we're going to have to ask you to be very brief. 
JOHN GAMBOA: I'll be extremely brief. First of all I'm John Gamboa, I'm 
the executive director of the Greenlining Coalition which is a multiethnic 
coalition. I was formally the director of Latino Issues Forum. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I should have said and Greenlining. You're no longer 
with ... You're representing Greenlining. 
JOHN GAMBOA: That's exactly right. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you. Sorry about that. 
JOHN GAMBOA: Very similar organization except it's multiethnic. It 
includes Asians and African-Americans among others. 
First of all, I want to thank the committee and yourself, Mr. Chairman, for 
holding these meetings and for allowing me to address you on such an important 
issue. And I'll be extremely, extremely brief. 
Our organization and our constituents are not opposed to competition if it's 
fair competition although we would like to see a little more cooperation and a 
little less competition if it's going to be competition like its been before in 
other cases of deregulation. Our community has suffered disproportionately and 
I'm talking about the at risk consumers, the low-income, poor limitingly 
speaking and recent immigrants have suffered disproportionately from 
deregulation in this country. For example, in deregulation of telephone 
services in 1980, the Latino community in this state had penetration, had 
telephone service of 90%. Today it's down to 80%. That's whats happened 
because of deregulation. The actual cost of residential services has gone up 
astronomically and has frozen people out and frozen the most at risk consumers. 
The effect of this is that about half a million children do not have access to 
emergency services through 911. That was the effect of deregulation of the 
telephone industry. 
Another effect of deregulation is that there is, in fact it addresses 
Assemblyman Baca's question, "Who protects the consumer?" There is no 
protection. In deregulation of the telephone industry, the low-income 
consumers were found to have suffered from Pacific Telephone's marketing fraud 
to the extent of 50 million dollars that had to be refunded plus fined 16 
million dollars. 
In the area of deregulation of gas, I've handed out to you a chart that was 
part of the talk given by Bruce Henning, the Chief Economist of the American 
Gas Association at a recent conference and I point this out to you because it 
certainly points out the problem that happens to the poor and the residential 
customers in deregulation. As you see in this chart in 1984, the well-head 
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cost of natural gas was $2.60 per million cubic feet. It's decreased to $2.0~, 
a 25% decrease. Everybody has benefited except the residential customer. 
Again, the residential customer takes the brunt. I think the best example of 
what happens in deregulation when our communities' interests are not taken into 
effect in the beginning is a deregulation of the savings and loan industry. 
The savings and loan industry as you know was a fiasco, was a fraud ... 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Mr. Gamboa, I don't want to break into your flow but, I 
mean, obviously your going to come to the point that we're interested in which 
is your view on electricity. Is the bottom line that because of what we've 
seen in these other areas that we should not deregulate electricity or is your 
message that it's okay to go forward, examine this and bring competition in but 
we need to lock into the law guarantees that the residential consumers will 
enjoy the benefits just as the other consumers? 
JOHN GAMBOA: Basically yes, but I think its more important than that. I 
think what we need to do and I think what you've started doing is to assist and 
encourage the at-risk consumer body to be part of the process. That's whats 
been lacking. What's wrong with the Bluebook? The Bluebook, in fact it 
connotates sad the color blue and it's certainly sad for our community. It 
does not address the problem. That particular proposal impacts our community 
negatively in a terrible way. It destroys all of the social contracts and 
gains we have made over the last 30 years. The importance, I think, and what I 
want to emphasize is the importance of slowing down the process. Doing the 
outreach in a sufficient way so our community can understand the issue, can 
participate and represent itself. None of the speakers that were up here today 
and none of the speakers that I see following except from our organization are 
proposing that or are speaking up for the people down on the bottom. We look 
to you to protect us and to give us the assistance to be able to have a voice 
in that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well/ I think the representative from TURN would suggest 
that that's their perspective, they share your perspective for all the 
consumers, the small consumers as well as the large. 
JOHN GAMBOA: TURN is a wonderful organization that represents the 
consumer body in total. Our organization represents the little seat consumer 
that sometimes gets lost, the most at risk consumer, people that are most often 
defrauded and market abused and that is shown by history. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. I can assure you that that's going to be our 
intention to bring everyone in as we exercise our oversight responsibility. 
JOHN GAMBOA: If I may, Mr. Chairman, just briefly what I'd like to do is 
make a recommendation. I've heard people recommend hearings on special issues 
regarding around stranded investments and pooling. I think we need also 
special hearings to see what the effect is on the little seat consumer. I urge 
you to have such hearings. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: All right. Thank you. Thank you for that message. Thank 
you for coming today. We're going to take our break now. I think we'll come 
back at 2:00. We are going to start promptly at 2:00 and I think we'll be able 
Page 61 
to go expeditiously through the rest of our witnesses if now they react to what 
they've heard and we stick to our five minute limit. 
BREAK 
(Chair-man Sher and beginning of Eevin Williams not on tapa.) 
EBVIN WILLIAMS: ... population of fifteen million people of color. There 
is a very important need to insure that that populace of this great state is 
heard and participates in these discussions to the greatest extent possible. 
As I was about to say some call or refer to the deregulation proposal on 
discussion as the Bluebook proposal. Since the Halloween holiday is next week 
I want to recharacterize the Bluebook proposal as the "Trick or Treat" 
proposal. 
In the African American, Latino, and other communities of color, if history has 
ever repeated itself the electrical companies will get the treat and the 
communities of color will get the trick. The proposal is based on an outdated 
Reagan trickledown economic theory and it didn't work 14 years ago and it won't 
work today. Survey of the African American community shows no support for 
deregulation. CPUC has never disputed that deregulation is not in the best 
interest of small consumers of color and I think it was Mr. Baca that pointed 
out that so-called choice for people of color may very well be illusory. 
Regulatory history indicates that competition without establishing fair rules 
leads to unfair results. For example, breaking up AT&T telephone monopoly 
resulted in lowered long distance rates benefiting large business users but 
higher rates for residential, local services. The effects of these rate 
changes on the availability of phone service and low-income communities were 
devastating. A recent analysis of census data showed that 20% of black 
children under the age of six live in homes without phones. A different 
industry, for sure, but if you deregulate the chicken so will you deregulate 
the egg. Research also indicates that where people of color are concerned 
easing regulations and allowing competition among the electric companies may 
result in higher and poor service for the following reasons: First, competing 
for larger consumers, utilities will reduce rates to the lowest possible cost 
for electrical customers. To make up for the loss of revenue, utilities may 
increase rates for smaller customers, minority and low-income homes and 
businesses who lack the bargaining power and information to demand the same 
competitive rates. 
Secondly, the service needs of smaller customers including small minority 
businesses may be neglected in pursuit of keeping larger companies happy. 
Thirdly, rate assistance programs for income customers may be reduced or 
eliminated. Companies that provide rate assistance for higher costs than those 
that do not. To stay competitive, utilities may cut costs that do not increase 
revenue. And finally, because small customers are captive customers of 
utilities until the year 2002, they will be stuck with higher rates imposed by 
utilities which unlike the competitive have lingering costs that still need to 
be paid off. Each of the latter will have a staggering consequence on African 
American communities. 
In closing, only those balanced positioning of the disinfranchised and the 
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powerful corporate interests will competition work to benefit all Californians. 
We believe that there has been insufficient outreach, in fact, there needs to 
be an inverse reaching out to insure that all Californians play a role and 
participate in decisions that are being made that will affect their lives from 
now to perpetuity. We appreciate the opportunity to have a chance to at least 
bring some of the concerns that have been brought to us in communities of color 
in the bay area. The first hearing that I attended I was absolutely astounded 
at the fact that outreach has been considered advertising in the federal 
register. People who are low-income living in public housing don't have 
accessibility nor do they read the federal register. So we believe that 
additional hearings just as on the other issues where side hearings may be held 
should be convened to address the plethora of concerns that confront people of 
color with regard to small business, minority business, contracts, all the 
other social incentive programs that may be impacted by this trick or treat 
deregulation. And I thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you and next we have Linda Filchev. 
LINDA FILCHEV: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. I'm going 
to focus my discussion on costs which is after all the driving force behind the 
Bluebook proposal and behind the hearings today. Now, supposedly, the 
commission's desire in issuing the Bluebook proposal is to reduce costs but the 
key question here and the key question for our constituency is this, reduce 
costs for whom? Which class of consumers are we talking about when we say we 
want to reduce costs? 
You know, it's my perspective sitting here in the audience and also sitting in 
at some of the PUC hearings that if you were to just sit in on these hearings 
you would think that the only class of customers in this state are large 
industrial commercial customers and that there are no residential and low-
income customers in California. From the perspective of our constituencies, we 
stand to lose if any portion of the Bluebook proposal is adopted. Our view is 
that we'll end up as captives of the utilities, as Mr. Williams has pointed 
out, and that our bills are going to increase. 
Another issue here that's supposedly in the background of this debate is the 
desire to stimulate the California economy so that California can remain 
competitive. The Commission has linked the well-being, the economic well-being 
of California, with large industrial and commercial interests. That's all very 
well and fine, but the fact is that in the recent years of down-sizing it's 
been small business, the small business sector that's created jobs for 
Californians and that's particularly the case in communities of color. So it's 
a fallacy, this notion that savoring big business is going to help the state. 
We need to look at the needs of the small business community and particularly 
the minority small business community. 
One of the problems with the debate so far is this; electricity under the 
Bluebook proposal is viewed as a commodity, a commodity not that different from 
bushels of wheat or tons of iron ore to be bought and sold on the market. The 
reality is that electricity is a basic necessity and in this state it has been 
a vehicle for achieving important social policy. Programs have been created in 
recent years that benefits all of California. Unfortunately, in the context of 
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this debate these programs, programs such as LERA, Demand Side Management, The 
WMDVBE Program, these programs are now discussed as if they are a burden 
contributing to increased costs and burdening competition. As a result these 
equitable programs which have brought tangible benefits to our communities are 
now at risk. In one sense they've become scape goats. OUr view is that 
programs such as LERA, WMDVBE, DSM, are programs that are cost-effective. Last 
year alone, the WMDVBE program, that's the Women Minority Service Disabled 
Business Enterprise Program created one billion dollars worth of contracts for 
women-owned and minority-owned businesses. I ask you to consider the cost, the 
human and the economic cost of eliminating such a program. 
With regard to to the LERA Program, last year l.l million households 
participated in that program. That's only one-third of the eligible households 
in the state by the way. The average cost to the residential customer of LERA 
was 16 cents a month. Again, I ask you to consider in the course of this 
debate the cost of eliminating a program such as LERA which has helped one 
million people pay their electricity bills. 
Another cost to consider and a cost that the utilities should consider as well, 
is what is .the cost of shutting off people's power. There are administrative 
costs associated with shutting people's power off and turning it on again and 
to my knowledge no one has yet to study the cost to the state, both human and 
economic costs, of having households living without electricity for any period 
of time. We don't know how many people had their power shut off last year, for 
how long and what the consequences were. In fact, rather than putting a 
program such as LERA at risk, I suggest that the appropriate dialogue concern 
itself with increasing the LERA Program to bring it in par with Universal 
Lifeline Service in the telephone industry which offers a 50 percent rate break 
as opposed to just 15. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I am going to ask you if you can to summarize, but in 
doing so the point that I am most interested in, are you saying that this 
restructuring should not go forward because these valuable programs will be 
sacrificed, or, on the alternative are you saying you don't take that position 
but if the restructuring does go forward these programs must be preserved? 
Which of those two or both? 
LINDA FILCHEV: Well, our view is there are many aspects of the Bluebook 
proposal that will be devastating for our communities. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But I'm more particularly interested in the general 
concept because I see the PUC back ... If we just focus on the Bluebook, you're 
going to not be focusing on what's likely to emerge from all of this so I think 
it's important for me and the committee generally to know, are you saying that 
you oppose any introduction of this competition and direct access because you 
fear that it will lead to the loss of these programs or are you saying make 
sure that if these programs go forward, the proposal goes forward that the 
programs will be saved? 
LINDA FILCHEV: In a general sense, our view is that to the extent that 
savings can be captured we do not oppose competition and deregulation and 
restructuring so long as those savings are passed on equitably to our 
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constituency and that includes low-income people and communities of color. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. That's fine. That's what I wanted to know. 
LINDA FILCHEV: Okay, at the present time we don't see a direct access 
plan that would be workable because of this problem of market leverage. But 
again, to the extent that savings can be captured and passed on. Sure we 
support that if it brings us lower rates as well. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Good. That's what I wanted to hear. Do you have anything 
else you wish to say? 
LINDA FILCHEV: Well, I'd just like to end by emphasizing that, you know, 
in addition to considering the cost of kilowatt hours, we need to consider the 
human costs as well and I would also like to reiterate Mr. Gamboa's request 
that this committee hold a hearing addressing the concerns that I've raised 
addressing low-interest concerns, the concerns of community of color and the 
equitable programs that are now in place. 
much. Thank you both. All right. 
perspectives and so our next witness 
And you tell us which consumers you 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you very 
We are going to continue with the customer 
will Dian Grueneich from her own company. 
represent and what your perspective is if you will. 
DIAN GRUENEICH: Thank you. My name is Dian Grueneich with Grueneich 
Resource Advocates. I am appearing today on my own behalf. In general I've 
been representing consumer interests at the PUC and in the Bluebook proceeding, 
I've specifically been representing the interests of state agencies as 
consumers. So that certainly is coloring my remarks today. 
There were three areas that I was going to touch upon briefly. I guess four 
with my introduction. The first initial point is that I think overall it's 
fair to say having sat in many meetings with customers that we continue to be 
concerned about our perspective being addressed at the CPUC in the whole 
restructuring proceeding and we thank you for having us today. And certainly 
as the Commission proceeds with its proposals and with its report to the 
Legislature in response to ACR 143, one of the things that we're really going 
to be looking for is were there some listening to the customer perspective. 
Let me give you one example of why we get into this situation that as I think 
you may be aware we have going on now at the CPUC a formal hearing on what is 
one of the two aspects of the restructuring, the PBR Performance Based 
Ratemaking Proposal and I'm not going to get into the merits of Southern 
California Edison's proposal. That's the case going on now, but in response to 
questions as to what consultation Edison had with customers in designing that 
proposal the answer was none. They didn't talk to customers and so what we're 
looking at is as we're now saying PBR is one of the mechanisms where is going 
to be the form in which we can have some significant input. 
The other perspective I bring is that I do not believe this is some magic win, 
win situation for everyone, that we simply discover ways that we can all come 
out better that under the existing system. I do believe that there are going 
to be some losers and one of the very significant roles that I see this 
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committee playing is in helping to identify who those losers are and to see 
what instruments can be developed to help cope with that. Whether those who 
are winners are truly getting a fair share and those who are losers what 
mechanisms we can develop but I think there clearly are going to be some 
losers. 
Quickly, the three substantive points I was going to address was what I just 
alluded to was Performance Based Ratemaking. My understanding is that you will 
be having a separate hearing on it so I won't go into detail other than having 
spent a great deal of time now looking at the issue. One thing that I think is 
important to understand is that contrary to what may be the initial reaction to 
PBR is that under PBR shareholder and ratepayer interests are not necessarily 
aligned and as we are starting to explore some of the mechanics of getting into 
it it's clear that there are real tradeoffs. And what we're also dealing with 
I think is that in ACR 143 with regard to PBR there were some clear policy 
items which the Legislature, I think, was asking for a response from the 
Commission as it is starting to set up PBR, what are the Commission's goals and 
policies? 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Can I break in there because you obviously are involved in 
the PUC proceedings. Is there a document or documents that in a 
comprehensible, fairly simple way, describe the PG&E and Edison PBR proposals 
that could be presented to this committee and the members of this committee so 
that we can understand the proposal or is it part of a much larger rate 
application thing that is incomprehensible to all but the experts who 
participate in this. 
DIAN GRUENEICH: There is not a document now that I know of but my bet is 
if you ask for one you'd get one. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Do you think we could get a two or three page description 
of the PG&E and the Edison PBR proposals? 
DIAN GRUENEICH: Yes. And I think I would add to that probably the SDG&E 
one because that's one that's actually been implemented but I think that's 
important and I'd be happy to work with the other parties. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And who would we ask? 
DIAN GRUENEICH: I would probably ask the proponents of the utilities and 
then, I'm sure you would get responses as far as comprehensiveness. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you. 
DIAN GRUENEICH: On PBR, the other point that I was going to make, was one 
of the issues that has come up with the Edison PBR that I think we're looking 
for guidance from certainly the Commission and any help with the Legislature is 
that, as I was mentioning, ACR 143 sets forth some policy items that the 
Commission should be considering presumably in the context of PBR as well as 
direct access. We're in the middle at the PUC of a specific decision on the 
mechanism and an issue as arisen like in so many of these issues should we 
understand what are the polices and goals we are trying to achieve with PBR 
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first and then look at the specific proposals or are we in the context of the 
proposal somehow going to sort this out? I think I join with many people who 
say looking back on it we sure wish we would sort out some of these policies 
but one of the concerns we have with our limited resources is we may go through 
these PBR proceedings and then suddenly at the end start to address some of the 
policy issues of where we're going and be told, "Well, let's redo the whole 
proceeding. " 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I don't want to be misunderstood about what I asked for 
previously. I know that the PG&E, for example, has given us, given my staff an 
explanation of the general reasons for PBR and what its designed to achieve and 
I have in my possession some overheads that were presented as part of the 
proceeding, but what I'm talking about are the benchmarks, the target. Is that 
reduced to writing anywhere that a lay person could understand what it is that 
would be the Performance Base that Edison is asking for so you could look at it 
and see what percentage of the savings, if they're realized will go to the 
benefit of the shareholders and what percentage translated into expected 
dollars? You know, a nice simple explanation of what precisely it is that 
people who are not intimately familiar with the proceeding could understand? 
DIAN GRUENEICH: We're, I think with Edison, we're up to 57 witnesses in 
six weeks of hearings so my thought is the best thing is to make the request 
for the document to be prepared page limit, etc., because if you just ask for 
information that's already out there, you know, hundreds of pages may suddenly 
emerge. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I'm looking for the primer that actually .... 
DIAN GRUENEICH: What I can offer is we have actually put together for the 
Edison PBR a chart of the major parties to the proceedings, their various 
positions on revenue-sharing on benchmarks, on risk factors, things like that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That's their position. I want PG&E's proposal, is there a 
proposal to which they're reacting that has the hard figures in it in terms 
what these benchmarks against which their performance are going to be measured? 
Is that set down, I shouldn't ask you these questions but ... 
DIAN GRUENEICH: It is set down. There is some discussion that they've 
asked for it to be put on hold. There is some discussion they may withdraw it 
because of the interrelationship with 143 and is it something they want on the 
table at this time since it's not actually being ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, go ahead with your presentation. 
DIAN GRUENEICH: But I would be happy to work with the other parties to 
get the information to you. 
The second point that I was going to make was with stranded investment that I 
firmly believe it should not be addressed in a piecemeal fashion in that Jim 
Caldwell is absolutely right that when you start to look at it there are going 
to be write-ups as well as write-downs and we've got to make sure that we get 
the benefit no matter what system we do of looking at it as a coherent piece 
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and that's one of the reasons why, I think, just about every customer group has 
protested the proposed settlement with Edison on accelerated depreciation for 
San Onofre. That that to us is exactly the wrong sort of approach to be taking 
to take out a piece of the puzzle one aspect, get that dealt with in some sort 
of piecemeal fashion and say well let's now deal many months later with the 
rest of the restructuring. We think it needs to be done in a coherent fashion. 
With regard with the ruling, I did want to say that I actually think that 
substantively I do agree with the PUC saying, "Let's get out on the agenda and 
let's start some hearings on stranded investment. So I don't disagree with 
their view that we should get some hearings started on this now and I think 
that since we are not in a situation where we have a consensus view on 
different proposals, it makes as much sense as anything to say under different 
proposals what would stranded investment look like and certainly what's the 
magnitude of it? I also happen to believe since there really has been no 
discussion of stranded investment at the Ombonk Hearings really that we should 
also get out what are various positions as far as who should bear the risk with 
it. In other words, I would go further than just saying what's the magnitude 
of stranded investment. I would say what are the argument for it being solely 
a ratepayer responsibility? What are the arguments for it being shareholder as 
well and I happen to fit in with the camp that says I think that there is some 
pretty strong arguments that the shareholders need to pick up some costs. I 
certainly disagree strongly with this view though that the CPUC is on the right 
track to say that they are going to limit cross-examination and who can 
participate in the hearings and discovering that sort of thing. I think we're 
all going to be looking to getting a little bit broader investigation. 
The third area that I did want to touch upon and again I know this goes to my 
understanding of this will be another hearing that the Legislature is looking 
at is the whole issue of DSM renewables and R&D and the point that I wanted to 
make is twofold: one is that everyone is saying that in the new world, 
whatever that new world is, they'll support it. I mean I don't know what if a 
single party and I think I've read just about everybody's pleadings in the 
Bluebook case, I don't know a single party that said no we won't support it. 
So to me, this is the time to, I don't know whether we start a parallel set of 
hearings or whether at some workshop effort but that again says, "Okay, there 
are a couple of different paths we can be taking, what do we need to have in 
place in the mechanisms under those different paths to keep in place the DSM, 
the renewables, the R&D since everybody says they want to be there? In other 
words, what I see is it's time to start moving into some details to know if it 
workable. I personally believe it is. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You see nothing you can tell that says that people think 
all of those programs that are currently being sponsored,some through rates, 
should continue? 
DIAN GRUENEICH: I'm sorry. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You see no descent from the proposition that in the new 
world of restructuring that the DSM should continue the diversity that 
supported zero emission vehicles, the low-income, you haven't seen anybody 
descent to any of that? 
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DIAN GRUENEICH: I was restricting, let me clarify and apologize. I was 
restricting my comments to the DSM, the renewables, that level. I personally 
am a little bit of a cynic when it comes down to signing on the dotted line how 
much it's really supported, but what I ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You would say that's true of our next witness. She going 
to confirm that the large industrial users support continuation of those 
programs even if it means the rates will be slightly higher for their members? 
DIAN GRUENEICH: What I have been told is that they do support DSM 
programs and diversity and so what I ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: We'll verify that just in a minute. 
DIAN GRUENEICH: So what I... And let me also say in the Bluebook I do 
represent the Department of General Services who does support direct access and 
our position has been we also do support DSM and renewables and what I'm saying 
is, I think, now is the time to, in essence, put our feet to the fire. In 
other words, let's see the specific proposals. We've had about nine months of, 
you know, yes, we'll support it. What does it look like? What are the funding 
mechanisms? What are the levels of funding, that sort of thing is what I'm 
saying. 
And the other point I was going to make with regard to the whole area of DSM 
and renewables is a point that I know you are fully aware of is that in the 
meantime with all this debate the programs are in shambles and a grave concern 
that I have is that in the brave new world which I actually happen to think 
more competition in DSM does make an awful lot of sense, if we've lost a lot of 
our infrastructure and it takes us three years to get the new world what 
happens in the meantime? And we've not been particularly successful in getting 
this, having any sort of attention and so my hope is, you know again, through 
this committee we can get a little bit of light shed on the need to actually 
have some policy support in the here and now and some actual support for these 
programs. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you very much for your testimony. Next 
witness is Karen Edson, representing Californians For Competitive Electricity. 
You can tell us who those Californians are and whether they indeed support all 
of some have called, "Social Programs" and are prepared to pay their fair share 
to support them. 
KAREN EDSON: Mr. Chairman, Assemblyman Baca, I'm Karen Edson here 
representing California For Competitive Electricity. That group, Assemblyman 
Sher, includes not every Californian although we would like it to include every 
Californian, is made up of the California Manufacturers Association, the 
California Large Energy Consumers Association, the California League of Food 
Processors, the Independent Energy Producers Association, Destech Energy, El 
Paso Natural Gas and Wickland Oil Company. This is a group of power producers 
and consumers that came together in the belief that restructuring offered 
really a historic opportunity to the state of California to achieve much 
greater efficiency in the electricity sector. 
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Let me begin by in many ways responding. I feel a certain burden here as I 
think the only witness on the list who includes, has industrial consumers among 
the constituency. A certain obligation to respond to the impression, I'm 
afraid, that may have been left by earlier speakers and that is that somehow 
there's a jailbreak here, that there is this interest on the part of industrial 
consumers in California to escape their fair share of state program costs and 
stranded costs. As a matter of fact CCE, Californians For Competitive 
Electricity, took great care at the outset in the formation of their group to 
establish a set of principles that they would then apply in the evaluation of 
the competing proposals many of which you've heard described today. And among 
those principles are that all consumers must benefit in this process. That 
there must be equitable ways to make sure that all consumers reap the benefits 
as well as bear their fair share of the stranded costs that we're talking 
about. 
Secondly, CCE has also come to grips with certain environmental principles and 
has taken the position that it supports mechanisms to ensure that a 
restructured market is consistent with energy conservation and environmental 
and renewable resources policies. This is a group that believes that 
California can lower its electric rates through restructuring and that 
restructuring should be measured against the following two main objectives: 
one is that you can achieve it through the following ways: one is that utility 
generation assets should be priced at market value and second that California 
should achieve vigorous competition in the generation market by (a} eliminating 
self dealings, and {b) giving consumers direct access to generation through 
nondiscriminatory cost base transmission rates. 
Now recognize, these consumers are sophisticated consumers of power in 
California, they understand that there are stranded costs that will have to be 
digested, if you will. They take these positions in their long-term interests 
to bring competition to bear to the benefit of the entire state. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let me just break in there because your organization 
includes the independent producers as well. 
KAREN EDSON: Yes it does. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Nonutility producers some of which have called alternative 
energy suppliers ... 
KAREN EDSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: So you disagree with the statement that our consultant, 
not disagree but you would disabuse him of any concern he's talking about 
stranded costs and one way to deal with it is what he calls, economists call an 
excise tax to pay for those and he has a sentence here on page thirteen, 
"Alternative suppliers of electricity, however, are likely to argue that in ESS 
that tax unfairly penalizes them for mistakes that the utilities and regulators 
have made in the past." You don't think you would make that argument. You,d 
think that as we go into this new era that all of the producers and their 
customers more particularly, should share in paying for the mistakes that the 
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utilities and the regulators have made in the past? 
KAREN EDSON: CCE and all of its members recognize that QF contracts are 
among, portions of those contracts are among, the so-called stranded costs in 
this market. Their view is that those are indeed contracts subject to all of 
the same conditions and treatment as any other contract in that market and that 
they will be addressed in manners that flow from that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And that all consumers will share in bearing whatever 
burden flows from that? 
KAREN EDSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: How about Diablo Canyon? 
KAREN EDSON: Well, there will be clearly major stranded costs associated 
with nuclear plants and other utility assets and if you examine the CCE's 
principles you'll note that they take a position very similar to the one just 
articulated by Ms. Grueneich which is that there needs to be a sharing of costs 
between consumers and shareholders. That's not to say that consumers bear none 
of those costs. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Once that's decided though, once that certain part 
of it, whether it's 100%, if that's the decision or 70% that your 
organization's view is that your members should take their fair share whatever 
portion of it is assigned to consumers? 
KAREN EDSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Good. 
KAREN EDSON: And let me now, if this would be of use to you, speak to 
some of the competing proposals that ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. That would be of use. 
KAREN EDSON: As I mentioned at the outset, CCE supports direct access to 
the generation market by consumer interests, supports consumer choice in that 
fashion and its' belief in that has a number of aspects but one of the many 
reasons is that its critical in the competitive market, they have many sellers 
and many buyers. Now we know that there are many sellers in the generation 
market. People tend to talk about how, "Oh yes, we know now that there's 
competitive generation market. We've seen it." Just as important in the 
competitive market is having many sellers which is something that direct access 
may get for you. 
Among the proposals that is now receiving the most attention is the Poolco 
proposal and various versions proposed by San Diego Gas and Electric and 
Southern California Edison. And we have a couple of significant concerns about 
that. One is establishing a pool through which all transactions move one way 
or another. It really forecloses market innovations which would work t0 the 
detriment in many ways of all consumers in California. For example, just 
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Monday of this week, PG&E announced that it has reached an agreement with 
DESTECH Power Systems, a major independent power producer to provide wholesale 
network access to their system. As this suggests, this transaction has 
occurred and is occurring really ahead of the restructuring that's underway and 
holds a promise of some very innovative kinds of transactions that might occur 
in the market if the state instead suggests that all transactions must be 
handled through a pool you foreclose that kind of market innovation. 
Secondly, in forcing all the transactions through the pool, its also possible 
that you are stifling competition in terms of some of the service refinements 
that might otherwise be available. Some customers may want higher quality 
service than the system would normally provide and may be willing to pay more 
for that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They could buy it separately, couldn't they? 
KAREN EDSON: Well, it's not clear through the Poolco proposals whether 
that kind of mechanisms would materialize. Perhaps they would but its ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But the electrons are going to be funneled through some 
central mechanism whether its the pool or the utility or whatever ... 
KAREN EDSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I mean you're not going to have a direct line from the 
generator to the consumer. 
KAREN EDSON: No. That's absolutely right and in fact, we believe that 
pools will be law. That you will have pools. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So the service has to do somehow with receiving the 
electricity, is that right, the setup at the consumers place of business? 
KAREN EDSON: There may be physical equipment that's necessary to help 
support certain levels of service. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Yes. But I'd say why couldn't that be offered and sold 
directly, separately. 
KAREN EDSON: Well, it's possible there'd be ways of doing that through 
Poolco but as I understand it Poolco envisions a mechanism which clears all 
generations through the pool at a single price. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Do you agree with Mr. Glynn from PG&E that the pool 
approach is not truly direct access? 
KAREN EDSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And because you've got this melded price that you don't 
really have generators selling directly to the consumer at a price they 
negotiate where the consumer pays directly to ... 
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KAREN EDSON: Right. And you don't allow this kind of service definition 
that I'm describing. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So the way it seems to line up now I see over here in one 
column that Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric, I got PG&E and the 
Californians For Competitive Electricity in this other column. Have I got that 
right? 
KAREN EDSON: I suppose you can look at it at that level. I certainly am 
eager to tell you that CCE does not endorse PG&E's proposal in all its aspects 
and ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Some problems with the proposal. 
KAREN EDSON: There are areas of agreement. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Well, you are going to tell us about it at some 
point. 
KAREN EDSON: Well, I think the timing inherent in the PG&E proposal is 
one obvious problem we would have. But I just wanted to mention beginning with 
Poolco that there are some difficulties there and others that involve the 
pricing mechanism itself that I'm really not able to address very clearly for 
you but I think it merits further examination. 
Second, with regard to the proposal Mr. Caldwell has put forward, I like many 
other observers find it quite intriguing. I think though that there are some 
important considerations about the state's ability to implement that and the 
possible implications this truly has to be a national kind of proposal. Keep 
in mind the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has a longstanding policy of 
cost base transmission rates. The inherent and the sell off of the 
transmission system is a market based transmission rate and it's difficult for 
me to conceive of a system where you would have that in California but cost 
rates elsewhere so I think you set up a whole series of changes that are 
essential to actual implementation. 
That really takes me through the substantive comments I wanted to make about 
the proposal. I just want to reiterate that there are long-term benefits that 
can be achieved in this market and really a tremendous opportunity for the 
state if the Public Utilities Commission and this Legislature can see clear to 
follow through with a very orderly process. We very much appreciate this 
hearing, having an orderly thoughtful process is really essential to any kind 
of satisfactory outcome in this and are looking now to the Commission to see 
some better definition of what process and mechanism they may have in mind. 
The order that was released this morning is something new to us that we're 
still examining. It's not clear to us that it provides the kind of definitive 
that I think would really help us bring some better kind of order to the 
debate. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Do you have a prediction on how soon we'll see a proposal 
crafted by the Public Utility Commission for restructuring? Do you want to 
give me a date? 
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KAREN EDSON: Can I give you a decade? 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Sure, I mean if its a decade ... 
KAREN EDSON: Well, my experience has been that the Public Utilities 
Commission does not move swiftly. My hope is that you can keep this proceeding 
on track. In fact, timeliness is one of the most important things that, I 
think, needs to be achieved. We've not seen timely decision-making from the 
California Public Utilities Commission in a variety of areas that I hesitate to 
get into here. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So you're telling us we should needle the Commission to 
move faster? 
KAREN EDSON: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you for your testimony. All right, the next 
witness is Mr. Ed Texeira, who is the director of the Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates from the California Public Utilities Commission. Welcome. 
ED TEXEIRA: Thank you. I'll be brief. I understand the time constraints 
that you have. I'd like to make three points only. 
First of all, we believe that the Bluebook is an incredibly valuable document. 
It started a fantastic dialogue. At least it started a dialogue and there are 
not many people who agree with it completely but it has something I believe for 
everyone. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Speaking for myself I'm prepared here in public, to 
stipulate that so that each witness doesn't have to say what a great thing the 
PUC did and it... Okay. 
ED TEXEIRA: Well, just to say one thing. One thing it did do, it did 
focus the debate on reducing electric rates and that was an incredibly valuable 
contribution because that was not the policy in California before that 
document. 
Second, on PBR's. We believe that PBR's will provide a more effective tool for 
regulating utilities than the traditional cost of service regulation. And 
further, you made a request on what the various PBR's, outlines of them. We'll 
be glad to provide your committee within a week or ten days of an outline of 
the various proposals including kind of an overview of what PBR's are. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I would appreciate that and I be more appreciative if it 
shows what PG&E and Edison say should be the targets, the benchmarks against 
which they will be judged because from my limited exposure to this. I hear 
that the debate's going to center around not so much whether this is a good 
idea, I think people generally agree that it is, but the real debate is where 
do you set the benchmarks so that you know how much the investors profit from 
exceeding the benchmarks and how much the ratepayers do. 
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ED TEXEIRA: Certainly. We'll present their proposals and then we'll have 
a little analysis of it to answer your question. You would not be able to get 
that from just looking at the proposal so we'll give you a brief analysis with 
it and we think we can do it within five or six pages probably. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Good. For each one? 
BD TEXEIRA: No. No. In total. This will be an overview and a summary 
rather than a detail ... 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: But, I mean, won't it be different for the two utilities? 
Are their proposals for PBR identical? 
ED TEXEIRA: There are similarities and there are differences. There 
probably are more similarities than differences. And we'll also show you the 
San Diego proposals, the original, our proposal, the Commission's, etc. We 
will try and present something comprehensive but in an overview basis rather 
than in great detail, if that's the desire of the committee. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That's fine. I would appreciate that. 
ED TEXIERA: Finally, on transition costs. It is clear that transition 
costs should be shared by all ratepayers. I believe before this committee last 
May, the question was posed of me, "What percentage should the shareholders pay 
of the transition costs?" I believe I responded somewhere between zero and 
fifty percent. I was unwilling to be more precise than that. 
Along these lines now and there was a little bit of criticism from two 
witnesses ahead of me on the Edison settlement that we have partially 
completed. And the point of our settlement with Edison on the SONGS, 
transition costs, if you can phrase it that way, was that it was important that 
there be some shareholder contribution to the SONGS, transition costs. And 
that is why we were willing to end as a settlement. If you want an estimate, 
there is controversy on what the estimate would be, our estimate of what the 
Edison shareholder hit would be would be somewhere between ten and fifteen 
percent. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let's pause for a minute on that. You call it a 
settlement to deal with the transition costs. That assumes that we are going 
to transition to something new. This is really Edison getting ready for the 
restructuring, is that right? 
BD TEXIERA: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And trying to deal with their own stranded investment by 
making it less in the near term by writing this down faster. 
ED TEXIERA: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And in order, by writing it down faster, that would have 
had an adverse affect on rates and to compensate for that they decided to 
eliminate some other programs that had costs so that it would balance out in 
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its impact on rates, is that right? 
BD TBXIERA: There were separate pieces in the arrangement. The SONGS 
arrangement, because of other things that were happening, would not have 
resulted in a ratepayer increase. In addition to that ... 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: You mean accelerated amortization of the costs so that 
that had been by itself there would have been no impact in the coming year, or 
two years, on rates? 
BD TBXIBRA: Because there were other things happening at the same time. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Happening independent of anything that was part of the 
settlement? 
BD TEXIERA: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So why did they need to scrape these other programs that 
some people say were sacrificed on the alter of whatever? 
BD TBXIBRA: This is separate from the DSM question. This was the ACRA 
and the SONGS 1 amortizations that are taking place. Two of them are 
separable. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: How about the general point that the previous witness made 
that this is really, it's transition to what we're talking about here, 
introducing competition restructuring. Is is a mistake to start dealing with 
that piece of it through this proceeding in isolation from what the whole 
general restructuring is going to be as ordered by the PUC. 
ED TEXIERA: In a perfect world, it would be better to handle the 
transition costs not on a piecemeal basis. The world is not perfect and we 
wanted the precedent of principle established that the shareholders would 
participate. The Commission's Bluebook did not give us any comfort on 
shareholder participation and we wanted the precedent established. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: So your participation for the Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates, you were scared by the Bluebook too? 
BD TBXIBRA: We love the Bluebook. We could not predict how the 
Commission is going to respond and would act when push came to shove. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Okay. I think that we've gone as far as we can with that 
question. I appreciate your testimony. Thank you for being here today. Have 
you anything further? 
BD TBXIBRA: No. That's all. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Okay. 
ED TBXIERA: Thank you very much. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Our final witness from the consumer end of this is 
Jerry Bloom from the SPURR, School Project for Utility Rate Reduction, and he's 
cloned himself. There are four of them. Do all of you want to talk? Who's 
the spokesperson? You're going to speak for the group? Okay. Five minutes. 
JERRY BLOOM: Good afternoon. My name is Jerry Bloom. I am appearing 
this afternoon on behalf of consumers. Specifically, I'm joined by Dr. James 
R. Solberg, who's managing director of School Project for Utility Rate 
Reduction. SPURR represents 150 school districts in California. He is also 
here on behalf of the regional energy management coalition who represents an 
additional 180 school districts. Together these districts provide educational 
services to 2.3 million students in the kindergarten through the twelfth grade. 
I'm also joined on my right by Mr. Neil Carmen, assistant vice president of the 
Center of Health Resources which is a subsidiary of the Hospital Council of 
Southern California. Together with the Hospital Council and northern and 
central California, the Hospital Council of Southern California represents 450 
hospitals, health care facilities, and medical clinics. These consumers appear 
before you this afternoon to stress the absolutely critical need to lower costs 
of electric services to all California consumers. There doesn't seem to be any 
doubt on anything we've heard today on that point. Although you may have 
traditionally heard from the industrial community we are here to tell you that 
schools and hospitals are suffering from a high cost of electricity and these 
high costs have an adverse impact on their ability to offer health care and 
educational services. For example, California public schools pay over 300 
million dollars annually for their electric power, a 25% reduction in energy 
costs equal to 75 million dollars would allow the public schools to hire 2,640 
new teachers. The California hospitals pay approximately 250 million dollars 
annually for their electric power. A 25% reduction for them would allow them 
to hire 1,240 new nurses. 
I'm also appearing this afternoon on behalf of Jefferson Electric, who through 
partnership with these consumer organizations will provide customized electric 
service at a lower cost. Given the opportunity through restructuring Jefferson 
intends to provide customized service to industrial, commercial and to 
residential customers. While it is acceptable that large industrial customers 
will benefit from competition, residential, commercial and the small industrial 
customers must also benefit. As recognized by the Legislature in ACR 143, the 
high rates are a contributing factor to the economic problems in the state. 
While some claim, and you've heard it this morning, that the issue is really 
total cost and not rates, it simple is not true for people who use a lot of 
electricity. They use a lot of electricity and the rates are high. They are 
suffering and what we have to do is simply lower the rates. The CPU has 
initiated the Bluebook and let it be clear that we applaud their leadership and 
their efforts. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They stipulate that. You didn't have to say that. 
JERRY BLOOM: Right. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. 
JERRY BLOOM: While one of the critical things in the debate seems to be 
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not shall we have change, shall we bring competition, but how to do it. We'd 
like to offer you today a model for you to consider. This model which is now 
shown on the screen shows: 1) that the competition is the mechanism for change 
that will lower rates for all consumers. The question is what type of model. 
You've heard a lot today about PoolCo verses direct access. The hospitals and 
the schools believe that we have to have competition at both the wholesale and 
the retail level for the benefits of competitions to reach hospitals, schools 
and the residential consumer. Specifically, with a PoolCo only approach there 
will be no guarantees that a benefits of competition, in fact, will trickle 
down to these other customer classes. Our diagram specifically isolates a 
merchant function which will be performed by service providers. This 
competitive service will provide hospitals and schools with services that are 
unavailable in a PoolCo system. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I'm just going to interrupt because then I won't have to 
go back to it. They argue that, for example, that in the pool suppose in a 
given period the average rate in the pool is 8 cents a kilowatt hour. They 
argue there would be nothing to prevent through the hospitals or schools going 
directly to a power supplier and entering into a contract for 5 cents a 
kilowatt hour and that while they would pay 8 cents into the pool they would be 
reimbursed 3 cents from their contracting party. Why couldn't that work? 
JERRY BLOOM: I guess the question we would ask is what their talking 
about are contracts for differences and if you could have a direct contract 
between the consumer and the seller of the commodity whether they can establish 
the terms and conditions, why set up a system that forces them ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, you say why do it but they say their reasons for 
doing it and you can have these direct bilateral contracts where you can go out 
and find the best deal possible. 
JERRY BLOOM: I think the key reason for not doing it just through a 
PoolCo is that it blocks the innovation that can occur when the buyer and the 
seller can establish their own mechanisms, their own prices, their own types of 
service they want by having a direct contract. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You mean you buy more than just the electrons in the 
price? 
JERRY BLOOM: Absolutely. And you stifle the innovation as the prior 
speaker talked about even just the PG&E and DASTEC agreement. What you do is 
you stifle the competition if you would force everyone to buy out of a pool at 
pool terms ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: How do you like the PG&E plan? 
JERRY BLOOM: We also, in terms of direct access, we are firmly in support 
of direct access. In terms of the plan there are specifics as well, such as 
the timetable that we would disagree with; however, we clearly are in favor of 
the direct access approach. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So its much like the previous witness we just heard, 
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Californian For Competitive Economy. So we'd put you in the PG&E column as a 
subset, that you like the plan with direct access but speed it up. 
JERRY BLOOM: Yes. But we also have a few twists of our own to add to 
that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: It makes us very hard for us up here, all these twists, 
but go ahead. 
JERRY BLOOM: One of the things that I was just discussing with you is the 
fact that we wanted to highlight which you have not heard from others is this 
merchant function and it goes to your questions a moment ago on the pool idea. 
Because of this merchant function, by providing the direct access, you can have 
information services, sales functions, things like DSM and other programs, that 
can be factored in in terms of customizing programs that would be in service 
that would be offered directly to the customers. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, let me ask you about that as long as you bring it 
up. That's DMS services if the customer wants it. Right? 
JERRY BLOOM: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Suppose the Legislature wants DSM for everybody. Would 
these direct access people pay their share for that? 
JERRY BLOOM: Yes. I think .. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Under your plan? 
JERRY BLOOM: Yes. Not only would they pay that share, but we think as 
you said this morning we don't want to use the "T" word but if we talk about 
sir charges and things, it's a real misnomer to say and we think it's incorrect 
to say that you can only cover social programs, environmental concerns and 
things through a centralized wholesale power market. In fact, it would be our 
position through competition if we get away from, for example, funding DSM 
programs on a cost basis as we are now and put a competitive market into the 
offering their services, will not offer the same services, will offer better 
services and we'll be able to offer their services at a lower cost. There's no 
reason why if competition helps the generation sector and helps in the other 
types of functions of different sectors, that it won't help them providing DSM 
and social programs. What we have now is a flowthrough of those costs with no 
way or no incentives to do them effectively or efficiently. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Competition for DSM as well as for generating? 
JERRY BLOOM: Absolutely. The next thing we'd like to point out is that, 
and it goes right to the point you were making is that we have to look at 
stranded costs and you've heard a lot about stranded costs this morning and 
anticipating your question would we agree that the stranded costs are a 
problem? Yes. Do we believe that they have to be absorbed and spread 
throughout and equitably shared? The answer is yes, of course, as well. What 
we are worried about is that we have this bugaboo that says we've got stranded 
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costs and there so large and they're so uncontrollable that we can't go forward 
with the program. We do think there's costs. We do think these are very 
difficult issues, but we need to identify them, identify them carefully and 
correctly and move on with the program. The big thing is to get the ball 
rolling and to keep things moving ahead in terms of dealing with those issues. 
We do believe that California is at a critical crossroads. It cannot afford to 
delay the implementation process. If we move cautiously and carefully, we will 
get there. We're not going to get everything correct. We're not going to 
answer every single question. More importantly, we can't get into endless 
debates trying to decide what the market will or will not do. If there's one 
thing we've learned with the other industries that we've deregulated, gas, 
telephone, any of them, is that whatever we think is going to happen we're 
going to forecast it wrong, we're going to project it wrong. Let's get 
together, let's work together with the Legislature and the PUC and the 
California Energy Commission and set up a program and start implementing it and 
see where we go. 
In terms of there's been a lot of questions today about what do we do in terms 
of the very near term. We do have a position on that and that is that the 
Commission should issue some type of policy decision that shows us and starts 
limiting the debate, focusing the debate, I think would be a better term for 
it. We need to start having some decision-making that starts directing the 
proposals. We need to get on with the stranded costs and unbundling 
investigations that were, in fact, developed in the Bluebook proposal but we 
also can't wait and hold back on the initial policy statements or some of the 
policy determination until all these investigations are completed. That 
process will not only lead to as others have feared, some difficult or task in 
terms of, for example, looking at stranded costs. If you look at, are we 
talking about a five-year phase and are we talking all customers, or are we 
talking certain customers. That will influence what types of stranded costs 
and what we're looking at so we need some direction and some focus in terms of 
the debate. That can come through some directives from the Commission. It may 
not even need to be a final decision. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: What I hear you saying is, "Let's get on with it. Let's 
trust the market." But at the same time you tell us that every time we've 
tried to predict or how it was going to come out we've been wrong every time 
and of course, what California's being asked to do is to abandon a traditional 
way of setting rates and supplying electric services and so it's kind of a 
dramatic change that's being proposed here and you say we don't know what we're 
going to get. We can't know, we've guessed wrong every time. 
JBRRY BLOOM: I think you've hit on a very astute nuance. That's exactly 
the point. Instead of having the regulators and the Legislators trying to 
figure out and predict what the market will do and probably guessing wrong, we 
have to have the confidence to let the market start making determinations. Let 
the market determine if we need a pool. If a pool develops naturally in the 
marketplace, bravo! But don't have a regulatory established pool. If the 
market sets up aggregation and customers and provides the types of services, 
what we don't want to say is that we have to figure it out and try to legislate 
and regulate ourselves into a marketplace. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Your pillar of faith though is the market. Trust the 
market and it will all come out okay. 
JBRRY BLOOM: With appropriate guidance and oversight by the Legislature 
and the PUC. That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You're a very good witness. Said all the right things. 
Thank you very much. Thank you all. Is that it? Yes, I think ... five minutes 
so I'm going to call it it. Thank you very much. Well, that completes 
customer perspectives. Now we're going to invite two witnesses who represent 
non-utility generator perspectives, although, in a sense we already heard from 
one through that group through those who have joined Californians For 
Competitive Electricity, but now we're going to get them directly. I guess 
John White, are you going to go first or Jan? Did you, you're on the agenda 
first John, so we'll start with John White, Executive Director of CERT, Center 
For Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technology. 
JOHN WHITE: Thank you for having us here today and thank you for having 
this committee and thank you for having ACR 143. And I thank you for getting 
the PUC to launch this investigation of stranded costs which we think despite 
the rhetoric in the letter is a very important development. 
One of our concerns, quite apart from all of the points that have been made 
today, is that whether this is now a staff proposal or not, this is a proposal 
that has already had a very, very large negative impact quite apart from all 
the academic and consulting expertise that has now been deployed in California. 
In the near term, we have lost momentum in some very crucial areas. So I think 
it's important that as we try to develop a response that we recognize we've 
already had some assumptions begin to take hold and one of the reasons we 
supported the motion or introduced the motion on the stranded costs is because 
the piecemeal approach to restructuring potentially is devastating as one grand 
blue or purple or yellow book. In the near term, the utilities are slashing 
DSM budgets quite apart from the rhetoric that says they still support it and 
think it's important. We are seeing, in specifically the Edison rate case, 
proposals for major cuts in DSM, major cuts in research and development, people 
getting laid off already. We've also got loss of low-income programs. We 
think that's the wrong signal to send given the track record of these programs, 
particularly DSM. 
Our group includes both environmental interests, environmental groups, energy 
efficiency providers and renewable technology developers. And in unrelated 
proceedings such as the DRPU we are seeing a continued loss of momentum, a loss 
in new markets that otherwise had been found to be cost-effective and needed 
and beneficial to the ratepayers and every single proceeding before the 
Commission and before this body. And yet, no action is taken. So what we have 
is the markets for renewables drying up in California, new markets, people 
going overseas, DSM losing momentum. Whether or not this particular proposal 
goes forward, these are things that have happened and are happening so one of 
our biggest concerns has been the cart before the horse mentality that seems 
to, up til now, have pervaded the Commission's deliberations of having the 
policy be adopted before the answers and the evidence is in as to what the 
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implications of the policy will mean, both from the standpoint of equity as 
well as from the standpoint of protecting the states policy interest. 
I think that we've heard from the parties' general support as Ms. Edson said, 
for the principle for renewables and DSM being included in the new structure. 
On the other hand, we already have some pretty good examples of what works. I 
think SMUD's programs from a supply and demand side, remain a model of how to 
go about acquiring resources and what resources to acquire. We think that in 
any pool or any market mechanism that has developed there has got to be a way 
for things other than price, short-term price to be factored in and one of the 
things that we are hopeful of this committee doing, is to insure that whatever 
parachute is strapped on the back of renewables and efficiency interests before 
we jump out of the plane, we need to be sure that parachute's going to open and 
that in fact there's going to be renewables actually result in the portfolio of 
the California supply system. 
Dr. Borenstein's presentation this morning mentioned strategic differences and 
assets within regions. I would argue that for California we have a special 
base of resources this state that offer not only the opportunity for economic 
development and clean environmental benefits from our substantial efficiency 
programs we already have and our substantial renewable resources that we have 
available to be deployed. These technologies not only are assets to our 
ratepayers, but they are assets to our strategic economic future. The whole 
world is watching California with respect to restructuring. They used to watch 
us with respect to renewables and DSM. I think the job of this committee is to 
insure that whatever restructuring occurs that, in fact, these strategic 
technologies find a place and that at the same time some of the other witnesses 
that have spoken about the importance of equity considerations between and 
among customers be essential and I for one think that the Legislature's role in 
this process is crucial. I also think that it's important that we maintain 
some diligence with respect to the evidence that people are throwing around. 
One other thing that is supposed to be a casualty of restructuring as 
Integrated Resource Planning. As a lot of the academic experts say, "Well, we 
won't need that anymore because the market is going to decide everything and 
all we have to do is create either bilateral markets or pools and we will have 
enough of certainty and enough rationality in the market and what I would 
caution you is that Integrated Resource Planning, where we look at the life 
cycle costs to society as well as to the ratepayers, has proven very valuable 
at giving discipline and transparency to the assertions of what's cheap and 
what's expensive and what pollutes and what does not and I don't know what 
mechanism necessarily would come forth with respect to restructuring in this 
regard. All I know is that the results of knowing what things cost and who's 
going to bear the risk and what things cost over not just the first year when 
the price of gas is low but over the thirty-year life span of some of these 
projects that somehow we've got to find a way to include that in any new 
structure and I think that one of the things that I hope that the committee can 
do is maintain its oversight of this process. I think the role that has been 
played up to now at focusing the debate and getting the criteria, the design 
criteria I think you spoke of, that I think is something that's going to need 
to continue. 
I also think that we need to be mindful of the many other related perceivings 
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that are going on outside the restructuring debate such as PBR, such as the 
cost recovery, such as these cuts in DSM programs and the BRPU and look at all 
of them at the same time because essentially we could have a virtual 
restructuring and an implicit abandonment of the policies that I think all of 
us share at a rhetorical level. The question is whether we can maintain those 
policies in practical level. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: ... comment and get your reaction. I mean your giving this 
committee a rather formidable assignment. You want us to be the oversight 
committee for everything that's going on at the PUC. I know that President 
Fessler would not welcome that. 
JOHN WHITE: I think that just merely providing another venue and an 
opportunity for evidence to be presented and views to be shared. I'm not 
saying that you need to do their job for them. But I do think there is a role 
for the Legislature to play, both with respect to the policies under which this 
restructuring occurs and ultimately the institutional restructure of the 
implementation of restructure. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I'm kind of floundering around about how we can best play 
the role that you think we ought to play and you know, we propose and enact 
laws and I've had enough experience to know that when you're dealing with 
another agency like the PUC that we can say do a "Thou Shalt Not" law. You 
shall not do this unless it has these features but it's very difficult to write 
those requirements into the law in a way that you can have any comfort level 
that they're going to do what you intended them to do. I mean, I tried to do 
it in some other areas such as, as you know, something called reclaim and you 
write the language and get it through the Legislature but then will it be 
applied by the otLer body in a way that carries out what you were trying to get 
at. 
JOHN WHITE: I think you shouldn't underestimate the influence you've 
already had on the proceeding. I know sometimes a Resolution is often thought 
of as not as big a deal as a statute but in this case, because you embodied the 
concerns of so many of the parties and gave a signal, I think you had an 
important effect. The other example I would give rather than reclaim is maybe 
the work that Senator Rosenthal did with respect to the merger, the proposed 
merger with Southern California Edison in San Diego where I think the statutory 
requirements bore significantly on the ultimate outlook. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I don't like that analogy particularly because, you know, 
we know what the outcome was there and I don't want anybody to think that what 
we're about here in this committee is designed to kill anything and ... 
JOHN WHITE: Let me make clear that one of my concerns is that we not have 
an endless transition because in the meantime, renewables and DSM are losing 
faster than anybody else, so ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So for that reason you want to move ahead. 
JOHN WHITE: I think providing a mechanism for the parties to come 
together and put cards on the table and ask tough questions, answer tough 
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questions, is a very salutary effort. And I think the PUC is actually 
beginning to borrow some of those techniques and beginning to look for not so 
much a winners and losers scenario is something that might actually have some 
ability to bring people together. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And you think that what we saw happen last night with this 
evidentiary hearing on stranded costs is calculated to let all the people put 
their cards on the table and bring them together? 
JOHN WHITE: Certainly it's better than doing it a piece at a time and I 
think there still needs to be some recognition of organic relationship between 
the Legislature and the PUC with respect to policy. I think that's beginning 
to happen. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Jan Smutny-Jones. 
JAN SMUTNY-JONES: Thank you Chairman Sher. I'm Jan Smutny-Jones from the 
Independent Energy Producers and we are happy to be here today. Obviously 
independent energy producers in this state are a significant component in the 
electricity market. We provide about 60,000 jobs that have been retained in 
this state as a result of the 14 billion dollars worth of investment in 
independent power in this state over the last decade so obviously, we believe 
that independent power is, in fact, the competition. 
About 11 months ago we had a biannual resource competitive auction which led to 
bids of projects cost between four and five cents and whether or not the 
benefits of that cheap power become in the future is directly related to what 
the Public Utilities Commission ultimately does and decisions that this 
Legislature makes with respect to the future of the industry. 
The reasons that we are in the fifth year of a biannual process at the PUC has 
to do with the fact that the process as we know it now is broken. That we have 
a problem, basically a conflict of trying to put monopolies into a competitive 
world and it just doesn't work. We believe that the Commission has obviously 
opened up an opportunity for us to try to change that paradigm and that's 
really what's important. 
I want to answer one question first since it was an issue that was raised 
earlier and it was also raised by your expert earlier this morning. IEP does 
not deny that some of the contracts are currently about what is identified as 
current market price. The interim standard offer for contracts which were 
developed in the early and mid '80's were, in fact, based upon utility oil 
forecasts of where oil is going over the next ten years. At that time, which 
was directly related to Senator Leonard's question about 40% of the state's 
power was being produced by oil. If you will recall in the early '80's, we 
were just coming off of our second middle eastern oil crisis and oil was very, 
very high. The interim standard offer for contracts, as you can see by this 
chart, have already begun to fall off and by the year 2002 are in essence gone. 
So this is, in fact, the self-correcting problem and, I think, one that does 
not really warrant any additional activity on the part of the Public Utilities 
Commission and certainly not the Legislature. 
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Also, to sort of put something in perspective here because I think it's 
important, in the fourth quarter of 1984 a short-run avoided cost in the PG&E 
service territory was 7.2 cents. Okay. This month in PG&E service territory 
short-run avoided cost is 1.6 cents. So there has been a significant drop in 
short-run avoided cost and I'm not saying we agree with that 1.6 cent number as 
the correct one but it is clear that avoided costs have dropped over time. 
One last issue with respect to this. There are, in essence, two generic types 
contracts out there. One is the fixed-price contracts which we referred to 
earlier. The other a variable price contract which basically flooded the 
market. Now Edison is also involved in that market. They have about 11 
hundred megawatts worth of contracts associated with their Mission Energy 
projects which are currently being paid a rate probably somewhere in the area 
of three and a half to four cents. That's just not Mission projects, that's 
the variable price contracts throughout the state so while there are obviously 
in the power purchase contracts are a component of higher rates, we would 
obviously firmly disagree that we are the principle cause of high rates in 
California. And certainly we would agree with Mr. Foster's analysis that the 
wholesale obligation of contracts would be foolish public policy. 
Moving on in terms of what we see as the key issue here and that is regardless 
of what type of ultimate structure the PUC is able to come up with is that it 
precludes self dealings and cross subsidies. And that to us is really the good 
key problem. As I indicated earlier, we currently have an existing utility 
structure which has three components, generation, transmission and 
distribution. Certainly one of those functions, degeneration function, 
certainly susceptible to competition. I don't think it's really a competitive 
market now because I think of some of the defects we have in terms of trying to 
put this monopoly structure in the competitive market. So I think it's 
extremely important that the PUC, and to the extent that it is appropriate, the 
Legislature, move incentives forward basically to spin off generation assets 
from the transmission and distribution assets. Transmission and distribution 
from our viewpoint will always remain a monopoly. I don't think it makes a lot 
of sense that we don't see a lot of people clamoring to want to build wires all 
over California and that's probably appropriate. But we believe that the 
generation sector ought to be spun off and that ultimately the distribution 
utility or those on the distribution end should be economically indifferent to 
the source of the electron? 
This is one of the principle reasons why IEP is not currently supporting Poolco 
because Poolco does not basically disaggregate that function. Utilities still 
remain on three sides of the transaction. They're generating, they're 
transmitting ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I was told recently that that's unavoidable in the San 
Diego service area now because of the constraints on transmission something to 
the effect of 3200 megawatts need there and the pool can only bring in on 
transmission 2000 megawatts so at least for some period of time, unless 
somebody's going to build some more transmission lines for their 1200 
megawatts. Are you saying, you'll go in there and build them in the San Diego 
basin? 
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JAN SMOTNY-JONBS: I have several of my members who have been trying very 
hard and SDG&E's been trying very hard to stop them from building generation in 
the San Diego area so they can sell power to San Diego. We would love that 
opportunity. I think the other problem we have here is that we don't allow, 
Mr. Foster I think earlier indicated that a lot of what goes on in the 
transmission system is driven by physics and we don't expect the Legislature to 
enact a law that ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Would you agree that you could not transmit from outside 
the area 3200 megawatts into San Diego? 
JAN SMOTNY-JONBS: I don't know that to be the case. What I do know is 
that there are opportunities in San Diego right now. I have two members right 
now with projects proposed to build in San Diego which would not require 
transmission lines from anywhere and we've had a very difficult time getting 
San Diego to enthusiastically open their arms and accept this power and a lot 
of that has to do with the current structure of the utility, frankly. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well all I'm saying whether it's the utility itself or 
your members who build this 1200 that have to be local. They would have a heck 
of a leverage with the pool if you can't bring in the full 3200 from outside 
you've got to get 1200 whether it's your members 1200 or the utilities they 
have pretty good market power. 
JAN SMUTNY-JONBS: They would have pretty good market power and I think 
what that also suggests is an issue that is really not looked at in the 
discussion of Poolco in that in order to insure that there is not some sort of 
market power developing either in that set of circumstances or some other. You 
will need to superimpose some sort of regulatory process over that. And I 
think one of the questions we need to ask ourselves and you as a legislator 
specifically need to ask is, does basically supplanting the existing PUC 
regulatory structure with basically a regulatory structure that would be 
dominated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is that necessarily in 
anybody's best interest and the answer from my way of thinking is probably no. 
I think the problem we have I think is Poolco right now has sort of taken a 
life of its own and people are assuming that it really is sort of a panacea for 
a lot of complicated problems out there. The real problem that it does not 
resolve, however, is it does not really functionally disaggregate the utility. 
So ultimately the purchaser of the electron, the utility purchaser of the 
electron, is not economically indifferent as to the source of that electron and 
that it will ultimately matter a lot to that distribution utility as to whether 
that electron came from it, generation resource, or whether it came from one of 
my members. And that's the concern there, in the long run ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So your not, IEP is not in the Poolco column. 
JAN SMUTNY-JONES: We are not in the Poolco column. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Are you in the PG&E column? 
JAN SMOTNY-JONES: We have some difficulties with PG&E, obviously 
everyone's raised some questions with respect specifically to the climbing of 
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the PG&E direct access issue. we will be happy to supply some of our comments 
in terms of how we would see direct access working which is different than 
PG&E's to the committee, if that would be of some use. We are also ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: We're looking for all these models out here and it's kind 
of like pulling teeth to get them so I can have my two or three or four that I 
can share with the committee and then we can look at the implications of 
each ... 
JAN SMDTNY-JONES: Well, they're kind of like a virus. They do sort of 
mutate very, very quickly so whatever you get one day may look very different. 
I think the other model that was spoken on today was the Newco which was Mr. 
Caldwell's model which we are also looking at with interest based upon the fact 
that it does have the effect of separating out the generation allowing that to 
be competitive from the transmission and distribution functions which we think 
obviously is the key issue there. 
I also want to underline something that Mr. White said earlier and that is the 
importance of trying to get some stability put back into the system. I know 
that this committee has been informed in the past about the effect of the 
Bluebook upon utility stocks. My members, too, have been hit by the level of 
uncertainty. Obviously my members sell into competitive markets and to the 
extent that this issue remains uncertain out here it does lead to, the market's 
pretty suspicious about what they should or should not be doing in California. 
So I think it's important that we get on with some of the hard work ahead of us 
in terms of actually trying to create a new paradigm out there for utilities 
and we do it quickly rather than stretching it out over 5, 6, 10 years which 
has unfortunately been our experience in the past. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So we should needle the PUC to do the right thing by June 
30th, 1995, is that your recommendation? 
JAN SMOTNY-JONES: I would needle them to do the right thing by then, yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Is that date realistic? 
JAN SMOTNY-JONES: As you recall I said I'm in the fifth year of a 
biennial process so I'm highly suspicious as to any dates certain here but I 
certainly think that what the Commission could do in the relatively near future 
is give the parties clear indications of which direction it's going to go. I 
happen to believe that if the Commission decided tomorrow that they were going 
to do the Bluebook as it's written, I frankly don't think that will happen, but 
if they were going to do that as written, it would entail probably a whole 
series of different evidentiary hearings to specifically work out some nuts and 
bolts issues like how do you unbundle services, how do you identify stranded 
assets, all kinds ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Yes, well that's fine. But I mean just the chemistry ... 
I'm looking for the date when we should realistically give us the general 
proposal. 
JAN SMOTNY-JONES: I think June '95 should be doable. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, we'll shoot for it. 
JAN SMUTNY -JONES: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Thank you. All right. Next group of witnesses. Thank 
you for your testimony, both of you. On the agenda it's called The 
Environmental Perspectives. We're going to broaden that to the Environmental 
and Labor Perspectives and we have first Daniel Kirshner, from the 
Environmental Defense Fund. We're also going to hear from David Goldstein, 
from NRDC and then Ray Sanborn, Chairman of the Coalition of the Utility 
Employees. That's this group and we're making progress. I'm going to ask the 
sergeant, "Do you have a pad of paper over there for anyone who is not listed 
on the agenda who is going to want to give a very brief statement at the end of 
the process to let them sign your pad and then I can decide how much time each 
one can have. " Mr. Kirshner. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: Good afternoon. I'm Dan Kirshner. I'm senior Economic 
Analyst with the Environmental Defense Fund. 
First, I want to express the apologies of my colleagues, Tom Graff and John 
Krautkraemer, who are unable to be here today. 
At the outset, I want to make it clear that The Environmental Defense Fund is 
in favor of reform and in favor of increased competition. We see environmental 
and economic benefits possible in this. We also think there's a lot of 
agreement out here about what has to happen in order to get there from here. 
That way, if we have to have a broadly acceptable deal, it has to be fair and 
we have to maintain environmental protection. , I think those are some of the 
elements that just have to get across if we're going to get anywhere with this 
stuff. I'm pleased that you've heard mentioned of some of these issues of 
fairness in environmental protection from other groups such as the large 
customer representatives, Dian Grueneich, representing the state as a customer 
and Karen Edson, representing the Coalition for Competitive Electricity. 
With respect to these environmental and energy efficiency goals they're for a 
large part legislatively mandated and that I think there's a broad agreement 
with regard to these goals. 
Let me try to be a little bit more specific than I was in my prefiled written 
comments. As Dr. Borenstein said this morning under price competition, the 
incentives are to sacrifice spending on DSM as the utilities currently are 
doing. For example, under the pressure of current events PG&E has pledged a 
rate cap and right now environmental energy efficiency programs and outside 
management measures are in the same box with Diablo Canyon. That is, they're 
trying to hold the rates and they're trying to protect stranded investments and 
one of the sacrifices to be made right now happens to be DSM on the cutting 
block. Investments and energy efficiency shouldn't be in this box and they 
don't have to be and we don't need new Legislation and we don't need to say the 
"T" word or anything like that. What we need is something out of the CPUC to 
do something about this. So what we need to do is get through this transition. 
Right now we're in another land. We're stuck here waiting for something to 
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happen and I think there's everything to be said for getting them moved along a 
little bit, at least on a policy direction. Something that would make it clear 
that what's happening right now is not acceptable. Now, this is where 
direction can help. Maybe it's part of their plan. They say straight out, "We 
are going to maintain these mandates. We're not here to destroy the DSM 
program," but in the meantime they are going downhill. I think it would 
behoove them and us to get something on the table sooner rather than later and 
I think we don't need to have huge investigations but at least something to 
give us some idea. I think the Bluebook has been put up for discussion. There 
have been plenty of comments that there are certain things in there that are 
going to work or aren't going to work. There is some indication from the 
Commissioners of things that they're thinking are going to work and aren't 
going to work and we need to hear from them. Where are we going now? As I say 
and I think that I echo what John White said, "As long as we're in this 
transition it's not really serving any of us." 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You know, that would suggest to me that we shouldn't have 
got in their way. We ~h0uld have let th~m, in August, come out with their 
proposal, their vision and then you could have responded, you r~ow, then that 
at least says where they're heading and you can say, "Don't forget DSM," and 
that ought to be factored in. Was it a mistake to slow them down and have them 
hold these hearings around the state on the Bluebook? 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I don't think, it's certainly not a mistake. I think 
they slowed themselves down well enough, I mean, they don't need any extra 
help. I think their original schedule is clearly unrealistic. I thank the 
Legislature for making that 100% clear to them. 
CHAIRMAN SH~.l!l\: Do I presume the 1995 date is the target or is that too 
late? 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I missed what that was about. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, we were trying, what we should be looking to see 
President Fessler talks about crafting the draft proposal recognizing they'll 
be a lot of nuts and bolts and hearings afterwards but what would be your view 
as to the target date for that crafted proposal being promulgated not as a 
final order but at least as a draft order? 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I don't know how soon we can get to a craft proposal. 
I'm thinking of something more interim, just some idea of ... Do I still have 
to fight about DSM or are we in agreement? 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: Well, they're not going to spin off that and deal with 
that up front. They're going to talk about Poolco's and retail wheeling up 
front and then we're going to talk about, "How do you deal with stranded 
investments? How do you insure diversity? How do you deal with the 
environmental questions'?" 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: You hear a lot of people not talking about Poolco verses 
bilateral contracts. I mean, that's a side issue. When we get to competition, 
I think we can agree on that but we want to know what's going to happen. How 
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are we going to preserve fairness? I mean, if ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They should set aside how they're going to achieve 
competition, set that aside you are saying, is that right? And their main 
focus now should be how are you going to preserve DSM? 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: Well, we're not going to be able to cut aside any of it. 
Essentially, I'm not on one side or the other on Poolco direct access and I 
don't think they are either, but I'd like to know. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I think I heard your message and I'm sure it fits in with 
the way I see this thing unfolding but what role do you think this committee 
has on what you would like to see? What could we do fast that would be useful? 
You say, there is a limbo out there or vacuum and it ought to be filled. What 
would you have this committee and the Legislature do now in the month of 
January and the month of February, 1995, when we're back in session? 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I'm going to overstep my bounds as to what anything I 
know about here but what I'd like to see and I don't know if it's in your power 
to do that, I'd like to see you have them outline where they're going and I'd 
like to see you provide direction if there is something missing from that 
outline that's important to the Legislature, let them know now. Then let them 
craft something more detailed that meets our requirements. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I guess I don't understand what it would, when you say 
where they're going, what that encompasses. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: Well, if I read the Bluebook carefully, what it says is 
DSM, the market will take care of it. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Yes, that's right. But what it really says is retail 
wheeling and performance based ratemaking. That's what it says and then they 
talk about what will happen to these workers and they say they're also 
concerned about preserving energy conservation programs, etc., etc., but they 
don't tell you how they're going to take care of that but it seems to me that 
the first step is either to confirm or deny that they're going to go forward 
with retail wheeling. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I would like to know that. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Something in lieu of that. Something different than that. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I think they're going to go forward with it and I'd like 
to think that ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, you just assume they are going to go forward. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: But I'd like to hear it from them. I mean, we'll all be 
better off. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I don't believe you are going to hear it from them. 
Everything I hear is that they're not going to go forward. That's my suspicion 
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anyway with retail wheeling. But anyway, I think we've gone as far as we can 
go. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I guess we're in agreement we'd both would like to hear 
what they think they're going to do. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: The question is what do we want to hear and I thought you 
were saying that they ought to focus on the things you are most interested in 
and have them tell you specifically what their vision is for that, those 
programs that you've worked on. 
DANIEL KIRSHNER: I'd like to hear the other ones too but that would ... I 
mean it would be better for both of us at some point and then we'd have 
something to react to ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, thank you. So, is Mr. Goldstein here? I've been 
corrected. Dr. Goldstein. I should probably always say Dr. Goldstein and then 
you can correct me. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Thank you very much, Chairman Sher. I appreciate the 
opportunity to speak here. I appreciate the fact that there are hearings on 
this subject at all because I think the Legislature's involvement in this 
process has been very constructive. I particularly appreciate this hearing's 
focus on the cost of electricity service. We'd like to remind people that the 
cost of electricity service as Chairman Imbrecht was saying is the rate times 
the amount of consumption. The distinction is important because the policies 
affecting rates and the policies affecting consumption are different. 
California rates are higher than average but overall costs are lower than 
average because California energy consumption is lower. One of the reasons its 
lower has been the activities of this committee and Legislature as a whole and 
the two Commissions over the past 20 years. The next slide shows that the 
burden of electricity on the economy despite California's high rates is lower 
than for the rest of the United States and has been consistently lower for more 
than the past decade. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Why are all those large consumers leaning on us so 
heavily? 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Because they see some economic gain to do it. Their 
leaning on the northwest, the lowest rates in the country just as hard as their 
leaning on you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: They see a way to bring costs down, don't they, that's 
what they want? 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: They would like to see any way that they can reduce 
costs. I mean, their profits go up if consumption goes down for the same 
output their profits go up as the rates go down. But the point is if you 
achieve low rates like they have in Bonneville service territory they're still 
saying the same thing. We need still lower rates. In other words, it's not 
that we've got higher rates than average if we came down to average we'd be 
fine. The problem would go away. You're getting the same advocacy from 
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industrial customers ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: I'll never be satisfied until ... 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Well, that's what we're seeing. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: So this shows there's not a cr1s1s in electricity costs 
due to rates; however, there is a crisis as a couple of speakers have pointed 
out in electricity consumption because of the response to the Bluebook because 
of utilities cutting back on DSM programs that have been successful in 
anticipation of what might happen at the PUC with regard to retail wheeling. 
Let me go to the question of rates and ask why they're high. Two issues have 
come up today, uneconomic nuclear power plants and high cost independent power 
contracts. The point I would like to make with respect to these two problems 
is that both of them have been addressed successfully by policy years in the 
past and they're not going to recur. Uneconomic nuclear power plants were 
planned in California before 1973 when there was no public scrutiny over the 
cost-effectiveness of utility investments. By enacting the Warren Alquist Act, 
the problem that led to uneconomic nuclear power plants was solved. We had a 
process that when it was confronted with additional nukes it would have made 
the problem even worse than the late 1970's provided a forum where we could say 
these things don't make sense and we stopped them before the problem became a 
lot worse than it is today. 
Another way of saying it is if the Warren Alquist Act had been enacted in 1967, 
we might have avoided this problem altogether by having a way to discuss the 
issue of the economies of nuclear power before it was too late. High cost 
independent power contracts as a previous speaker showed, the cost of those 
declined rapidly over time just due to the nature of the contracts. Secondly, 
the high cost contracts came about in the early 1980's when we thought oil 
prices were going up. And yeah, we overpaid for them but we also created a 
renewables industry in California that we might not have done otherwise. In 
other words, these high costs produced and much bigger response than we thought 
and made possible a move and concept to the next phase which is instead of 
competing independent power against uneconomic coal and nuclear power plants as 
we did in the early '80's, let's compete them against each other and come up 
with a lowest cost and that's the direction that I think we want to be moving 
in and we're already moving in without any radical changes in the regulatory 
structure. Now if some of the Bluebook is nonradical changes I'll get into 
that in a little bit. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Is that your position that there shouldn't be any radical 
changes in the regulatory structure? 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Well, it depends on what you consider to be changes, 
Chairman Sher, because there's been a lot of evolutionary change over the past 
15 years in regulation which, I think, is taking us in the right direction. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Let's focus in on NRDC's position on trying to promote 
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competition on the generation side. Is that restructuring by bringing more 
competition in on the generation side? Do you have a position on whether 
that's a good thing? 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Yeah. Before I answer that, let me say that I think 
it's more important to promote competition between the supply side and the 
demand side because most of the uneconomic future choices, are choices that are 
currently being made that we could change are on the demand side. Retail 
wheeling creates competition that is limited to the supply side and thus, 
despite being called introducing more competition is actually restricting 
competition. 
Now, with regard to your question of competition on the supply side, we would 
like to see moves towards greater competition. We think that the process 
thatrs going on at the PUC can lead in that direction. At the moment we're not 
in the Poolco column, we're not in any particular column. We think that the 
pool concept might be a starting point for several of these discussions. But 
I'd like to put that in a context and that is if we buy 100% of our power on 
the stock market, we're leaving ourselves open to a lot of problems with 
respect to insurance against catastrophic events 1 high prices, resource 
diversity, a lot of environmental issues and so on. So what we envision is the 
need to have some competitive contracting mechanism for long-term power 
contracts by a utility to a wide source of possible suppliers for part of the 
power supply and then something like a pool, some kind of short-term 
competitive mechanism for acquiring a certain percentage of power, probably 
smaller, in the short run so that your setting up competition between different 
suppliers who will sign 30-year contracts on one hand, competition in terms of 
short-run efficiencies or short-lead time projects on the other hand. Does 
that answer your question? 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Sort of. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Thank you. On the consumption side, if you'll show the 
next slide, the Public Utilities Commission has been a leader in regulatory 
reforms over the last twelve years and particularly over the last five years to 
create a more competitive market among supply side and demand side by aligning 
societal benefit with private profit. In other words, if you're interested in 
utilities being part of a solution to reducing the states electricity costs, 
let's pay them for their success in reducing electricity costs. The more they 
save the more they get paid and that's basically what the collaborative tried 
to do on an experimental basis. This experiment was an immense success. 1.9 
million dollars in carefully measured analyzed net benefits to California 
consumers in two and a half years of running the program. This produces a more 
competitive business environment in California because by allowing business 
customers to be more energy efficient there are a number of case studies 
showing how they become more globally competitive where plants might have 
closed down or moved or actually expanded ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Dr. Goldstein, I understand that you are very supportive 
and have been very instrumental in NRDC and these energy efficiency programs 
and also DSM but I'm not sure that that is telling us what we need to know for 
how we relate to the PUC and what's the ongoing discussion and if you could 
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translate it into that it would be more helpful to me. You don't have to sell 
energy efficiency programs to me. You don't have to sell DSM to me but I guess 
what you do have to tell me is where is NRDC on this ongoing debate that is 
going to be decided in a very short period of time? 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Okay, we believe and the events since the Bluebook 
demonstrate in the real world in case there is any doubt in the theory that 
retail wheeling sets up competition in low rates rather than in energy services 
and causes utilities to cut back on their provision of DSM. We've seen PG&E 
and Edison propose or actually implement 40\ cutbacks in DSM programs for 1995 
which is a quarter of a billion dollars a year of net loss for every year that 
this continues going on. So we think one of two things would be constructive 
in solving this. Either to remove retail wheeling from the table of discussion 
until we can first come up with some mechanism, as Dan Kirshner was saying, to 
deal with the DSM problem or from our perspective simply to eliminate retail 
wheeling as an option from the discussion at all. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: See the problem I had and think I had it with Dan himself 
was, this is not my view, but some would say that's the tail wagging the dog. 
I mean, this debate didn't start about DSM. The debate started with the 
issuance of the Bluebook which said, "Bring competition, restructure the 
electric services industry." You're worried about what's going to happen to 
DSM but you're not going to prevent that other discussion and the movement 
towards some kind of a proposal on something retail wheeling or something else 
from happening and so what would be most helpful to me is to say, "If it's 
going to be this then you ought to do this" about DSM or, "If it's going to be 
that" or you can't protect DSM if you go that way so don't let them do that at 
all. That's the kind of thing that would be helpful to me in terms of knowing 
what your position is given the program that you're interested in. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: I believe that retail wheeling is an inappropriate 
solution regardless of the effect that it has on DSM, that it creates 
inequities and instabilities in the electricity system that are a bad thing 
even if we can protect DSM. I don't think that I will necessarily convince 
everyone else that that's right in enough time to prevent a quarter billion 
dollars a year in escalating of lawsuits from occurring so what I would like to 
see if we can do at the very least is to say a quarter billion is a lot bigger 
than any possible gains other than redistributing costs that are already sunk 
from one party to another which as we've seen from today's hearing is very 
controversial and there's no obvious way to do it. 
This isn't the tail wagging the dog, this is the dog, this is the biggest 
element of economic inefficiency that has ever been identified in the 
California system. Sometimes ... 
CHAIRMAN SHBR: I didn't mean it is terms of its effectiveness in terms of 
savings, I meant in terms of the dog that's out there, you know, and what issue 
is being looked at in that other forum. And you know, there is no way that 
we're going to stop them from looking at it. Are you saying that we should in 
the Legislature on an emergency basis in January try to adopt on a two thirds 
vote of each House a mandate on the Public Utilities Commission to stop selling 
DSM down the river? 
Page 94 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Well, there's a question of political feasibility that 
you ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, yeah, that's right, but at least I want to know what 
you're telling we ought to do and then I'll make the judgment about the 
political feasibility of doing it. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Well, a quarter of a billion is a lot of money emd lot 
of jobs and a lot of economic competitiveness. Is it worth losing it, that's a 
million dollars of business a day that we let go by with uncertainty. Is the 
loss worth it? What are we getting out of it? That's the question I would 
pose. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: But in the context of this debate, that would translate it 
into "stay away from retail wheeling." So that I take it ... I'm looking for 
the message from each witness on what it is we're talking about here. Not on 
some other subject. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Yeah, well I think that specific message "stay away from 
retail wheeling" makes a lot of sense for a variety of reasons that we can 
provide you with at great lengths. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Do you want to make one final comment before I call 
the next witness? 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: Yeah, I guess the final comment I would make, Mr. 
Chairman, is that NRDC along with San Diego Gas & Electric submitted a joint 
statement signed by about 40 participants to the Public Utilities Commission 
that addresses exactly the issue that I tried to bring up a second ago that at 
very least let's get going a discussion at the PUC to find out how the gains of 
DSM can be preserved regardless of what decisions are made on restructuring. 
So if there's any way the committee can encourage the Commission to take that 
process up, we heard what we find a reassuring level of consensus today on that 
one thing after all the things that are disagreed with that the intention even 
among proponents of so-called competition, is let's protect the gains that this 
state has in economic deficiency due to utilities ... through DSM. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, I apologize if I was short with you. I'm just 
trying to translate what the witnesses say into something that's usable for me 
as I try to carry out the assigned task of this committee. 
DAVID GOLDSTEIN: No, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I think it was 
very constructive. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you. All right, our next witness is Ray 
Sanborn and with him is Mr. Art Carter. 
ART CARTER: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sanborn could not be here so it takes two 
of us to take his place. I'm Art Carter, representing the Coalition of 
Utility Employees, and with me is Mark Joseph, with the law firm of Adams and 
Broadwell. The Coalition of Utility Employees comprises all of the investor-
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owned utilities and the municipal-owned and operated utilities with 
approximately 40,000 members. Already this Bluebook has cost us considerably 
in terms of employment. PG&E has probably laid off 1,500 people. We 
anticipate before this whole process is over we'll probably lose between three 
and four thousand jobs without knowing what the impact will be in the other 
utilities. Before introducing Mr. Joseph who has appeared at many of the 
hearings offering expert testimony and to give you our own prospective on what 
ought to be done, I want to emphasize our strong support for the Legislature to 
hold the PUC's feet to the fire in complying with ACR 143. After listening to 
the dialogue between you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Arth this morning, it would 
seen that the Bluebook has lost much of its color. There doesn't seem to be 
anybody who's now willing to take responsibility for it. Perhaps at the next 
hearing the PUC will tell us that it was a file clerk who developed the 
Bluebook. In any case let me turn at this point to Mr. Joseph who will speak 
to a couple of key points. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. 
MARK JOSEPH: The electric utility system which has grown up over the last 
hundred years in this state is one of the best and most reliable systems in the 
world. We should be very, very careful before we do irreparable damage to that 
system. When we make these changes and if we do make changes we have to be 
sure that they are really going to benefit all the people in California. We 
think that carefully thought out and carefully designed changes can be made 
which will benefit everyone. We believe that the Poolco concept and PBR could 
be ways of improving the system if they're done carefully and properly. 
However, with respect to direct access as PG&E proposes it, we think that 
ordinary residential and small business consumers would never be able to make 
the kind of special deals that a large consumer can make. There is no way that 
either you or I or anybody representing our neighborhoods can make a deal which 
will get us electricity and be competitive with a large industrial user which 
has a large steady load which doesn't fluctuate very much. We are inherently a 
less desirable customer no matter how clever we are and no matter how clever 
anyone representing us as a group is. We will always be less desirable. We 
can never compete. Direct access can never be equal access. In contrast with 
the Poolco concept where you have an independent dispatcher dispatching the 
generation resources has a lot to say for it. And I think there are really two 
important overriding features of a pool which are attributes. First, the 
generators would compete to sell their power based on their price. Cheaper 
generators, as you pointed out earlier, would sell to the pool before more 
expensive generators would. And the important factor here is really that these 
benefits would flow to all customers, not just to the people who can make 
deals. All customers get the benefit of this competition. We are in the 
Poolco column. 
Now with respect to PBR, PBR could work if it's properly designed and you asked 
several witnesses, "What are these benchmarks, what's really going on?" I'm 
going to take a small stab at answering your question and tell you what the 
important features are of PBR. 
Let's start out with the price cap. The price cap is determined and I'll use 
Edison as a example because that's the case that is currently going on where 
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there's really the most data. Edison would start with a base rate of revenues 
for the transmission and distribution part of the company which we set based on 
1995 general rate case revenues. That's the starting point. Each year after 
that it goes up by inflation but not quite full inflation. It goes down from 
that by a productivity factor. That's the total revenue. Everything else is 
left to Edison's discretion. Any amount they can spend less than that 
benchmark each year under Edison's proposal goes first lOOt to the 
shareholders. Then, if there are really large savings below that, they get 
split between the shareholders and the customers. That's the price side of 
PER. 
The other side of PER, which everyone recognizes as important, is the service 
side of PER. And this is the side which most concerns us. It's critical that 
strict service performance targets be established for the utilities because if 
these targets are not properly designed it will simply provide the utility with 
a strong economic incentive to take short-term profits at the expense of the 
reliability of the system. The company will get financial rewards for 
degrading the human and physical infrastructure of the company. So, in 
considering the appropriate approaches to utility reform ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Don't you say that starting point are the 19, what rates, 
what year? 
MARK JOSEPH: 1995 would be the starting point for Edison. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: The rates that are now permitted for transmission and 
distribution, is that what you said? 
MARK JOSEPH: Yes. The nongeneration side ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And there's no... Those rates don't assume a certain 
level of service? 
MARK JOSEPH: Those rates assume serving all of the customers the utility. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: As the utility sees fit or, you know, certain response 
time when your power is off? 
MARK JOSEPH: Because everyone recognizes that the utility will have a 
financial incentive to cut back on things like maintenance and repair, part of 
Edison's proposal and part of all the proposals so far has been to establish 
service quality standards which have to be maintained at the risk of a penalty 
if they're not maintained. And so that's the service half of PER. And we 
think that that's the half that people who are looking out for the interests of 
the customers have to be very careful to see that it gets implemented properly. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. But it's possible to do it but you shouldn't lose 
sight of it. That should be part of the deal. 
MARK JOSEPH: That's right. We think it's possible to do it. We have 
made specific proposals in the Edison case and those ... 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: And in their application they made their own proposals, is 
that right? 
MARK JOSEPH: They did. And we thought it ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: That's what I want to look at, you know, to see what they 
are and to see what the response is. 
MARK JOSEPH: We'll be happy to provide you as much or little detail on 
that as you want. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: No more than six pages. 
MARK JOSEPH: We'll do. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. All right. 
MARK JOSEPH: We think that California's high quality reliable electric 
service is an asset of this state. It's an asset to businesses and it's an 
asset to the consumers, and I would sort of pose a series of questions that 
anyone should consider before they jump too hard on the PBR band wagon. I 
would ask whether anyone really thinks the economy will be better off if a 
storm keeps businesses in the dark for half a day instead of half an hour. I 
would ask whether new businesses will really locate in California, if their 
computer systems periodically lose power for a few seconds because transformers 
are not replaced until they fail. And I would ask, is it worth deferring 
maintenance of the electrical system so consumers can save a nickel a month if 
they have to reset their VCR'S all the time. 
And what about the people who put the wires back up after a storm and who 
replace the transformers before they fail? Or answer the phone when you have a 
question about your bill? PG&E has already announced, as Art said, that 
thousands of people are going to lose their jobs. Is it really in the public 
interest for thousands more at PG&E and several thousand at the other utilities 
to lose their jobs just to save a few cents per month. I think several 
witnesses have said, "That's not where the money is. The money is in 
generation." And so we should be very careful with these PBR proposals that we 
don't really damage the system that we need to save, particularly to really 
achieve very small savings. That's all I have to say for you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, just so I'm clear, are you saying that PBR can have 
benefits if it's done right or are you saying you don't see where the savings 
can ever justify taking these risks about what the utilities will do in order 
to achieve the savings. 
MARK JOSEPH: I'm saying that PBR can save some money, though it's not 
going to be very much and it's not going to be anything ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Is it worth doing from your point-of-view? 
MARK JOSEPH: I think it's probably not worth doing but I think it's going 
to happen. 
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CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. I like that. That's clear so you always want to 
have a backup. It's shouldn't be done. It's not worth doing but if they do it 
then it ought to have certain things built into it. 
MARK JOSEPH: That's right. I think anybody who looks at the numbers will 
see that there isn't really very much ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: When we have our hearing on PBR I hope you'll come back 
and talk to us about that. Thank you very much for your testimony. It was 
very clear. Okay. We're nearing the end. We've got two more witnesses under 
item eight on the agenda, the Municipal Utility Perspectives. Welcome Gerry 
Jordan, who is the Executive Director of California Municipal Utilities 
Association and Jan Schori who is the General Manager of SMUD so Gerry, are you 
going to start? 
GERALD JORDAN: Thank you. And thanks for sticking around, you and 
Senator Leonard both. 
In our view, restructuring is fundamentally a Legislative policy issue and to 
the extent that you are going to have dramatic policy changes which go beyond 
letting markets evolve on a step-by-step basis, we think that decision ought to 
be made through legislative action and not through regulatory action. I think 
you've already identified that the most important aspects, I think, from a 
Leglslative standpoint and from the standpoint of policies adopted by local 
elected officials are how we're going to handle such things as externalities, 
fuel diversity and renewables, DSM and efficiency issues and social goals. And 
to be very clear, our message for you today is transmission first. We have 
tried with a lot of our utilities who don't own transmission for approximately 
the last hundred years to get wholesale transmission access. We don't have 
wholesale transmission access yet. We think we're very close. We spent the 
last four years negotiating a regional transmission group and are happy to 
report that two days ago FERC approved the first two regional transmission 
groups and the one that we're involved in, the Western Regional Transmission 
Association, which includes most of the major utilities in the western United 
States and the Western Area Power Administration and the Bonnieville 
Administration and we think that is probably the single most optimistic 
prospect for lowering rates for everybody in California. 
Everyone of the proposals that have been talked about today, whether they're 
either version of Poolco or retail wheeling are dependent on transmission 
access. It is simply naive to believe that if we can't perfect wholesale 
transmission access that there's going to be any possibility of perfecting 
either a transmission pool or a retail wheeling. Having said that I will say 
that we would rank the existing proposals of the proposals we think that the 
retail wheeling proposal has clearly the most problems related to it. There 
are technical issues we think that are not easily solved. In addition, there 
are significant jurisdictional issues. We do not believe that the PUC has the 
authority to order retail wheeling. We think that's pre-empted by the federal 
government and by FERC and going down that road we've created a number of 
jurisdictional problems. We think that the Poolco idea has a lot more 
potential. There are still a lot of unanswered questions particularly as to 
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how transmission and transmission pricing is going to be handled but it is a 
next better step. 
Of the current proposals The Western Regional Transmission Association we think 
is the most likely to succeed and we're not suggesting that efforts to evolve 
towards a pool cease but we should certainly deal with transmission access 
first while we're working on those other things. If it took us four years to 
negotiate Worda, it's going to take considerable time to negotiate a pool or a 
retail wheeling environment which takes care of all the things we've previously 
mentioned. 
As I said before, I think we'd like to emphasize that we believe there ought to 
be a step-by-step process here and it ought to be evolutionary, not regulatory 
in nature. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay. Thank you. 
JAN SCHORI: Last but not least. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Well, we've got a couple ... 
JAN SCHORI: You've got a few other people. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: On the end here. 
JAN SCHORI: My name is Jan Schori. I'm the General Manager of the 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District which I assume all of you know serves 
Sacramento. I imagine most of you, if not all of you, are customers of ours. 
I do have a written statement that I would like to have be made part of the 
record. Since we're sort of running out of time I'll keep it real short. I do 
have a few comments I wanted to make. 
First, I think SMUD has been hailed by some as a model utility of the future 
and one of my concerns in watching this entire restructuring debate is whether 
or not we're going to become a utility of the past. Unfortunately, it seems to 
me that some of the parties have lost sight of a very critical objective that 
SMUD has sought to pursue in all of its ratemaking decisions and that is a 
careful balancing of maintaining cost-effective rates with important public 
policy measures that we have made major commitments to, especially in 
Sacramento, a commitment to doing something about cleaning up the air. We're 
concerned that we're about to become a member of the Lonely Hearts Club when we 
look at what's happening to renewables and DSM programs. And we encourage this 
committee to take a strong stance to encourage not just the PUC but all of the 
parties that are coming before you to make a commitment to come up with some 
real solutions. What are we going to do to ensure that the state continues to 
maintain the steady progress that we've shown in promoting renewables. 
More than 30 people, 30 companies and entities signed a DSM joint statement 
that was submitted to the CPUC with a list of questions indicating that there 
are critical issues that have to be resolved to push forward with the gains 
that we've made in the energy efficiency front. At this point, that's where 
it's ended. That group has not yet met and I admit, SMUD is one of the members 
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and we need to get on the dime. We need to come up with some concrete 
solution. 
I wanted to respond to the advantage of being last, obviously, as I can respond 
to a few of the comments that were made by people ahead of me. First, I wanted 
to comment briefly on Assemblyman Baca's questions about PBR and its 
applicability to municipals. It's really a meaningless concept from 
municipalities because obviously our rates are basically cost based. We don't 
have any stockholders. We only have ratepayers. The ratepayers are the 
customers, they're the owners. There is no conflict of interest and the bottom 
line is when we make a decision, if it's a good one the ratepayers benefit, if 
it stinks, they have to pay for it. And unfortunately at SMUD, we have 
examples of both and we're dealing with them in our rates right now. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: And they vote the rascals out, right? 
JAN SCHORI: Yes. Well, they voted something else out of our rate base. 
Into the rate base but out of service, I guess would be an accurate way of 
putting it. We're very concerned about the direct access proposal because when 
you look at it from a municipal perspective it really does look to us like it 
is simply a mechanism for cost shifting and bypass, so at this point we are not 
aligned with that column. We are not at this point endorsing the Poolco 
concept either, primarily because there are so many questions that remain 
unanswered and we want to be sure that our customers will end up to be better 
off if we engage in this kind of a proposal. We do, however, strongly support 
the idea that we have to do something about solving transmission. We think 
maybe a transmission pool is the first idea we should look at. 
And last, I wanted to comment briefly on the CERT proposal. SMUD has not yet 
met with CERT to work through the proposal and it's applicability to SMU~ but I 
think there's some fundamental issues that need to be understood. Generally 
speaking, that proposal is going to work for utilities that own a lot of old 
transmissions that can be written up to market value. If you look at most 
municipalities, if they own any transmission at all, it's pretty darn new and 
it's pretty close to market value right now. Witness the California-Oregon 
Transmission Project. When you have a utility like SMUD that has a huge 
stranded investment problem in dealing with Rancho Seco, it's very clear to me, 
at least with the level of analysis we've done to date, that proposal is a 
loser for us. We may be the biggest losers, but it's not clear to me how any 
transmission dependent utility really is going to come out better off. 
Their customers come out better off under that proposal. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. Thank you for your testimony to both of you. 
All right. We have two other persons who have signed our list. I invite them 
to come forward now. Glynnis Jones, Appliance Recycling Centers of America, 
who's given us a video that we promise we'll read if you keep your remarks very 
short. Not read, but view, I should say. 
GLYNNIS JONES: I will be very brief. Thank you for giving me an 
opportunity to let you know how, for a private company such as ARCA, providing 
DSM services to an electric utility, how frightening the Bluebook proposal 
process has been. We got into this very late in the game and discovered how 
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complex and how many barriers there are to understanding all of the procedures 
and the bureaucracy that's involved in this. But what we do have is 70 
employees in the city of Compton working in our facility that started out as a 
win, win, win proposition a year ago and now looks like a lose, lose, lose come 
the first of the year. We've been told that it's likely that the funding will 
end for the program at the end of this year. This is something that we took a 
look at what the risks were involved in working with electric utilities and 
decided that given the state's position in support of DSM and environmental 
issues that it was a good risk for us to take. we have since re-evaluated 
that. However, we think that perhaps if the Public Utilities Commission 
receives its funding through the Legislature, perhaps one way to make it all 
more realistic to them is to start discussing their funding for 1995. Maybe 
this will bring a little more sanity to this discussion and bring people to the 
table looking at real solutions, not theoretical situations and we have 
peoples' jobs on the line so I ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Maybe you'll become a stranded cost and you'll be bought 
out. 
GLYNNIS JONES: Well, that's what I have is a stranded investment in 
Compton. The building was for sale for three and a half years before we 
invested in it. We've made a five million dollar investment and we have no 
other customers that currently today can replace the electric utility 
business ... 
CHAIRMAN SHER: So you heard all these witnesses today say they wanted to 
share in paying for these stranded investments so it looks good for you. 
GLYNNIS JONES: What's good for the goose is good for the gander, okay? 
So thank you very much for listening to us and we hope that we'll be able to be 
a participant in the future in the discussions of the DSM and the electric 
utility industry in California. We hope that things will happen that will 
allow us to stay in place. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. 
GLYNNIS JONES: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Final witness, Carolyn Kehrein, is that how you pronounce 
that? I'm sure I botched that. I can pronounce your employers name though, 
Proctor and Gamble. 
CAROLYN KEHREIN: It's Kehrein. I'm Carolyn Kehrein. I'm with Proctor 
and Gamble. Proctor and Gamble is both an industrial customer and a 
cogenerator. Cogeneration has allowed business to be more viable in this 
state. There's been lots of talk today about the minority of QF contracts -
the interim standard offer 4. I wanted to provide some data on the majority of 
the QF contracts. The majority of the QF contracts currently are making 
between less than three cents and five cents. This is for very reliable fuel 
efficient power generated ... near load centers. Bob Foster earlier today said 
that there was a problem, going to be a problem even after the fixed price 
problems disappeared. I don't think that less than three to five cents is a 
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problem. For instance, facilities that operate under Pacific Gas and Electric 
SOl right now would be making an annual average of about three cents this year. 
I'm not saying that that three cents is reasonable but that's what they're 
getting paid. so the last point that I'd like to make is that this last decade 
has been very hard on business. Stock prices have been impacted, there's been 
downsizing, i.e. layoffs, job loss, and this has occurred at a lot of different 
companies that you've heard of. For industry to survive all of our suppliers, 
including our utilities, need to go through some of the leanness that industry 
has gone through. They need to become as lean and effective as we've had to 
become if we're going to survive the whole chain, it has to be lean and 
effective. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: You mean you like retail wheeling as a consumer and that 
you can be competitive to supply as a generator? 
CAROLYN KEHREIN: Personally, I am in support of direct access, yes. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Thank you. Personally and for Proctor and Gamble? 
CAROLYN KEHREIN: From what I know I think Proctor and Gamble is in 
support of direct access. 
CHAIRMAN SHER: Okay, thank you. I think we've reached the end of our 
witness list. I want to thank you all for attending and staying to the bitter 
end as Senator Leonard and I did. I've learned a lot. You'll be hearing more 
from us but that concludes our business for today. Thank you. 
######## 
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